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Wednesday, March 12, 2025

Risepoint: The Rise and Fall of Another OPM?

In recent years, the online education sector has seen dramatic growth, largely fueled by partnerships between universities and Online Program Managers (OPMs) like Risepoint (formerly known as Academic Partnerships). These companies promised to help institutions expand their online offerings, providing technical support, marketing services, and student recruitment in exchange for a significant share of tuition revenue. However, as OPMs grew in power, their business models came under intense scrutiny for potentially exploitative and predatory practices.

The Rise of Risepoint

Risepoint, initially founded as Academic Partnerships (AP) in 2007 by Randy Best, became a leading player in the OPM space, helping universities launch and manage online degree programs. In return, Risepoint took a significant cut of the tuition fees, sometimes as much as 50%. The company’s model relied heavily on tuition-share agreements, which have long been controversial due to the significant financial burden they place on both institutions and students.

These arrangements became more contentious as the cost of higher education continued to rise, particularly in the case of online degrees. Critics argue that the large sums taken by OPMs like Risepoint divert essential funds from universities, leading to higher tuition fees and contributing to the growing student debt crisis. This concern has been amplified by the rise in aggressive recruitment tactics employed by OPMs, which often target low-income students with promises of easy access to higher education without fully disclosing the financial implications.

Randy Best's Ties to Republicans: A Controversial Network

Randy Best, the founder of Academic Partnerships, had close connections to prominent Republicans, including Jeb Bush, the former governor of Florida. Best has been a well-known advocate for education reform and has built a network of relationships within both political parties. His close ties to Bush, a key figure in education policy, have been part of a broader pattern of OPM companies gaining influence across the political spectrum.

This bipartisan network of political connections allowed Best and Academic Partnerships to navigate the political landscape and expand their reach in the higher education sector. However, critics argue that such ties may have contributed to a lack of accountability for OPM companies like AP/Risepoint, who have operated with little oversight while profiting off of public institutions.

Risepoint's Ownership: The Vistria Group and Its Ties to the Obama Administration

A key piece of Risepoint’s corporate structure lies in its ownership by Vistria Group, a Chicago-based venture capital firm with close ties to political and corporate elites, including former President Barack Obama. In 2019, Vistria Group acquired Academic Partnerships for its Vistria II fund, adding the company to a broader portfolio that includes a number of for-profit education assets such as Edmentum, Vanta Education, FullBloom Education, MSI Information Services, Apollo Education Group, and Unitek Learning.

Vistria’s co-founder, Marty Nesbitt, is a close friend of Barack Obama, and the firm has been associated with several high-profile political figures. Nesbitt himself is known to have worked closely with Obama on various initiatives, and his connections have helped Vistria expand its reach in the education sector. The firm’s investment in Risepoint underscores a broader trend of venture capital firms seeking profit from higher education, leading to concerns about the growing corporate influence on public institutions and their students.

The Controversy at the University of Texas-Arlington

The close connections between OPMs and university leaders have not been without scandal. In 2020, Vistasp Karbhari, the president of the University of Texas-Arlington, resigned following a controversy involving his relationship with Academic Partnerships. Karbhari had accepted two international trips paid for by the company, sparking an investigation into potential conflicts of interest. The university had paid Academic Partnerships more than $178 million over a five-year period for managing its online degree programs.

This situation drew public attention to the potential for improper financial relationships between university administrators and private OPM companies. The high cost of these partnerships, particularly the large amounts paid to OPMs like Academic Partnerships, raised questions about whether universities were prioritizing student outcomes or simply enriching private firms at the expense of public funds.

Minnesota Leads the Way: A State Takes Action

The controversy surrounding tuition-share deals reached a boiling point in 2024 when Minnesota became the first state to pass legislation restricting these agreements. St. Cloud State University in Minnesota had signed a tuition-share deal with Risepoint that resulted in the company receiving a substantial percentage of tuition revenue. Critics of the arrangement argued that the deal drained valuable resources from public universities, while enriching private companies at the expense of students.

In response to mounting pressure, Minnesota lawmakers passed a bill banning new tuition-share agreements with OPMs, signaling a shift toward greater oversight of these partnerships. The move was hailed by critics as a much-needed reform to protect public institutions and students from exploitative business models.

Senate Concerns and Growing Backlash

In addition to state-level efforts, U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, and Tina Smith raised concerns over OPM practices in a 2024 letter to eight major OPM companies, including Risepoint. The senators questioned whether the recruitment tactics and revenue-sharing models contributed to rising student debt and whether these companies were sufficiently transparent about how tuition funds were being used.

