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Showing posts sorted by relevance for query edtech. Sort by date Show all posts

Thursday, July 10, 2025

EdTech on Reddit: A View from the Ground Floor

On the surface, the education technology sector still markets itself as innovative, exciting, and essential. But a closer look at one of the most active online forums for education technology professionals—Reddit’s r/edtech—reveals something more conflicted. Beneath the surface hype, professionals, educators, and developers are wrestling with deep questions about impact, sustainability, and purpose. 

One particularly candid thread titled “EdTech is booming, but are we actually solving real problems?” captures the contradictions at the heart of the industry. The discussion, which you can find here, begins with a deceptively simple question that cuts to the core of the field’s current identity crisis.

The post's author reflects on the fast-paced expansion of edtech platforms and tools, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. They point to the increasing ease of starting a company, accessing AI tools, and attracting seed funding, while simultaneously questioning whether these efforts are genuinely improving learning or merely adding noise to an already crowded ecosystem. They ask whether these tools are addressing core issues or simply automating what doesn’t need to be automated.

The responses are both candid and sobering. One veteran of the industry responded bluntly: “Edtech is not booming and has never really been about the ‘real problems.’ It's always been about money and profits over learning outcomes.” That comment received widespread agreement and set the tone for a critical conversation. Others pointed out the industry’s cyclical nature. “Edtech got very drunk on COVID,” said one user. “It drove a huge surge in valuations, but edtech seems committed to these boom/bust cycles every 7–12 years.” The market hype rarely aligns with long-term adoption, and the collapse of post-pandemic funding has only exacerbated this disconnect.

Some posters argued that edtech remains a “vitamin” instead of a “painkiller”—in other words, a nice-to-have rather than a must-have. Others expressed frustration that edtech often duplicates traditional classroom experiences without improving them. One user described much of the industry as “PowerPoint with lipstick.”

Another major theme is the shift in purchasing power and institutional demand. While startups chase direct-to-consumer models or try to sell to companies, the bulk of the market remains in K–12 and higher education institutions. These institutions are now facing budget cuts and reduced federal COVID-era funding. One teacher noted that “schools have less funding and are becoming more risk averse,” making it even harder for edtech startups to gain traction unless they solve very specific problems.

Some edtech insiders also weighed in. A sales representative commented that tools not tied to curriculum—particularly safety and administration tools—are the only ones gaining momentum. In other words, districts may still buy technology, but they’re buying it for infrastructure, not pedagogy. In a parallel conversation, another Redditor emphasized that much of the money is still on the hardware side: Chromebooks, security systems, and basic connectivity tools.

Meanwhile, generative AI remains a wild card. Several posters, including a college professor, described increased interest in AI-powered learning tools, but they also cautioned that few institutions have coherent strategies for integrating them into teaching. Hype continues to outpace effectiveness.

Other users expressed concern about how edtech firms are shaped by investor expectations. One pointed out that venture capital is trying to insert industrial design (ID) approaches into traditional education, often with harmful results. They argued that these approaches not only fail to improve outcomes but also deepen inequality and erode trust in public education.

If r/edtech is a canary in the coal mine, it’s one with a lot of sharp observations and few illusions. The subreddit is a space where industry insiders, educators, and skeptics hash out what’s working, what isn’t, and what’s broken. The consensus seems clear: most edtech products are not solving fundamental problems. The collapse of funding from the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) funds has dried up easy wins. Products that do succeed tend to solve practical administrative problems, not pedagogical ones. Teachers, meanwhile, are being asked to adopt new tools without evidence that they help students learn or reduce their workload.

The Reddit forum serves as an unscripted, unfiltered pulse check on the edtech world. Unlike polished press releases or self-congratulatory conferences, r/edtech offers raw and sometimes painful truths. For researchers, journalists, and education leaders, the subreddit offers a vital look at what the field is thinking when no one is watching. In that sense, it may be one of the most honest barometers of education technology today.


Source:
“EdTech is booming, but are we actually solving real problems?” Reddit, June 2025.
https://www.reddit.com/r/edtech/comments/1lu23y5/edtech_is_booming_but_are_we_actually_solving/

Monday, April 10, 2023

EdTech Meltdown

The Silicon Valley tech downturn has been creating reverberations in other parts of the economy and in other areas of the US.

Edtech, a small subset of the tech industry that overlaps with higher education, is facing major headwinds as skepticism about higher education and the economy grows.  Even two industry insiders, Noodle CEO John Katzman and Kaplan executive Brandon Busteed have been critical of the short-term thinking and questionable outcomes of edtech. Katzman has called some companies in the space "more adtech than edtech," implying that some do little more than marketing and advertising for colleges and universities.     

Ultimately, it's US consumers who are feeling the greatest pain as participants in online education--a mode of instruction that for millions of people may have more risks than benefits--within an increasingly dysfunctional economy that produces expensive education and fewer good jobs.   

Significant problems that were observed in large subprime colleges like University of Phoenix, Corinthian Colleges, ITT Tech, DeVry University, Colorado Tech, and the Art Institutes more than a dozen years ago have resurfaced in edtech.  And other problems unique to edtech have emerged. 

