The collapse of 2U and its subsidiary edX has put Sallie Mae (SLM) on the radar. Many of those elite brand certificate programs (under the name Harvard, MIT, Cal Berkeley) were propped up by Sallie Mae private student loans.
When the adult learners who took these certificate courses from edX did not get better jobs that they were promised, some ended up struggling to pay their loans. Some have defaulted on their loans. And a ripple occurs. As part of a larger edtech meltdown, and with IT jobs being lost each month, the situation promises to get worse.
As a hedge for SLM, most of these loans are processed into
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities (SLABS) and sold off as assets. Large investors, including pension programs are
invested directly or indirectly in this mess.
Sallie Mae Boom and Bust
Sallie Mae (SLM) is a private lender that has had a number of problems. Despite being bailed out by the US government and spinning off part of itself, SLM has a poor credit rating that's bad and getting worse.
In 1972, the Nixon administration created the Student Loan Marketing Association, or “Sallie Mae” — a government-sponsored enterprise empowered by the government to use U.S. Treasury money to buy government-backed student loans from banks.
As a publicly traded corporation Sallie Mae has benefited from decades of close government connections.
SLM was very profitable (and very predatory to consumers) when there was little oversight, and the US economy was booming. But when the Great Recession hit in 2008, SLM had to be bailed out when the US government purchased billions of dollars in government-backed student loans. After that bailout, Sallie Mae returned to maximizing profitability. Over the last 5 years, SLM shares have gained 144 percent in value as student borrowers have suffered.
While the economy is doing well enough for the middle class, that could change for the worse, not just for consumers, but also Sallie Mae.
Calls for divestment from exploitative industries have long been part of movements for social and economic justice—whether opposing apartheid, fossil fuels, or private prisons. Today, another sector demands moral scrutiny: the network of for-profit education corporations and student loan servicers that have turned higher learning into a site of mass indebtedness and despair. From predatory colleges to the companies that profit from collecting on student debt, the system functions as a pipeline of extraction. For those who believe education should serve the public good, the issue is not merely financial—it is moral.
The Human Cost of Predatory Education
For decades, for-profit college chains such as Corinthian Colleges, ITT Tech, the University of Phoenix, DeVry, and Capella targeted low-income students, veterans, single parents, and people of color with high-pressure marketing and promises of career advancement. These institutions, funded primarily through federal student aid, often charged premium tuition for substandard programs that left graduates worse off than when they began.
When Corinthian and ITT Tech collapsed, they left hundreds of thousands of students with worthless credits and mountains of debt. But the collapse did not end the exploitation—it simply shifted it. The business model has re-emerged in online form through education technology and “online program management” (OPM) firms such as 2U, Coursera, and Academic Partnerships. These firms, in partnership with elite universities like Harvard, Yale, and USC, replicate the same dynamics of inflated costs, opaque contracts, and limited accountability.
The Servicing of Debt as a Business Model
Beyond the schools themselves, student loan servicers and collectors—Maximus, Sallie Mae, and Navient among them—have built immense profits from managing and pursuing student debt. Sallie Mae, once a government-sponsored enterprise, was privatized in the 2000s and evolved into a powerful lender and loan securitizer. Navient, its spinoff, became notorious for deceptive practices and aggressive collections that trapped borrowers in cycles of delinquency.
Maximus, a major federal contractor, now services defaulted student loans on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education. These companies profit directly from the misery of borrowers—many of whom are victims of predatory schools or structural inequality. Their incentive is not to liberate students from debt, but to sustain and expand it.
The Role of Institutional Investors
The complicity of institutional investors cannot be ignored. Pension funds, endowments, and major asset managers have consistently financed both for-profit colleges and loan servicers, even after repeated scandals and lawsuits. Public sector pension funds—ironically funded by educators—have held stock in Navient, Maximus, and large for-profit college operators. Endowments that pride themselves on ethical or ESG investing have too often overlooked education profiteering.