“We continue to have concerns about the impact of OPM partnerships on rising student debt loads,” the senators wrote. They specifically targeted the high percentage of tuition revenue taken by OPMs, arguing that this model created financial disincentives for universities to lower costs or improve educational outcomes for students.

In response, Risepoint and other OPM companies indicated a willingness to engage with policymakers, but the growing scrutiny of their business practices indicates that their influence in the higher education space may be waning.

Academic Partnerships Acquires Wiley’s Online Business

In an interesting turn of events, AP/Risepoint expanded its reach in November 2023 by acquiring Wiley’s online business for $150 million. This acquisition is part of a broader trend of consolidation in the OPM sector, as companies seek to maintain their competitive edge in an increasingly saturated market.

The deal underscores Risepoint’s ambition to broaden its portfolio of online education services, even as its business practices face growing criticism. While Risepoint sees this acquisition as a growth opportunity, others view it as a sign of the consolidation of power within the OPM sector—a market that has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of transparency and for its role in inflating costs for both universities and students.

New Department of Education Guidelines

As the federal government joined the conversation, the U.S. Department of Education took steps to regulate the OPM industry more closely. In January 2025, the department issued new guidance that could lead to penalties for colleges that allow their OPM partners to mislead students. The guidance prohibits OPM employees from using college email addresses or signatures that imply they are employed by the institution, as well as from misrepresenting the quality of online programs.

The Department of Education’s actions came in response to long-standing concerns about misleading marketing practices. Student advocacy groups have called for stronger oversight of OPMs, which often promise students high-quality education without fully disclosing the financial ramifications. “OPMs commonly mislead students about the quality of their online programs, and that is illegal,” said Carolyn Fast, director of higher education policy at The Century Foundation.

The Decline of OPM Growth

However, the OPM industry is showing signs of slowing down. A report by Validated Insights in October 2024 revealed that OPM growth has dramatically slowed, with 147 partnerships ending in 2023—the highest number of contract terminations since 2020. Additionally, new contracts for 2024 have dropped by more than 50%. This slowdown signals that many universities are reevaluating their reliance on OPMs like Risepoint, opting instead to bring online programs in-house or partner with alternative providers.

The reduction in OPM partnerships reflects broader trends in higher education, where increasing scrutiny over business models, rising student debt, and calls for greater accountability are reshaping the landscape. Universities are under increasing pressure to justify the cost and efficacy of online degree programs, and many are finding that the financial burden of partnering with OPMs may no longer be sustainable.

The Future of Risepoint and the OPM Industry

The scrutiny surrounding Risepoint and other OPMs is part of a larger conversation about the future of online education and the need for greater transparency in how these programs are marketed and funded. As states like Minnesota lead the charge to limit tuition-share agreements, and as federal agencies take a more active role in regulating the industry, the days of unchecked growth for OPMs may be numbered.

Risepoint, once a leader in the OPM space, now faces a rapidly changing regulatory environment that threatens its business model. While the company continues to acquire new assets like Wiley’s online business, the industry as a whole may be entering a period of retrenchment, with universities becoming more cautious about entering into partnerships with companies that take a large cut of tuition revenue.

As the OPM industry faces increasing scrutiny and regulatory challenges, the future of companies like Risepoint remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the once-booming market for online program management is shifting, and the predatory practices that have long been associated with OPMs are being closely examined. Whether Risepoint can adapt to these changes or whether the OPM model as a whole will undergo significant reform remains to be seen.

Saturday, November 15, 2025

Entangled Frontiers: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the UAE, South Sudan, and the Israel-Palestine Arena — Implications for Higher Education, Censorship, and Global Governance

The global higher education landscape is increasingly shaped by conflicts, diplomacy, and shifting regional alliances. The relationships among Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), South Sudan, and the Israel-Palestine conflict highlight the interconnections between geopolitics, humanitarian crises, and the responsibilities of universities as institutions of knowledge, ethics, and justice. These contexts influence not only student mobility and research collaboration but also institutional priorities, funding flows, and academic freedom. Understanding the intersection of geopolitics and higher education is essential for institutions seeking to engage globally with integrity, equity, and impact.