Chegg is an edtech company based in Santa Clara, California, and provides homework help, online tutoring, and other student services.  The company's value grew more than 300 percent in 2020, during the Covid pandemic, but has faced headwinds for the last two years. This includes allegations that  Chegg enables students to cheat on homework and other assignments. Derek Newton has chronicled this problem in the substack The Cheat Sheet.

[Chegg shares grew in 2020 during the Covid pandemic. Source: Seeking Alpha] 

 
Coursera is a publicly traded MOOC based in Mountain View California.  Shares started trading in April 2021.  The company has under-performed as a profit making enterprise. Massive Open Online Courses were once seen as a wave of the future in adult education but their popularity has waned. 

[Coursera has underperformed since its IPO in April 2021.  Source: Seeking Alpha]

2U (based in Lanham, MD) and Guild Education (based in Denver) and are two edtech companies based outside of Silicon Valley. 

2U is a publicly traded Online Program Manager (OPM).  The company services major universities such as the University of Southern California and University of North Carolina with support for some of their online degree programs. 2U has received an enormous amount of funding from Cathie Wood, a major Silicon Valley investor, and has continued to receive support despite a long record of financial losses.  

Some 2U investors have grown tired of persistent losses--and it has shown in the declining share price. The company also faces increased scrutiny in DC for recruiting consumers unable to recoup the cost of education for high-priced masters degrees in areas such as social work.  2U acquired edX, the Harvard-MIT MOOC in 2021 and its profitability remains to be seen.  

In 2023, 2U sued the US Department of Education for attempting to require more transparency between OPMs and their clients.  This strategy is similar to the defensive strategy that subprime colleges have used to stop gainful employment regulations, and more recently, borrower defense to repayment rules.  

 


 [2U shares have dropped more than 90 percent over the last 5 years. Source: Seeking Alpha]

Guild Education is a privately held corporation that grew to an estimated $4.4B evaluation in a few years. Guild serves businesses by administering online education benefits for large corporations such as Walmart, Target, and Macy's.  While its work may help companies with their bottom line, they appear to do little for their workers. 

At least ten of Guild's investors are based in Silicon Valley, including Silicon Valley Bank and venture capital firms in San Francisco, Palo Alto, and Menlo Park, California. Valuations.fyi reports Guild's estimated value at $1.3B, a 70 percent drop from its peak in June 2022. 

 
[Image above: Guild's valuation in Billions from valuations.fyi]
 
The Higher Education Inquirer will continue to observe changes in edtech as the College Meltdown advances.  


A ‘rigged’ economy and skepticism about college (Paul Fain, Open Campus)

How University of Phoenix Failed. It's a Long Story. But It's Important for the Future of Higher Education. 

The Cheat Sheet (Derek Newton)

2U Virus Expands College Meltdown to Elite Universities 

Erica Gallagher Speaks Out About 2U's Shady Practices at Department of Education Virtual Listening Meeting

Borrower Defense Claims Surpass 750,000. Consumers Empowered. Subprime Colleges and Programs Threatened.

Guild Education: Enablers of Anti-Union Corporations and Subprime College Programs 

College Meltdown 2.0 

The Growth of "RoboColleges" and "Robostudents"

The American Dream is Over (Gary Roth) 

Friday, September 29, 2023

2U-edX crash exposes the latest wave of edugrift

2U, a Lanham, Maryland-based edtech company and parent company edX, is facing layoffs of an estimated 200 to 400 workers--a significant number for a company that only employs a few thousand--amid more rumors that the company is for sale. While the pain of their firings may be consequential for those who are experiencing it, the pain of those the company has damaged, mostly striving middle-class consumers and their families, may be worse.  

2U's problems are not new. The Higher Education Inquirer first reported on the beginning of company's meltdown in October 2019.  In July 2022, 2U announced layoffs as it changed its business model (again) and the US Department of Education scrutinized the company's grad school offerings.

2U began in 2008 as an online program manager (OPM), one of a few companies offering edtech services that required large amounts of capital and labor costs. They expanded through the acquisition of other edtech firms, Trilogy Education Services (2019) and edX (2021).  edX is an education platform that was created by Harvard and MIT as a massive open online course (MOOC) platform, but as part of 2U now concentrates on selling a number of elite and brand name tech bootcamps.

In 2022 and 2023, the Wall Street Journal (Lisa Bannon), Chronicle of Higher Education (Mike Vasquez), and USA Today (Chris Quintana) investigated 2U after a few US senators sounded the alarm about consumers being fleeced by 2U and other OPMs. 

With 2U's reputation in shambles and layoffs ahead, the parent company wrapped itself around the more respectable edX brand. Bjju's, an Indian edtech firm, was said to be looking at 2U or Chegg as a possible acquisition (Byju's is now facing its own problems).  

Concentrating on growth for years, then acquisition, then consolidation and rebranding, 2U has never generated an annual profit--and that trend doesn't appear to be changing. 