Investment firms like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street collectively hold billions of dollars in these companies, stabilizing an industry that thrives on the financial vulnerability of students. To profit from predatory education is to participate, however indirectly, in the commodification of aspiration.
Divestment as a Moral and Educational Act
Divesting from predatory education companies and loan servicers is not just an act of conscience—it is an educational statement in itself. It affirms that learning should be a vehicle for liberation, not a mechanism of debt servitude. When universities, pension boards, and faith-based investors divest from corporations like Maximus, Navient, and 2U, they are reclaiming education’s moral purpose.
The divestment movement offers a broader civic lesson: that profit and progress are not synonymous, and that investment must align with justice. Faith communities, student debt activists, and labor unions have made similar stands before—against apartheid, tobacco, and fossil fuels. The same principle applies here. An enterprise that depends on deception, coercion, and financial harm has no place in a socially responsible portfolio.
A Call to Action
Transparency is essential. Pension boards, university endowments, and foundations must disclose their holdings in for-profit education and student loan servicing companies. Independent investigations should assess the human consequences of these investments, particularly their disproportionate impact on women, veterans, and people of color.
The next step is moral divestment. Educational institutions, public pension systems, and religious organizations should commit to withdrawing investments from predatory education stocks and debt servicers. Funds should be redirected to debt relief, community college programs, and initiatives that restore trust in education as a public good.
The corporate education complex—spanning recruitment, instruction, lending, and collection—has monetized both hope and hardship. The time has come to sever public and institutional complicity in this cycle. Education should empower, not impoverish. Divestment is not merely symbolic—it is a declaration of values, a demand for accountability, and a reaffirmation of education’s original promise: to serve humanity rather than exploit it.
Sources:
U.S. Department of Education, Borrower Defense to Repayment Reports
Senate HELP Committee, For Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success (2012)
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) enforcement actions against Navient and Sallie Mae
The Century Foundation, Online Program Managers and the Public Interest
Student Borrower Protection Center, Profiting from Pain: The Financialization of the Student Debt Crisis
Dear Secretary Cardona, Department of Education Staff, and Regulating officials,
My name is Michael DiGiacomo. I am a former student and victim of two closed for-profit scam colleges and the student loan industry. I have been fighting this industry since 2003-2006, when I realized I had been played badly by these deceptive debt factories.
These "colleges," and others like them, were easily able to trick not just me, but many thousands of poor, first-time people into attending. The false promises of dream job placement stats and leads, fueled by the student loan industry's "College Students make A Million Dollars More" pitch, along with high pressure tactics, lack of financial understanding, and easy access to government funds made us all the prime target for these scamsters.
They also piled on fraudulent private student loans as they worked hand-in-hand with commercial lenders to help themselves fleece the 90/10 requirement to gain more federal money funds. The promise of the future our parents and grandparents had was turned into a scam to fuel the next big bubble and wallets of those schools, the industry, and their lobbyists.
Now, after having gone through this fight for almost 20 years, through the recruitment lies, joblessness, default, garnishment, depression, hopelessness, and the unknown, I have fought to have my federal student loans canceled as part of Sweet v Cardona [DEVOS] and the defense to repayment process. I am still miles away from relief.
The paychecks, garnished for federal loan money by Sallie Mae-owned debt collectors for years, will never be returned as they somehow escape the parameters of the Sweet v Cardona [DEVOS] settlement.
I spent years choosing between food or gas to get to work because federal student loan garnishments don't take those necessities into account when they rip away your paycheck. I have also not been refunded for years of payments made to the US Department of Education and Nelnet now that the federal loans have been closed in the settlement.
My GI BILL even dried up/time ran out because I was too ruined financially and burned by those schools to want to finally return to ANY college again. Unfortunately, I am not alone on this. Over and over again I have heard the same stories. I have lost friends, have seen people alienate family, or even abandon our country.
Now with Sweet v Cardona [DEVOS] class and post class members, I have heard that even with evidence, payments are not returned even though the loans are closed. I have seen servicers that are supposed to be helping class members [and post class] become whole pinball students away from them back to the department of education or others or give flat out incorrect information.