For scholars and administrators, these regions exemplify the challenge of balancing opportunity and risk. Research and student engagement opportunities abound in humanitarian crises, fragile states, and post-conflict zones, yet these are embedded in complex political and ethical landscapes. Additionally, the growing pressures on American universities to navigate internal censorship, legislative constraints, and donor-influenced agendas have profound implications for their global credibility and ability to engage abroad. This article explores each of these regions in depth, examines the cross-cutting implications for higher education, and discusses the domestic pressures in U.S. higher education that shape international engagement.


Saudi Arabia and Yemen

The war in Yemen has devastated the nation, creating one of the most severe humanitarian crises in recent history. Civilian infrastructure has been destroyed, millions of people have been displaced, and famine and disease threaten vast swathes of the population. Saudi Arabia, as the leading actor in the coalition intervening in Yemen, has faced both international criticism and pressure to negotiate. Recent diplomatic initiatives have suggested that Riyadh may be seeking to recalibrate its involvement, including attempts to engage Houthi representatives in peace talks. For higher education institutions, these shifts have important implications for student mobility, research opportunities, and refugee education programs. Yemen's crisis represents not only a humanitarian emergency but also a research frontier in global health, humanitarian logistics, and post-conflict educational reconstruction.

Saudi Arabia’s position on Israel adds another layer of complexity for global academic partnerships. The Kingdom continues to insist that it will not normalize relations with Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state. This position affects regional alliances, funding priorities, and the willingness of other states to engage in collaborative academic initiatives. For universities, this reality translates into both opportunities and constraints. Scholarship programs, research funding, and institutional partnerships linked to Saudi Arabia may be influenced by the Kingdom’s foreign policy priorities. Institutions engaging with Yemen must navigate a humanitarian context that is deeply intertwined with the diplomatic posturing of a regional superpower.


The United Arab Emirates

The UAE has emerged as a significant regional actor, leveraging economic strength to expand its influence across Africa, the Red Sea corridor, and the Middle East. Its normalisation with Israel through the Abraham Accords marked a historic diplomatic shift in Arab-Israeli relations, yet the UAE has simultaneously articulated clear objections to unilateral Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. In Africa, the UAE has deepened ties with South Sudan and other fragile states through financial agreements, including banking cooperation and long-term oil-backed loans. These interventions exemplify how foreign investment, diplomacy, and regional security concerns intersect in ways that directly affect higher education.

For universities, the UAE represents both opportunity and caution. Institutions can engage with new funding streams, branch campuses, and international partnerships facilitated by Gulf state investment. At the same time, ethical considerations are paramount. Funding sources tied to conflict zones, extractive economic deals, or contested geopolitical agendas require careful institutional scrutiny. Universities must develop frameworks that incorporate conflict sensitivity, ethical risk assessment, and transparency. The UAE’s dual role as a facilitator of academic mobility and a participant in contested geopolitical spaces underscores the complexity of engagement in regions influenced by external power.


South Sudan

South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation, has struggled to stabilize since its independence in 2011. Recurring conflict, economic dependence on oil, and weak governance structures have hindered the development of higher education infrastructure. Agreements with the UAE, including long-term oil-backed loans and financial cooperation, highlight the influence of foreign investment on the state’s trajectory and, by extension, its educational system.

For higher education, South Sudan presents both a critical research site and an urgent development need. Universities can contribute to capacity-building, curriculum development, and scholarship programs for displaced or return diaspora students. Research in post-conflict governance, peace studies, and resource management can inform broader academic understanding of fragile states. Yet these opportunities come with ethical and practical complexities. Partnerships with South Sudanese institutions must navigate the implications of resource-linked foreign investment, the risk of perpetuating inequality, and the fragility of governance structures. Universities engaging in South Sudan must balance their commitment to education with a nuanced understanding of political and economic realities.


Israel and Palestine

The Israel-Palestine conflict continues to shape the global higher education discourse, affecting student mobility, refugee education, research collaborations, and institutional partnerships. Saudi Arabia’s insistence that normalization with Israel is contingent upon Palestinian statehood and East Jerusalem as its capital remains a critical point of leverage in regional diplomacy. The UAE, despite having normalized with Israel, continues to assert that Israeli annexation of the West Bank represents a “red line” that could destabilize the region.

For universities, this context presents both opportunities and ethical challenges. Engaging with Palestinian students, hosting refugee scholars, and conducting research on human rights and humanitarian crises are vital areas of academic intervention. At the same time, institutions must navigate funding sources, regional political sensitivities, and reputational risks. Academic freedom in research on Israel and Palestine is often contested, both abroad and domestically in the United States, where political and donor pressures shape what research is feasible, safe, or fundable.