Earlier this year we listed 2U, Chegg, Coursera, and Guild Education as part of the EdTech Meltdown. 

Unlike the prior wave of for-profit college failures of Corinthian Colleges, ITT Tech, Education Management Corporation, and others that hurt working-class student debtors, 2U has collaborated with elite universities, targeting mostly middle-class folks for advanced degrees and certificates with elite brand names such as USC and UC Berkeley. Credentials that frequently are not worth the debt. Credentials that often did not lead to better paying jobs. Credentials that burden (and sometimes crush) consumers financially with private loans from Sallie Mae and others.

edX's website advertises coding, data analytics, cybersecurity, and AI bootcamps from a number of name brands: Ohio State University, Columbia University, University of Texas, Harvard University, Michigan State University, University of Denver, Southern Methodist University, University of Minnesota, University of Central Florida, Arizona State University, Northwestern University, Rice University, the University of North Carolina, and UC-Irvine.   

  • Ohio State University AI Bootcamp $11,745
  • University of Texas Coding Bootcamp $12,495
  • Berkeley Extension Coding Bootcamp $13,495
  • University of Pennsylvania Cybersecurity Bootcamp $13,995
  • Columbia University Data Analytics Bootcamp $14,745 

It's not clear how well managed the programs are and how much these schools are involved in instruction and career guidance.  However, edX claims that with their bootcamp certificates, graduates will "gain  access to more than 260 employers--including half of the Fortune 100--seeking skilled bootcamp graduates." 

While the targets of for-profit colleges and 2U may have been different, their approaches were similar: sell a dream to consumers that often does not materialize. Spend tens of millions on targeted (and sometimes misleading) advertising and enrollment. Keep the confidence game going as long as it will last. But that may not be much longer.

In April 2023, 2U filed a lawsuit against the US Department of Education to avoid further government oversight. A familiar defensive strategy in the for-profit college business.

There is much we don't know about how significant the damage has been to those who bought the 2U story and spent tens of thousands on elite degrees and certificates, but it must be significant. Most US families do not have that kind of money to spend on something that doesn't result in financial gains.  

Recent reviews of edX on TrustPilot have been scathing. And social media have been brutal on 2U, Trilogy, and EdX. Reddit, for example, has posts like "The dirty truth about edX/Trilogy Boot Camps." In a more recent post about edX, there was a flurry of negative reviews.


In 2016, we wrote "When college choice is a fraud." At that time we were focusing on the tough choices that working-class people have deciding between their local community college or a for-profit career school. Little did we know that the education business was already moving its way up the food chain and that edtech companies like 2U would be engaging in the latest form of edugrift

Related link:

2U Virus Expands College Meltdown to Elite Universities (2019)

Buyer Beware: Servicemembers, Veterans, and Families Need to Be On Guard with College and Career Choices (2021)

College Meltdown 2.1 (2022)

EdTech Meltdown (2023)  

Erica Gallagher Speaks Out About 2U's Shady Practices at Department of Education Virtual Listening Meeting (2023)

"Edugrift" by J.D. Suenram (2020)

When college choice is a fraud (2016)

Monday, September 30, 2024

"White Labeling" in Online Higher Education: Simplilearn

Yesterday the NY Times published an article titled "Students Paid Thousands for a Caltech Boot Camp. Caltech Didn’t Teach It." The scandal is likely larger than this NYT article and the small, but important, bits of information in it. Simplilearn, the edtech company involved in the scheme, but not named in the title, is a growing for-profit business with offices in Bengaluru, India and San Francisco. 

What makes the story interesting for consumers and consumer advocates is that like 2U-edX, we find another online program manager, Simplilearn, peddling elite university certificates that may not work out for those seeking better work opportunities. What makes the story doubly interesting is that Blackstone, a company with a trillion dollars in assets under management, holds a controlling interest in Simplilearn. 

What makes it triply interesting (and not noted by the NY Times) is that GSV Ventures has also been involved in Simplilearn.  GSV Ventures includes a number of high-profile names in education, business, and edtech, including Arne Duncan, Johny C. Taylor, Jr., Michael Moe, and Michael Horn.  

Simplilearn also markets online certificates with other elite, brand names, including Purdue University, University of Massachusetts, Brown University, and UC San Diego. In June, Simplilearn stated that it was growing dramatically in revenue (35-45%) and becoming profitable. Consumers on Reddit, however, have made critical remarks about Simplilearn bootcamps. 


Students can use Splitit, ClimbCredit or Klarna for buy now, pay later financing. 

"White Labeling" in Edtech

According to edtech innovator and pioneer John Katzman (Noodle), "White labeling is done everywhere; your GE microwave is not made by GE, and Walgreens doesn't make ibuprofen. And note that these are non-credit, non-accredited programs. Still, I wouldn't put my university's name on other peoples' programs without clear disclosure. Tech and marketing are one thing; teaching and academic advisement are at the core of what a university does."

HEI Values Your Feedback

If there is anyone who has attended one of these bootcamps, please let us know how you financed the program and whether it has resulted in a positive or negative return on investment.