And why does the class not cover federal loans held by Sallie Mae or other pre-Obamacare lenders?
Why should the same corporate banks that helped the scamster schools be allowed to keep the funding?
Why should the crooks be allowed to keep the robbery purse?
Why is the process of getting a federal loan legally closed so hard?
Why is there no federal program in place to help with the predatory/fraudulent private student loans?
The processes for Defense to Repayment and the Gainful Employment regulations are hard to follow for someone as knowledgeable as myself about this, never mind a first time student or parent with no experience in the process. Clearly the "Colleges" aren't being honest in the first place to their customers, never mind slow regulators and watch dogs.
I have watched the Student Aid website under serve people applying to defense to repayment they rightfully should be able to use. I have watched it only allow one school when they were hit by multiple. I have seen the website break or take minutes just to type the final name line. This is inexcusable since this is the one chance for people to make things right.
The government guaranteed funding needs to be heavily protected on what schools get access to, and on the other side students need to be easily able to be made whole when it turns out there is systematic fraud. The fraudsters are faster than the government patches to fix it.
Often when someone gets hit by one for-profit college, they get easily hit by a second one thinking the first was an isolated incident.
I have watched this fight and have been part of it for too long to watch it happen all over again. Regulation needs to be strong on the part of protecting borrowers and easy for borrowers to be made whole. The promise of a government accredited college should be just that. It should not be just an arm of a corporate entity or allowed to be made "Not-for-profit" just because they worded it differently.
The same corporate CEO's should not be trading companies and schools around like baseball cards or like whack a mole game once the one before it crashes down. Please put borrowers first if you want to have an educated society and protect them from corporate scamsters. And if somehow the scamsters DO get the upper-hand, please make it easier and more understandable for borrowers to get made whole.
When I joined the Army, I made a promise I would protect this country from all threats, foreign and domestic. The for-profit college and student loan industry is a domestic threat to this country and the public. They have decimated generations of prospective students and you still haven't fully picked up the pieces yet.
Sincerely, Michael DiGiacomo
Veteran US Army
Victim of the New England Institute of Art aka "The Art Institutes" Aka Education Management Corporation
Victim of Katherine Gibbs aka Gibbs aka Sanford Brown aka Career Education Corporation
Victim of SallieMae aka USAFunds Aka Pioneer Credit Aka Navient
The student loan market represents a significant segment of consumer lending in the United States, with approximately $1.7 trillion in outstanding debt. This market is undergoing profound transformation as financial technology companies challenge traditional banking institutions, offering innovative lending models and digital-first experiences. This report compares the current footprint of fintechs and banks in student lending and analyzes potential market shifts if federal loan guarantees were eliminated.
The student loan market continues to expand at a significant pace despite periodic concerns about sustainability. The private student loan sector alone was valued at $412.7 billion in 2023 and is projected to reach $980.8 billion by 2032, representing a compound annual growth rate of 10.1%15. Overall, the student loans market is growing at approximately 9.2% annually over the next five years7, indicating robust demand despite economic uncertainties and policy fluctuations.
Traditional banks maintain a significant but gradually diminishing presence in the student loan market. These institutions typically offer standardized loan products with competitive rates for students with established credit histories or qualified cosigners. Their underwriting processes tend to be more conservative than newer market entrants, focusing primarily on traditional creditworthiness metrics and income verification.
Among the major bank participants in student lending, Citizens Bank stands out for its nationwide offerings for undergraduate and graduate students, as well as parent loans. The bank distinguishes itself through its multiyear approval process, reducing the need for repeated hard credit inquiries for continuing students2. Other significant bank participants include PNC Bank, which offers specialized loans for health and medical professions, and Sallie Mae, a pioneer in private student lending that has evolved from its origins as a government-sponsored enterprise.
Financial technology companies have aggressively entered the student loan market, introducing innovations in product design, underwriting methodologies, and customer experience. These entrants typically operate with lower overhead costs than traditional banks and leverage alternative data sources for credit decisions, potentially expanding access to students who might not qualify under conventional underwriting standards.