Censorship and Academic Freedom in U.S. Higher Education

Recent developments in American higher education highlight the fragility of academic freedom, which directly affects international engagement. Surveys indicate that over one-third of U.S. faculty perceive a decline in academic freedom, and approximately 70% report self-censorship on topics such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. Legislation in several states, framed under terms like “viewpoint diversity” or “campus neutrality,” imposes constraints on curriculum, speech, faculty tenure, and university governance. These pressures are compounded by donor influence, administrative oversight, and the politicization of higher education.

Censorship and self-censorship are not abstract concerns; they have tangible impacts on research agendas, global partnerships, and the capacity of universities to host refugee or international scholars. Institutions with programs in global health, humanitarian response, Middle East studies, or post-conflict development must contend with domestic pressures that may limit the scope of inquiry or public engagement. The erosion of academic freedom in the United States thus has a direct effect on the credibility and effectiveness of universities abroad, as it mirrors, in some respects, the constraints faced by institutions in fragile or authoritarian states.


Cross-Cutting Themes

Several themes cut across these regional and domestic contexts. First, conflict and displacement in Yemen, South Sudan, and Palestine create urgent educational needs for refugees and internally displaced scholars. Universities must develop programs that provide access, mentorship, and flexible pathways to education. Second, foreign investment and resource-linked funding—from the UAE in South Sudan to Saudi-backed initiatives in Yemen—underscore the ethical complexities of international partnerships. Transparency, due diligence, and conflict-sensitive frameworks are essential. Third, diplomatic realignments, including the Abraham Accords and evolving Saudi-Israel relations, create new corridors for collaboration but also introduce geopolitical risk. Fourth, domestic censorship and political pressures in the U.S. affect research capacity, ethical engagement, and the freedom to examine contentious topics, directly influencing global credibility.

Finally, structural inequality and systemic injustice are central concerns. Funding flows, research agendas, and student access are all mediated by power structures that can perpetuate inequities. Universities must be conscious of whose voices are amplified, whose perspectives are sidelined, and how partnerships with conflict-affected states influence the production of knowledge. Ethical global engagement requires institutions to address these imbalances proactively.


References & Sources

  1. PEN America, “New Report Unveils Alarming Tactics in Censorship of Higher Education,” pen.org

  2. Times of India, “Is Academic Freedom on the Decline? 35% of US College Professors Say Yes,” timesofindia.indiatimes.com

  3. Times of Israel, “Faculty Survey Reveals Fear, Self-Censorship at US Universities,” timesofisrael.com

  4. Associated Press, “Under Threat from Trump, Columbia University Agrees to Policy Changes,” apnews.com

  5. The Guardian, “US Universities’ Faculty Unite to Defend Academic Freedom After Trump’s Attacks,” theguardian.com

  6. Le Monde, “UC Berkeley, the US Capital of Free Speech, Stands Firm Against Trump,” lemonde.fr

Monday, July 11, 2022

Colleges Are Outsourcing Their Teaching Mission to For-Profit Companies. Is That A Good Thing? (Richard Fossey*)

[This article is part of the Transparency-Accountability-Value series.]

Years ago, colleges employed people to perform auxiliary services. University employees staffed the campus bookstore, ran the student union, and performed janitorial services.

Over time, however, universities began outsourcing almost all of their auxiliary services. Barnes & Noble now runs hundreds of college bookstores. National fast-food chains operate stores in countless student unions.

Recently, however, American colleges have gone beyond outsourcing their non-instructional activities. Now, the universities are outsourcing their core mission: teaching students.

According to the Government Accountability Office (as reported in the Wall Street Journal), 550 colleges and universities are partnering with for-profit companies to design courses, recruit students, and manage instruction.

Academic Partnerships, one of the leading for-profit outfits, contracts with universities all over the United States to manage graduate programs--for a hefty fee, of course. Higher Education Inquirer estimates that AP collects about half the revenue from the courses and programs they manage.

2U, another for-profit online instruction provider, has a contract for services with the University of Oregon and gets 80 percent of the tuition for 2U-managed courses. That's a good deal for 2U's stockholders.

What the hell is going on?

As the Wall Street Journal explained, colleges are losing revenue due to declining enrollments. They aren't raising enough money to pay all their administrators and bureaucrats. Thus, hundreds of schools are investing heavily in online academic programs--especially graduate programs--to juice their revenues.