Related links:
Edtech Meltdown

Friday, May 12, 2023

OPM Market Landscape And Dynamics: Spring 2023 Updates (Phil Hill)

Editor's Note:  This article first appeared in Phil Hill's On EdTech Blog

Wow. Just wow – the last twelve months have been something.

Was this forwarded to you by a friend? Sign up, and get your own copy of the news that mattered sent to your inbox every week. Sign up for the On EdTech newsletter. Interested in additional analysis? It’s free through May 24, 2023. Upgrade to the On EdTech+ newsletter.

On to the update. [full-page audio link]


During several keynotes, podcast interviews, and panel sessions over the past two years, I have described how the Online Program Management (OPM) market was facing enormous pressures and would change dramatically. I took some heat in private conversations for overstating the case, but as the past 12 months have shown, it turns out that I understated the turmoil and change of the market.

With that in mind, it is time to update our two main OPM Market graphics that were last shared in the Summer 2022 update.

OPM Market Landscape

  • Market valuations of publicly-traded OPM companies have continued to drop, with 2U/edX, Coursera, and Keypath all down 75% or more from March 2021.

  • Pearson tapped out of the market, agreeing to sell its OPM business to private equity firm Regent.

  • Zovio is no more. It has ceased to be.

  • FutureLearn sold the remnants of its business to a for-profit system, and it now has the most obnoxious website of any OPM provider, past or present.

  • Byju’s, which (according to multiple media accounts) had been considering an acquisition of 2U/edX or Coursera, abandoned these plans to go off and deal with its own financial crisis.

  • Noodle acquired South Africa-based Hubble Studios.
  • The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the OPM market, triggering (but not causing) official efforts to make massive regulatory changes.

As readers of On EdTech know, this last bullet is now the driver for market dynamics for 2023 and probably 2024.

As always, please note that this view is intended to give a visual overview of the market landscape and is not mean to be comprehensive in terms of vendors represented. This is particularly true in the smaller customer base and fee for service categories.

OPM Market Dynamics

When we first came up with the Mad Max graphic in 2018, it was intended to counter the golly gee, the OPM market is rich, well-funded, and growing like crazy coverage, or the flip side of these companies are all getting rich pulling profits out of the schools coverage that we saw in EdTech and national media through 2022.

This year there are two primary changes with the overall message of the graphic:

  • Online enrollments in the largest OPM market (US graduate schools) are no longer growing – they’re dropping and in structural ways. OPMs are still chasing those enrollments and tuition revenue, but the dynamics change when the target has its own problems.

  • The small threat from the Department of Education and its activist allies to the OPM market has become a major threat, with an all-out assault.

We still get a picture of a chaotic market that is not for the faint of heart, and one that is seeing consolidations and category changes, and these changes will continue. All of this in a Mad Max-style pursuit of college online course and program revenue (whether rev share or fee-for-service or a blend, and whether degree- or certificate-based).

Note the changes in the program revenue target:

as well as the central market threat from ED regulations, going after both revenue sharing and TPS status, all in the name of protecting the helpless:

with 2U being the chosen target to personify the regulatory actions:

We also see Pearson getting out of the OPM business:

Zovio’s crash:

and Byju’s flying away from the scene.

ASU+GSV Angle

Next week I (along with Glenda Morgan) will be at ASU+GSV, and I will be on a panel with Ryan Craig, Mike Goldstein, Katherine Lee Carey, and Toby Jackson. The session is titled “Decoding the Dear Colleague Letter – What’s a TPS?!”, scheduled for Wednesday at 11am PDT. I am eager to find out at the conference if the investment community is aware of the significance of ED’s targeting of the OPM market, at least for revenue sharing business models, and of the potential impact of TPS guidance.

Update 4/13: Added bullet on Noodle acquiring Hubble Studios.

Wednesday, July 23, 2025

The Digital Dark Ages of Higher Education: Greed, Myth, and the Ghosts of Lost Knowledge

In a time of unprecedented data collection, artificial intelligence, and networked access to information, it seems unthinkable that we could be slipping into a new Dark Age. But that is precisely what is unfolding in American higher education—a Digital Dark Age marked not just by the disappearance of records, but by the disappearance of truth.

This is not a passive erosion of information. It is a systemic, coordinated effort to conceal institutional failure, to commodify public knowledge, and to weaponize mythology. It is a collapse not of technology, but of ethics and memory.

A Dark Age in Plain Sight

Digital decay is usually associated with vanishing files and outdated formats. In higher education, it takes the more sinister form of intentional erasure. Data that once offered accountability—graduation rates, job placement figures, loan default data, even course materials—have become reputational liabilities. When inconvenient, they vanish.

Gainful Employment data disappeared from federal websites under the Trump administration. Student outcomes from for-profit conversions are obscured through accounting tricks. Internal audits and consultant reports sit behind NDAs and paywalls. And when institutions close or rebrand, their failures are scrubbed from the record like Soviet photographs.

This is a higher education system consumed by image management, where inconvenient truths are buried under branded mythologies.