SoFi represents one of the most prominent fintech lenders, distinguished by its no-fee structure and flexible repayment arrangements with fixed APRs ranging from 4.19% to 14.83%16. College Ave provides private student loans covering up to 100% of school-certified attendance costs with APRs ranging from 3.99% to 17.99%16. Ascent has gained market recognition for its non-cosigned loan options that use future income potential rather than current credit history as the primary underwriting criterion.
Marketplace platforms have emerged as important intermediaries in the student loan ecosystem. LendKey partners with credit unions and community banks, functioning as both a marketplace and loan servicer5. Credible allows borrowers to compare offers from multiple lenders through a single application and soft credit check, streamlining the shopping process for students and families5.
Based on the search results, the following represent key players in the current student loan market:
Citizens Bank - Offers multiyear approval and diverse loan options
PNC Bank - Specializes in healthcare profession loans and offers scholarship opportunities
Sallie Mae - Pioneer in student lending with undergraduate and graduate loan options
Discover - Provides comprehensive student loan offerings with competitive rates
Wells Fargo - Previously a major player but has exited the market
MEFA - Regional specialized educational lender
Education Loan Finance (ELFI) - The student loan division of SouthEast Bank
SoFi - Known for no-fee structure and comprehensive financial products
College Ave - Offers loans covering up to 100% of attendance costs
Earnest - Features borrower-friendly terms and competitive rates
Ascent - Specializes in non-cosigned loan alternatives
LendKey - Marketplace connecting borrowers with community banks and credit unions
Credible - Student loan comparison marketplace
MPower Financing - Focuses on international students
Juno - Group-based negotiation platform for better loan terms
Iowa Student Loan - Nonprofit state-based lender
EDvestinU - Nonprofit lender affiliated with New Hampshire Higher Education Loan Corporation
Stride Funding - Offers income share agreements and alternative financing models
CommonBond - Socially responsible student lender (not mentioned in results but a known market participant)
These institutions represent a mix of traditional financial services providers and newer, technology-focused entrants. The market continues to evolve with mergers, acquisitions, and strategic partnerships reshaping competitive dynamics.
The potential elimination of federal student loan guarantees would fundamentally alter the market landscape, likely causing significant contraction and restructuring. This change would transform both the size of the market and the nature of participating institutions.
Without federal guarantees, student lending would revert to pure risk-based lending principles, dramatically changing accessibility and terms. The current market structure exists largely because federal guarantees remove most default risk for lenders, enabling broader access to financing and more favorable terms than would otherwise be available.
A Reddit discussion highlighted this dynamic: "Making students loans not guaranteed and having it work like a real loan and with that allowing it to be bankruptible would seem like a good idea"10. However, this would mean loan approval would be "based on criteria such as the borrower's ability to repay within a reasonable time frame and their high school performance"10, fundamentally changing who could access education financing.
If federal guarantees disappeared, the market would likely undergo significant consolidation:
: Banks with substantial balance sheets and diverse revenue streams would have the greatest capacity to absorb increased lending risk. Among current participants, Citizens Bank, PNC Bank, and Discover would be best positioned to maintain student lending operations, though with substantially tightened criteria and higher rates.
: Only those fintechs with sophisticated risk assessment models, alternative revenue streams, or access to institutional capital would likely survive. SoFi, having diversified beyond student lending into banking, investing, and insurance, would be among the strongest contenders. Earnest, with its sophisticated approach to underwriting, and Ascent, which already specializes in future-earnings-based lending, might also persist.
: The market would likely shift toward income-based repayment models like those offered by Stride Funding, which ties repayment to future earnings rather than relying on traditional debt structures9. These models effectively shift some risk from borrowers to investors who bet on future earnings potential.