Respected public universities like the University of North Carolina and the University of Oregon have turned to for-profit companies to design or revamp various graduate programs, recruit students, and oversee instruction.

Why don't the professors do those things?

I don't know. Perhaps the faculty don't have the skills necessary to recruit students, manage enrollment, or design academic programs for an online format. Or maybe doing these things is just too fuckin' hard.

I have a professor friend whose dean ordered him to design and teach an online course for a master's degree program managed by Academic Partnerships. He was told the class would be conducted online over five weeks.

My friend was a good soldier and taught the course as directed. He had over 600 online students! When the class was completed, my friend told the dean he would never teach an online course that way again, even if it meant being fired.

As the Wall Street Journal pointed out, students are often unaware that they are taking a course managed by a profit-driven company, not the university.

For example, the University of Texas at Arlington has a big-time financial relationship with Academic Partnerships, which manages graduate programs in nursing, education, business, and public health. Nevertheless, UTA's promotional materials do not disclose that Academic Partnerships manages these online graduate programs.

Students all over the United States are taking out loans to pay tuition bills at public universities in the naive belief that these schools are non-profit entities dedicated solely to the public good.

Most of these students would be surprised to learn that a profit-making company is sucking up a good share of their tuition dollars to enrich their executives and investors.

My take on this? If a public university is so goddamn lazy or incompetent that it has to pay a private company to manage its academic programs, then that university should be closed. 

My Photo

Richard Fossey


*This article originally appeared in Richard Fossey's Condemned to Debt Blog. The blog's URL is https://www.condemnedtodebt.org/

 

 

Saturday, June 25, 2022

HEI Investigation: Academic Partnerships

In 2022, Online Program Managers (OPMs) are being scrutinized like their predecessors, for-profit colleges, in the early 2000s.  2U, one of the leaders in the industry, has been particularly singled out as a predatory company, working with elite schools like the University of Southern California, and selling their overpriced master's degrees.  

Before that, Kaplan Higher Education and Kaplan Higher Education gained attention for selling off their for-profit schools but maintaining the management services for Purdue University Global and University of Arizona Global.  

In this media attention on OPMs, a few companies have been able to avoid much scrutiny, with Academic Partnerships flying below the national media radar for years.  

Academic Partnerships (AP) is a mature online program manager that claims to serve more than 50 universities, most regional state universities.  The Higher Education Inquirer could only find about half that number. AP also claims to "help universities grow"--without providing much evidence.  In some cases, these lesser brand schools have been facing decreasing enrollment and revenues-- and it's not apparent how much AP can help them in the long run.  

What we do know is that the OPM receives about half of all the revenues for their work, which includes cheaper privatized marketing, advertising--and recruitment services from enrollment specialists spread across the US. 

AP's sales pitch is that they can transform their partner universities and help provide reasonably priced degrees in lucrative career fields (such as RN to BSN programs), but is this happening with all the online degree programs offered? And would some consumers be better off choosing a local community college? 


AP's partner universities include: 

Arkansas State University
Avila University
Boise State University
Carleton University
Eastern Michigan University
Eastern Washington University
Emporia State University
Florida International University
Louisiana State University Shreveport
Norfolk State University
Northern Kentucky University
Pittsburg State University
Radford University
St. Cloud State University
Southern Illinois University
Southern Oregon University
Southeastern Oklahoma State University
Texas A&M (International University)
University of Illinois Springfield
University of Maine at Presque Isle
University of North Carolina Pembroke
University of Texas at Arlington
University of West Florida
William Paterson University
Youngstown State University

If you teach or study online at one of these AP university partners, what have you observed?  

  • Do instructors maintain the rights to the content they have created?  
  • What are the online classes like compared to face-to-face courses?  
  • What are graduation rates for these online students compared to on campus students?
  • How much debt do former online students have compared to on campus students?  
  • What kind of jobs are former online students getting compared to on campus students? 
  • Are former online students able to pay off these debts?  

 

Related link: "The Private Side of Public Universities: Third-party providers and platform capitalism"

Related link: HEI Investigation: EducationDynamics

Related link: 2U Virus Expands College Meltdown to Elite Universities

Related link: Purdue University and Its Subprime College Cousin Committing Fraud 

Related link: Online Program Manager for University of Arizona Global Campus Facing Financial Collapse 

 

 

Tuesday, November 25, 2025

Higher Education and Its Complicity in U.S. Empire

For more than a century, U.S. higher education has been intertwined with American empire. Universities have served as ideological partners, intelligence hubs, policy workshops, and training grounds for the managers of U.S. global power. When Washington supports authoritarian allies, fuels regional conflicts, or looks away during humanitarian disasters, the academy rarely stands apart. Instead, it aligns itself—through silence, research partnerships, and selective outrage—with the priorities of the federal government and the corporations that profit from U.S. foreign policy.