The Robocolleges and the Rise of the Algorithm

No phenomenon illustrates this transformation more starkly than the rise of robocolleges—fully online institutions like Southern New Hampshire University, University of Phoenix, and Liberty University Online. These institutions, driven more by enrollment growth than educational mission, are built to scale, surveil, and extract.

Their architecture is not intellectual but algorithmic: automated learning systems, outsourced instructors, and AI-driven behavioral analytics replace human-centered pedagogy. Data replaces dialogue. And all of it happens behind proprietary systems controlled by Online Program Managers (OPMs)—for-profit companies like 2U, Academic Partnerships, and Wiley that handle recruitment, curriculum design, and marketing for universities, often taking a majority cut of tuition revenue.

These robocolleges aren’t built to educate; they’re built to profit. They are credential vending machines with advertising budgets, protected by political lobbying and obscured by branding.

And they are perfectly suited to a Digital Dark Age, where metrics are manipulated, failures are hidden, and education is indistinguishable from a subscription service.

Myth #1: The College Degree as Guaranteed Mobility

The dominant myth still peddled by these institutions—and many traditional ones—is that a college degree is a golden ticket to upward mobility. But in an economy of stagnant wages, rising tuition, and unpayable debt, this narrative is a weapon.

Robocolleges and their OPM partners sell dreams on Instagram and YouTube—“Success stories,” “first-gen pride,” and inflated salary stats—while ignoring the mountains of debt, dropout rates, and lifelong economic precarity their students face. And when those stories come to light? They disappear behind legal threats, settlements, and strategic rebranding.

The dream has become a trap, and the myth has become a means of extraction.

Myth #2: Innovation Through EdTech

“Tech will save us” is the second great myth. EdTech companies promise to revolutionize learning through adaptive platforms, AI tutors, and automated assessments. But what they really offer is surveillance, cost-cutting, and outsourcing.

Institutions are increasingly beholden to opaque algorithms and third-party platforms that strip faculty of agency and students of privacy. Assessment becomes analytics. Learning becomes labor. And the metrics these systems produce—completion rates, engagement data—are as easily manipulated as they are misunderstood.

Far from democratizing education, EdTech has helped turn it into a digital panopticon, where every click is monetized, and every action is tracked.

Myth #3: The Digital Campus as a Public Good

Universities love to claim that their digital campuses are open and inclusive. But in truth, access is restricted, commercialized, and disappearing.

Libraries are gutted. Archives are defunded. Publicly funded research is locked behind publisher paywalls. Historical documents, administrative records, even syllabi are now ephemeral—stored on private platforms, subject to deletion at will. The digital campus is a gated community, and the public is locked out.

Third-party vendors now control what students read, how they’re taught, and who can access the past. Memory is no longer a public good—it is a leased service.

Greed, Cheating, and Digital Amnesia

This is not simply a story about decay—it is a story about cheating. Not just by students, but by institutions themselves.

Colleges cheat by manipulating data to mislead accreditors and prospective students. OPMs cheat by obscuring their contracts and revenue-sharing models. Robocolleges cheat by prioritizing growth over learning. And all of them cheat when they hide the truth, delete the data, or suppress the whistleblowers.

Faculty are silenced through non-disclosure agreements. Archivists are laid off. Historians and librarians are told to “streamline” and “rebrand” rather than preserve and inform. The keepers of memory are being dismissed, just when we need them most.

Myth as Memory Hole

The Digital Dark Ages are not merely a result of failing tech—they are the logical outcome of a system that values profit over truth, optics over integrity, and compliance over inquiry.

Greed isn’t incidental. It’s the design. And the myths propagated by robocolleges, OPMs, and traditional universities alike are the cover stories that keep the public sedated and the money flowing.

American higher education once aspired to be a sanctuary of memory, a force for social mobility, and a guardian of public knowledge. But it is now drifting toward becoming a black box—a mythologized, monetized shadow of its former self, accessible only through marketing and controlled by vendors.

Without intervention—legal, financial, and intellectual—we risk becoming a society where education is an illusion, memory is curated, and truth is whatever survives the deletion script.


Sources and References:

  • Savage Inequalities, Jonathan Kozol

  • Tressie McMillan Cottom, Lower Ed

  • Christopher Newfield, The Great Mistake

  • Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains

  • U.S. Department of Education archives (missing Gainful Employment data)

  • “Paywall: The Business of Scholarship” (2018)

  • SPARC (Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition)

  • Internet Archive reports on digital preservation

  • ProPublica and The Century Foundation on OPMs and robocolleges

  • Faculty union reports on librarian and archivist layoffs

  • Inside Higher Ed and The Chronicle of Higher Education coverage of data manipulation, robocolleges, and institutional opacity

Tuesday, March 18, 2025

AFT President Selling Out to Edtech?