The student loan market would likely contract substantially from its current size, perhaps by 50-70%, as lenders would focus primarily on:
Students pursuing high-return degrees at prestigious institutions
Borrowers with exceptional credit profiles or financially strong cosigners
Fields of study with clear employment paths and strong salary prospects
The market might realistically shrink to 7-10 major players from the current diverse landscape. The following institutions would be most likely to maintain significant student lending operations:
Citizens Bank
PNC Bank
Discover
SoFi
Earnest
Ascent
Stride Funding or similar income-share agreement providers
Smaller regional banks, credit unions, and less-capitalized fintechs would likely exit the market entirely or dramatically reduce their student lending portfolios.
The removal of federal student loan guarantees would represent a fundamental restructuring of higher education financing in America. While it might address concerns about tuition inflation and excessive student debt, it would also significantly restrict educational access for many students, particularly those from lower and middle-income backgrounds.
Financial institutions with sophisticated risk assessment capabilities, substantial capital reserves, and diversified business models would be best positioned to remain in the market. The shift would likely accelerate innovation in alternative financing models, potentially leading to more alignment between educational costs and expected post-graduation outcomes.
For students, the changed landscape would require more careful consideration of educational investments, with greater emphasis on return-on-investment calculations for various fields of study and institutions. For higher education institutions, this shift would create strong pressure to demonstrate value and employment outcomes, potentially leading to significant changes in program offerings and pricing models.
This market transformation would ultimately test whether private financial markets alone can effectively finance broad access to higher education or whether some form of public support remains necessary to achieve societal goals of educational opportunity and economic mobility.
In classical history, a Pyrrhic victory refers to a win so costly that it undermines the very cause it was meant to advance. Less discussed, but increasingly relevant to modern governance, is the inverse strategy: the Pyrrhic defeat. In this model, short-term failure is tolerated—or even cultivated—because it enables outcomes that would otherwise be politically, legally, or institutionally impossible. When applied to public finance, pyrrhic defeat theory helps explain how the apparent collapse of a system can be leveraged to justify radical restructuring, privatization, or liquidation of public assets.
Nowhere is this framework more relevant than in the management of the federal student loan portfolio.
The federal student loan portfolio, totaling roughly $1.6 to $1.7 trillion, is not merely an accounting entry. It is one of the largest consumer credit systems in the world and functions simultaneously as a public policy tool, a long-term revenue stream, a data infrastructure, and a political liability. It shapes who can access higher education, how risk is distributed across generations, and how the federal government exerts leverage over the postsecondary sector. Precisely because of its scale and visibility, the portfolio is uniquely vulnerable to narrative reframing.
That vulnerability was not accidental. It was constructed over decades through a series of policy decisions that stripped borrowers of normal consumer protections while preserving the financial attractiveness of student debt as an asset. Chief among these decisions was the gradual removal of bankruptcy protections for student loans. By rendering student debt effectively nondischargeable except under the narrow and punitive “undue hardship” standard, lawmakers transformed education loans into a uniquely durable financial instrument. Unlike mortgages, credit cards, or medical debt, student loans could follow borrowers for life, enforced through wage garnishment, tax refund seizure, and Social Security offsets.
This transformation made student loans exceptionally attractive for securitization. Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities, or SLABS, flourished precisely because the underlying loans were shielded from traditional credit risk. Investors could rely not on educational outcomes or borrower prosperity, but on the legal certainty that the debt would remain collectible. Even during economic downturns, SLABS were marketed as relatively stable instruments, insulated from the discharge risks that plagued other forms of consumer credit.
Private banks once dominated this market. Sallie Mae, originally a government-sponsored enterprise, became a central player in both originating and securitizing student loans, while Navient emerged as a major servicer and asset manager. Yet as Higher Education Inquirer documented in early 2025, banks ultimately lost control of student lending. Rising defaults, public outrage, state enforcement actions, and mounting evidence of predatory practices made the sector politically radioactive. The federal government stepped in not as a reformer, but as a backstop, absorbing the portfolio and stabilizing a system private finance could no longer manage without reputational and regulatory risk.
That history reveals a recurring pattern. When student lending fails in private hands, it becomes public. When the public system is allowed to fail, it becomes ripe for re-privatization.