Recent U.S. actions in Venezuela, Ukraine, Yemen, South Sudan, and Palestine reveal how deeply embedded this pattern has become.

In Venezuela, the United States pursued years of sanctions, covert pressure, and diplomatic isolation as part of a regime-change strategy. Throughout this period, universities repeated a narrow range of policy narratives promoted by the State Department and U.S.-aligned think tanks. Panels and conferences elevated experts connected to defense contractors, oil interests, and government-funded NGOs, while the humanitarian consequences of sanctions and the legality of U.S. interference were often ignored. The atmosphere of academic neutrality masked a clear alignment with Washington’s objectives.

Universities also showed a troubling degree of complicity during Russia’s assault on Ukraine, a war marked by the systematic killing of civilians, mass displacement, and the kidnapping and forced transfer of Ukrainian children into Russia. Even after international human rights organizations and war-crimes investigators documented atrocities, some U.S. institutions maintained partnerships with Russian universities aligned with the Kremlin, accepted visiting scholars linked to state propaganda outlets, or avoided direct condemnation of Putin’s actions for fear of disrupting scientific or financial relationships. In certain cases, academic centers framed the invasion as a “complex geopolitical dispute” rather than a brutal, unilateral attack on a sovereign population, allowing Russian narratives about NATO, Western “provocation,” or Ukrainian illegitimacy to seep into public programming. While some campuses cut ties, others hesitated, revealing how financial incentives, research networks, and institutional caution can blunt moral clarity even in the face of internationally verified crimes against civilians and children.

Higher education’s relationship with the Gulf states adds another dimension to this complicity. As Saudi Arabia waged a catastrophic war in Yemen—with U.S. weapons, logistical support, and diplomatic protection—American universities deepened their financial partnerships with Saudi and Emirati institutions. Engineering programs, medical schools, cybersecurity labs, and energy research centers accepted major gifts and expanded joint research agreements. Few leaders questioned these ties, even as human rights groups documented atrocities in Yemen or as the UAE’s role in proxy conflicts, including episodes in South Sudan, came into sharper focus. Protecting revenue streams took precedence over confronting abuses committed by powerful allies.

Nowhere is the failure of higher education more visible than in its response to Israel’s assault on Gaza. As civilian deaths soared and international human rights organizations sounded alarms about the scale and intent of the military campaign, most universities responded with repression rather than reflection. Administrators disciplined student protesters, sanctioned faculty for political speech, and issued public statements carefully aligned with prevailing U.S. political positions. Research partnerships with Israeli institutions linked to defense industries persisted without scrutiny. Universities that once examined apartheid with clarity struggled to acknowledge parallels when the subject was Palestine. Donor sensitivities, political pressures, and fear of congressional retaliation overwhelmed any commitment to moral consistency or academic freedom.

The same institutional behavior is likely if U.S. policy shifts in East Asia. Should Washington move toward accommodating the People’s Republic of China’s ambitions regarding Taiwan—whether through diplomatic recalibration or reduced willingness to intervene—universities will likely adapt quickly. The history of U.S.-China normalization in the 1970s showed how fast higher education can reorient itself when geopolitical winds change. Partnerships, narratives, and research agendas would shift to align with new federal signals, demonstrating again that universities follow the imperatives of state power more readily than they challenge them.

The deeper issue is structural. U.S. higher education relies on federal research funding, defense and intelligence partnerships, corporate relationships, overseas investment programs, and philanthropic networks shaped by geopolitical interests. Endowments are tied to global markets that profit from conflict. Study-abroad and academic exchange programs depend on diplomatic priorities. Administrators understand that openly challenging U.S. foreign policy—from Venezuela to Ukraine, from Yemen to Gaza—can threaten institutional stability and funding. Silence or selective engagement becomes the safest administrative posture.

If the academy hopes to reclaim its integrity, it must learn to confront rather than replicate state power. That requires transparency about foreign funding and defense contracts, protection for dissenting scholars and students, genuine engagement with global South perspectives, and ethical evaluation of partnerships with authoritarian governments. Universities cannot prevent wars, but they can refuse to serve as intellectual and financial enablers of violence.