American Federation of Teachers (AFT) President Randi Weingarten is scheduled to speak at the upcoming ASU-GSV summit. For 16 years, the conference has been a space for those in edtech to hype their ideas, both good and bad.  We have noted a few of these bad ideas from bad actors over the years, to include 2UGuild, and Ambow Education

Given Weingarten's track record as President of AFT, we don't expect much from her in terms of speaking truth to power. There are many people in edtech that Weingarten should criticize at the summit. But she is too much of a politician to do such a thing when it is needed.  

Weingarten has been the President of AFT since 2008, a union with about 1.7 million members across the US. While AFT has had some victories, those victories were won by the rank-and-file and the hard work of AFT organizers, not due to the actions of Weingarten. With numbers that large, AFT could pose as a serious presence at demonstrations in DC and across the nation. They have done that, when they had to, but not when other folks' lives were at stake. 

In 2013, while Weingarten was President of AFT, we recommended that the union use its clout to tell teachers' pension programs and state retirement funds from investing in for-profit colleges like Corinthian Colleges, Education Management Corporation, ITT Tech, and the University of Phoenix. They refused. We have not forgotten how AFT was unwilling to defend consumers, student debtors, and retirees. 

Since that time, AFT has done little to defend folks against subprime robocolleges and online program managers like 2U and Academic Partnerships/Risepoint when they certainly needed to call them out. And now their ranks are full of educators and administrators with marginal online degrees.

Friday, July 11, 2025

Chegg: A Critical History of a Disruptor Turned Controversy Machine

Chegg, once hailed as a Silicon Valley disruptor democratizing access to education, has undergone a profound and troubling transformation since its founding in 2005. What began as a textbook rental company evolved into a billion-dollar homework help empire—an empire that, critics argue, has done more to undermine academic integrity than to foster genuine learning. Its business model capitalized on the structural weaknesses of American higher education and, in the process, normalized a shadow system of paid cheating.

Origins: Textbooks, Student Debt, and Disruption

Chegg was born at the intersection of inflated textbook costs and the neoliberal university. Founders Osman Rashid and Aayush Phumbhra sought to bring the efficiencies of the sharing economy to the campus bookstore. In its early years, Chegg attracted investor attention by promising cheaper textbook rentals—a modest but important service in an era of spiraling student debt.

But as textbook rentals became commodified, Chegg pivoted. By the early 2010s, it was building a suite of digital services: step-by-step solutions, tutoring, and subscription-based homework help under its Chegg Study brand. When Chegg went public in 2013, it promoted itself not just as a tech company, but as a partner in “student success.” In reality, it had found a way to turn student desperation into a profitable SaaS model.

Homework Help or Cheating-as-a-Service?

Chegg’s transformation into a homework help platform would eventually earn it a darker moniker: “Cheating-as-a-Service.”

Nowhere is this critique more powerfully detailed than in education journalist Derek Newton’s Cheat Sheet, a Substack project dedicated to exposing the industrial-scale cheating facilitated by platforms like Chegg, Course Hero, and Studypool. Newton, who has tracked the issue since 2019, documented case after case in which students used Chegg not to learn—but to submit answers for graded assignments and exams. Faculty across disciplines and institutions began reporting widespread cheating enabled by Chegg, especially during the remote learning surge triggered by COVID-19.

In one issue of Cheat Sheet, Newton wrote:

“Chegg isn’t an education company. It’s a cheating company. It monetizes academic dishonesty, obfuscates accountability, and deflects responsibility while raking in millions in subscription revenue.”

According to Newton, Chegg’s "ask an expert" function—where students submit specific questions and receive solutions within minutes—became a tool of choice for real-time cheating during online exams. Despite university honor codes, many students saw Chegg as a normalized part of academic life. Meanwhile, Chegg’s refusal to proactively block cheating or cooperate fully with universities left institutions scrambling.

Pandemic Profits and Ethical Collapse

During the COVID-19 pandemic, as universities shifted online, Chegg’s subscriber base soared. Students confined to Zoom classrooms flocked to digital platforms for support—or shortcuts. By 2021, Chegg had nearly 7 million subscribers and posted annual revenues of $776 million. Its stock price peaked above $100 in February 2021.

But that growth came with growing backlash. Professors and academic integrity officers called for investigations. Some universities demanded IP logs and timestamps from Chegg in academic misconduct cases. In response, Chegg adopted a policy of releasing user data only under subpoena—shifting the burden to faculty and administrators.

Chegg, for its part, insisted it was simply offering "study support" and denied facilitating cheating. But the evidence presented in Newton’s Cheat Sheet and other academic publications told a different story.

Collapse, AI Disruption, and Image Repair

In 2023, a new threat emerged: OpenAI’s ChatGPT. Free, flexible, and fast, ChatGPT began to supplant Chegg for the same user base. In a rare moment of corporate honesty, Chegg CEO Dan Rosensweig told investors that ChatGPT was impacting the company’s subscriber growth. Wall Street panicked. Chegg’s stock plummeted, its valuation shrank, and the company began rounds of layoffs—first 4% of its workforce, then 23% in 2024.

Desperate to stay relevant, Chegg pivoted again—this time toward “CheggMate,” its proprietary AI chatbot built in partnership with OpenAI. Yet the damage to its brand, and its future, was already apparent.