A portfolio does not need to collapse to be declared unmanageable. It only needs to appear dysfunctional enough to justify extraordinary intervention.
The post-pandemic repayment restart, persistent servicing failures, legal challenges to income-driven repayment plans, and widespread borrower confusion have all contributed to a growing narrative of systemic breakdown. Servicers such as Maximus, operating under the Aidvantage brand, MOHELA, and others have struggled to process payments accurately, manage forgiveness programs, and provide reliable customer service. These failures are often framed as bureaucratic incompetence rather than as predictable consequences of outsourcing public functions to private contractors whose incentives are misaligned with borrower welfare.
Navient’s exit from federal servicing did not mark a retreat from the student loan ecosystem so much as a repositioning, as it continued to benefit from private loan portfolios and legacy SLABS exposure. Sallie Mae, rebranded and fully privatized, remains deeply embedded in the private student loan market, which continues to rely on the same nondischargeability framework that props up federal lending.
Crucially, these servicing failures cannot be separated from the earlier elimination of bankruptcy as a safety valve. In normal credit markets, distress is resolved through restructuring or discharge. In student lending, distress accumulates. Borrowers remain trapped, servicers remain paid, and policymakers are confronted with a swelling mass of unresolved debt that can be labeled a crisis at any politically convenient moment.
Under pyrrhic defeat theory, such a crisis is not merely tolerated. It is useful.
Once the federal portfolio is framed as broken beyond repair, the range of acceptable solutions expands. What would be politically impossible in a stable system becomes plausible in an emergency. Asset transfers, securitization of federal loans, expansion of SLABS-like instruments backed by government guarantees, or long-term conveyance of servicing and collection rights can be presented as pragmatic fixes rather than ideological choices.
A Trump administration would be particularly well positioned to exploit this dynamic. Skeptical of debt relief, hostile to administrative governance, and ideologically aligned with privatization, such an administration could recast the portfolio as a failed public experiment inherited from predecessors. In that framing, selling or offloading the portfolio is not an abdication of responsibility but an act of fiscal discipline.
Importantly, this need not take the form of an explicit, congressionally authorized sale. Risk can be shifted through securitization. Revenue streams can be monetized. Servicing authority can be extended indefinitely to private firms. Data control can migrate outside public oversight. Over time, these steps amount to de facto privatization, even if the loans remain nominally federal. The infrastructure, incentives, and profits move outward, while the political blame remains with the state.
This is where earlier McKinsey & Company studies reenter the conversation. Long before the current turmoil, McKinsey analyses identified high servicing costs, fragmented contractor oversight, weak borrower segmentation, and low political returns on administrative complexity. While framed as efficiency critiques, these studies implicitly favored market-oriented restructuring. In a crisis environment, such recommendations become blueprints for divestment.
The danger of a pyrrhic defeat strategy is that it delivers a short-term political win at the cost of long-term public capacity. Selling or functionally privatizing the student loan portfolio may improve fiscal optics, but it permanently weakens democratic control over higher education finance. Borrowers, already stripped of bankruptcy protections, lose what remains of public accountability. Policymakers lose leverage over tuition inflation and institutional behavior. The federal government relinquishes a powerful counter-cyclical tool. What remains is a debt regime optimized for extraction, enforced by servicers, securitized for investors, and detached from educational outcomes.
The defeat is real. It is borne by students, families, and future generations. The victory belongs to those who acquire distressed public assets and those who benefit ideologically from shrinking the public sphere.
Pyrrhic defeat theory reminds us that collapse is not always accidental. In the case of the federal student loan portfolio, what appears to be dysfunction or incompetence may instead be strategic surrender: a willingness to let a public system deteriorate so that it can be sold off, securitized, or outsourced under the banner of necessity. If that happens, it will not be remembered as a policy error, but as a deliberate transfer of public wealth and power—made possible by decades of legal engineering that began when bankruptcy protection was taken away and ended with student debt transformed into a permanent financial asset.