Until such changes occur, higher education will remain entangled in the machinery of U.S. empire, complicit not through passivity but through the routine normalization of policies that inflict suffering around the world.
 
Sources

Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; U.S. Congressional Research Service; Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Brown University’s Costs of War Project; Washington Post and New York Times reporting on U.S. sanctions and foreign policy; Investigations by the Associated Press, Reuters, and Al Jazeera on Yemen, Gaza, Venezuela, and South Sudan; HEI archives and independent higher education researchers.

Wednesday, June 11, 2025

What do the University of Phoenix and Risepoint have in common? The answer is a compelling story of greed and politics.

In the increasingly commodified world of higher education, the University of Phoenix and Risepoint (formerly Academic Partnerships) represent parallel tales of how private equity, political influence, and deceptive practices have shaped the online college landscape. While their paths have diverged in branding and institutional affiliation, the underlying motives and outcomes share disturbing similarities.


The University of Phoenix: A Legacy of Legal and Ethical Trouble

The University of Phoenix (UOP) has been a central player in the for-profit college boom, particularly during and after the 2000s. Under the ownership of Apollo Education Group, and later the Vistria Group, UOP has faced a relentless stream of lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny, and public outrage.

In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reached a $191 million settlement with UOP over allegations of deceptive advertising. UOP falsely claimed partnerships with major corporations like Microsoft, AT&T, and Twitter to entice students. The result was $50 million in restitution and $141 million in student debt relief.

But the legal troubles didn’t stop there. In 2022 and 2023, the U.S. Department of Education included UOP in a broader class action that granted $37 million in borrower defense discharges. These claims stemmed from deceptive marketing and predatory recruitment practices.

Meanwhile, in 2024, the California Attorney General settled with UOP for $4.5 million over allegations of illegally targeting military service members between 2012 and 2015. The university’s controversial relationship with the military community also led to a temporary VA suspension of GI Bill enrollments in 2020.

The legal history includes False Claims Act suits brought by whistleblowers, including former employees alleging falsified records, incentive-based recruiter pay, and exaggerated graduation and job placement statistics. In 2019, Apollo Education settled a securities fraud lawsuit for $7.4 million.

More recently, UOP has been embroiled in political controversy in Idaho. In 2023 and 2024, the Idaho Attorney General challenged the state's attempt to acquire UOP, citing Open Meetings Act violations and lack of transparency. Though a federal judge initially dismissed the suit, Idaho’s Supreme Court allowed an appeal to proceed.

Through all of this, Vistria Group—UOP’s private equity owner since 2017—has reaped massive profits. Vistria was co-founded by Marty Nesbitt, a close confidant of Barack Obama, underscoring the bipartisan political protection that shields for-profit education from lasting accountability.


Risepoint and the Online Program Management Model

Risepoint, formerly Academic Partnerships (AP), tells a similarly troubling story, albeit from the Online Program Manager (OPM) side of the education-industrial complex. Founded in 2007 by Randy Best, a well-connected Republican donor with ties to Jeb Bush, AP helped universities build online degree programs in exchange for a significant cut of tuition—sometimes up to 50%.

This tuition-share model, though legal, has raised ethical red flags. Critics argue it diverts millions in public education dollars into private hands, inflates student debt, and incentivizes aggressive, misleading recruitment. The most infamous case was the University of Texas-Arlington, which paid AP more than $178 million over five years. President Vistasp Karbhari resigned in 2020 after it was revealed he had taken international trips funded by AP.

Risepoint was acquired by Vistria Group in 2019, placing it in the same portfolio as the University of Phoenix and other education businesses. The firm’s growing influence in higher education—fueled by Democratic-aligned private equity—reflects a deeper entanglement of politics, policy, and profiteering.

In 2024, Minnesota became the first state to ban new tuition-share agreements with OPMs like Risepoint. This legislative action followed backlash from a controversial deal between Risepoint and St. Cloud State University, where critics accused the firm of extracting excessive revenue while offering questionable value.

Further pressure came from the federal level. In 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, and Tina Smith issued letters to major OPMs demanding transparency about recruitment tactics and tuition-share models. The Department of Education followed in January 2025 with new guidance restricting misleading marketing by OPMs, including impersonation of university staff.