By 2025, Chegg was struggling to define its purpose in a rapidly changing education tech landscape. Its subscription model had been undermined by free AI. Its name remained tainted by years of academic dishonesty. And efforts to shift into AI tutoring raised further concerns about data privacy, surveillance, and automation in learning.

A Mirror of Higher Education’s Failures

Chegg’s rise and fall cannot be understood in isolation. It thrived in a system where students are overburdened, instructors are underpaid, and administrators look the other way as long as graduation rates and tuition dollars remain stable. Its gig-based backend—where underpaid "experts" supply answers for a global audience—mirrors the adjunctification of academic labor itself.

Derek Newton’s Cheat Sheet and other critical reporting have exposed how edtech platforms exploit the credibility crisis in higher education. The real scandal isn’t just that Chegg exists—it’s that the ecosystem made it necessary.

Conclusion

Chegg’s legacy may one day be viewed not as a revolution in learning, but as a symptom of higher education’s marketized decline. Like diploma mills and for-profit colleges before it, Chegg served the needs of students abandoned by the system—but did so at the cost of academic trust and intellectual growth.

As the AI era unfolds, and companies like Chegg scramble to reposition themselves, the Higher Education Inquirer will continue to ask: who profits, who pays, and who is left behind?


Sources

  • Derek Newton, Cheat Sheet newsletter: https://cheatsheet.substack.com

  • Chegg Inc. 10-K and Investor Calls (2015–2025)

  • The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Is Chegg Helping or Hurting?”

  • Inside Higher Ed, “Chegg, ChatGPT, and the New Arms Race in EdTech”

  • Bloomberg, “Chegg Warns of ChatGPT Threat”

  • Reddit threads: r/Professors, r/College, r/AcademicIntegrity

  • The Markup, “Chegg’s Gig-Economy Model and Academic Labor”

  • The Atlantic, “The Cheating Economy”

  • Higher Education Inquirer Archives on EdTech and Academic Integrity

Thursday, June 26, 2025

Murky Waters 2: Ambow Education, Chinese Influence, and US Edtech, 2013-2025

In Chinese culture, there’s an old proverb: “混水摸鱼” — “In murky waters, it is easier to catch fish.” The lesson is clear: confusion and opacity benefit those looking to manipulate outcomes for personal gain. In politics, finance, and international affairs, it is a warning. In the case of Ambow Education Holding Ltd., it may be a roadmap.

On June 26, 2025, Ambow announced a partnership with the tiny University of the West (UWest), a Buddhist college in Rosemead, California, enrolling just 153 students. The deal will implement Ambow’s HybriU platform—a so-called “phygital” learning solution combining digital and physical education delivery—positioning the technology as a tool for expanding U.S. academic access to international students. But a closer look reveals a story less about educational innovation than about power, soft influence, and the financialization of struggling institutions.

Ambow, a Cayman Islands–registered and formerly Beijing-based EdTech firm, has quietly entrenched itself in U.S. higher education. While other sectors of the U.S. economy—especially semiconductors and AI—have become more cautious of Chinese-linked investment due to national security concerns, American higher education remains notably exposed. The Ambow-UWest partnership exemplifies that vulnerability.

This is not Ambow’s first foray into U.S. academia. In 2013, the company was delisted from the New York Stock Exchange and liquidated after accusations of accounting irregularities. Rebranded and restructured offshore, Ambow re-entered the market, acquiring distressed for-profit colleges. In 2017, it bought Bay State College in Boston. Three years later, Massachusetts fined the school $1.1 million for fraudulent advertising, inflated placement rates, and illegal telemarketing. The school shuttered in 2023 after eliminating key services, including its library, and squandering pandemic-era federal aid.

In 2020, Ambow acquired the NewSchool of Architecture and Design in San Diego. Since then, NewSchool has appeared on the U.S. Department of Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring 2 list, signifying severe financial instability. Lawsuits followed, including one for unpaid rent and another over compensation disputes involving the school’s former president.

Still, Ambow continues to market itself as a leader in “AI-driven” phygital innovation. HybriU, its flagship platform, has been promoted at edtech and investor conferences like CES and ASU-GSV, with lofty promises about immersive education and intelligent classrooms. But the evidence is thin. The platform’s website contains vague marketing language, no peer-reviewed validation, no public client list, and stock images masquerading as real users. Its core technology, OOOK (One-on-One Knowledge), was piloted in China in 2021 but shows no signs of adoption by credible U.S. institutions.

Why, then, would a college like University of the West—or potentially a major public institution like Colorado State University (CSU), reportedly exploring a partnership with Ambow—risk associating with such an entity?

To understand the stakes, we must follow the money and the power behind the brand.

Ambow’s largest shareholder bloc is controlled by Jian-Yue Pan (aka Pan Jianyue), a Chinese executive with deep ties to the country’s tech and investment elite. Pan is general partner of CEIHL Partners I and II, two Cayman Islands entities that control roughly 26.7 percent of Ambow’s publicly floated Class A shares. He also chairs Uphill Investment Co., which is active in the semiconductor and electronics sectors, and holds board positions in tech firms with connections to Tsinghua University—one of China’s premier talent pipelines for its national strategic industries.