Despite this, Risepoint continued expanding. In late 2023, the company purchased Wiley’s online program business for $150 million, signaling consolidation in a turbulent industry. Yet a 2024 report showed 147 OPM-university contracts had been terminated in 2023, and new contracts fell by over 50%.


What Ties Them Together: Vistria Group

Vistria Group sits at the center of both sagas. The Chicago-based private equity firm has made education—especially online and for-profit education—a core pillar of its investment strategy. With connections to both Democratic and Republican power brokers, Vistria has deftly navigated the regulatory landscape while profiting from public education dollars.

Its ownership of the University of Phoenix and Risepoint demonstrates a clear strategy: acquire distressed or controversial education companies, clean up their public image, and extract revenue while avoiding deep reforms. Through Vistria, private equity gains access to billions in federal student aid with minimal oversight and a bipartisan shield.

The result is a higher education ecosystem where political influence, corporate profit, and public exploitation collide. And whether through online degrees from the University of Phoenix or public-private partnerships with Risepoint, students are often the ones left bearing the cost.


As scrutiny intensifies and state and federal lawmakers demand reform, the futures of Risepoint and the University of Phoenix remain uncertain. But one thing is clear: their shared story reveals how higher education has become a battleground of greed, power, and politics.

Sunday, September 11, 2022

State Universities and the College Meltdown

State Universities are using Google Ads to boost enrollment numbers.

(Updated November 28, 2022) 

While for-profit colleges, community colleges, and small private schools received the most attention in the first iteration of the College Meltdown, regional public universities (and a few flagship schools) have also experienced financial challenges, reorganizations, and mergers, enrollment losses, layoffs and resignations, off-campus learning site closings and campus dorm closings, lower graduation rates, and the necessity to lower admissions standards. They are not facing these downturns, though, without a fight. 

State universities, for example, are attempting to maintain or boost their enrollment through marketing and advertising--sometimes with the assistance of helpful, yet sometimes questionable online program managers (OPMs) like 2U and Academic Partnerships and lead generators such as EducationDynamics.  

 

Academic Partnerships claims to serve 50 university clients.  HEI has identified 25 of them. 

Google ads also follow consumers across the Web, with links to enrollment pages.  And enrollment pages include cookies to learn about those who click onto the enrollment pages. Schools share the information that consumers provide with Google Analytics and Chartbeat.  

                                       A pop-up Google Ad for Penn State World Campus

Advanced marketing will not improve institutional quality directly but it may raise awareness of these state schools to targeted audiences.  Whether this becomes predatory may be an issue worth examining.

 

In order to stay competitive, state universities have to have a strong online presence and spend an inordinate amount of money on marketing and advertising.  Ohio University and other schools now offer programs that are 100 percent online.  

 

State universities have joined for-profit colleges in the television advertising space. 

Despite marketing and enrollment appeals like this, we believe the financial situation could worsen at non-flagship state universities when austerity is reemployed--something likely to happen during the next economic downturn

While state flagship universities have multiple revenue streams, they are often unaffordable for working families.  Elite state universities, also known as the Public Ivies, have increasingly shut out state residents--in favor of people from out of state and outside the US--who are willing to pay more in tuition. 

Aaron Klein at the Brookings Institution calls this significant (and dysfunctional) out-of-state enrollment pattern as The Great Student Swap.  

State Universities with more than 4000 foreign students include UC San Diego, University of Illinois, UC Irvine, University of Washington, Arizona State University, Purdue University, Ohio State University, Michigan State University, and UC Berkeley. 

People fortunate enough to attend large state universities as undergrads may feel alienated by large and impersonal classrooms led by graduate assistants and other adjuncts.  There are also significant and often under-addressed social problems related to larger universities, including hunger, substance abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, hazing and sexual assault.  

Online only versions of flagship schools may not be of the same quality as their brick and mortar counterparts. Purdue University Global and University of Arizona Global Campus, for example, are open enrollment schools for working adults which produce questionable student outcomes.  These "robocollege" schools hire few full-time instructors and often spend a great deal of their resources on marketing and advertising.  


EducationDynamics is a lead generator for "robocolleges" such as Purdue University Global and University of Arizona, Global Campus.  

 

                    Purdue University Global has used questionable marketing and advertising.

The Higher Education Inquirer has already noticed the following schools in the Summer and Fall 2022 that received media scrutiny for lower enrollment, financial problems, or labor issues:

 
 
 
 
 

More schools will be added as information comes in. 
 
Related link: College Meltdown 2.0