Pan’s voting control over Ambow gives him sweeping influence over its corporate decisions, executive appointments, and strategic direction. His role raises critical concerns about the use of U.S. higher education infrastructure as a potential channel for data access, market expansion, and soft geopolitical influence.

To further legitimize its U.S. operations, Ambow recently appointed James Bartholomew as company president. Bartholomew’s resume includes controversial stints at DeVry University and Adtalem Global Education. While at DeVry, the institution was fined $100 million by the FTC for deceptive marketing. At Adtalem, he oversaw operations criticized for offshore medical schools and active resistance to gainful employment regulations.

Even Ambow’s financial underpinnings are suspect. Its R&D spending hovers around $100,000 per quarter—trivial for a firm purporting to lead in AI and immersive tech. Its audits are performed by Prouden CPA, a virtually unknown Chinese firm, not one of the major global accounting networks. These red flags suggest not a dynamic tech company, but a shell operation kept afloat by hype, misdirection, and strategic ambiguity.

That makes its ambitions in U.S. public education all the more dangerous.

Reports that Colorado State University—a land-grant institution managing sensitive federal research—may be considering a partnership with Ambow should prompt urgent scrutiny. Has CSU conducted a full cybersecurity and national security risk assessment? Have university stakeholders—faculty, students, and the public—been involved in the review process? Or is the university racing blindly into an agreement driven by budget pressures and buzzwords?

American higher education has long been susceptible to bad actors promising solutions to enrollment declines and funding shortfalls. But in recent years, the cost of these decisions has grown. With campuses increasingly dependent on international student tuition and digital platforms, the door has opened to exploitative operators and geopolitical influence.

Ambow has already shuttered one U.S. college. Its remaining campus is on shaky footing. Its technology lacks serious vetting. Its leadership is tethered to past scandals. And its largest shareholder has interests far beyond education.

This is not just about Ambow. It is about the structural vulnerabilities in American higher education—an industry ripe for manipulation by financial speculators, tech opportunists, and foreign actors operating with impunity. The murky waters of privatized, digitized education reward those who operate without transparency.

Public universities must remember who they serve: students, faculty, and the public—not offshore shareholders or unproven platforms.

If Colorado State or any other institution moves forward with Ambow, they owe the public clear answers: What protections are in place? What risks are being considered? Who really controls the platforms delivering instruction? And most importantly, why are public institutions turning to unstable, opaque companies for core educational delivery?

As the proverb reminds us, murky waters are fertile ground for hidden agendas. But education, above all, demands clarity, integrity, and public accountability.


Sources:

  • SEC filings and 20-F reports: sec.gov

  • Massachusetts Attorney General settlement with Bay State College, March 2020

  • Federal Trade Commission settlement with DeVry University, December 2016

  • U.S. Department of Education Heightened Cash Monitoring List

  • NYSE delisting notices, 2013

  • CES and ASU-GSV conference archives, 2023–2024

  • Corporate data from MarketScreener and CEIHL Partners

  • Ambow’s 2023 Annual Report and quarterly 6-K filings


Wednesday, December 4, 2024

More Layoffs at 2U, the Online Program Manager for Elite Universities

2U, the parent company of edX, has announced more layoffs today. The layoffs were announced to staff and it's not known yet whether they will be publicly reported. It appears that many of the cuts will come from edX bootcamps which may be closing by June 2025. 

2U filed for bankruptcy earlier this year and the bankruptcy was approved by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on September 9th. Mudrick Capital Management is currently involved in the turnaround plan. 

According to David Halperin, the edtech company may also be the subject of investigations by the Federal Trade Commission and California Attorney General.

2U is the online program manager for a number of elite universities, including Harvard, Yale, MIT, and the University of California. Some of the programs have been the subject of public scorn by consumers who claim they were defrauded. HEI has been investigating 2U since 2019. The Wall Street Journal has also investigated 2U and written several critical stories

edX promises career support to people who sign up for bootcamps. But what happens when the bootcamps close?    

Related links:

FTC and California AG Have Been Investigating Online College Provider 2U (David Halperin) 

Workers at 2U expect more layoffs in 2024 

2U Collapse Puts Sallie Mae and SLABS Back on the Radar (Glen McGhee)

2U Suspended from NASDAQ. Help for USC and UNC Student Loan Debtors.

2U Declares Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Will Anyone Else Name All The Elite Universities That Were Complicit?

HurricaneTWOU.com: Digital Protest Exposes Syracuse, USC, Pepperdine, and University of North Carolina in 2U edX Edugrift

2U-edX crash exposes the latest wave of edugrift

2U Virus Expands College Meltdown to Elite Universities

Buyer Beware: Servicemembers, Veterans, and Families Need to Be On Guard with College and Career Choices

EdTech Meltdown

Erica Gallagher Speaks Out About 2U's Shady Practices at Department of Education Virtual Listening Meeting