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June 25, 2025
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WASHINGTON, D.C. — As the House Select Committee on the China opens its landmark hearing, “Authoritarians and Algorithms: Why U.S. AI Must Lead,” Committee leaders are unveiling new bipartisan legislation to confront the CCP’s growing exploitation of artificial intelligence.
Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) today announced the House introduction of the “No Adversarial AI Act”— bipartisan legislation also being championed in the Senate by Senators Rick Scott (R-FL) and Gary Peters (D-MI). The bill would prohibit U.S. executive agencies from acquiring or using artificial intelligence developed by companies tied to foreign adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party. The House legislation is cosponsored by a bipartisan group of Select Committee members, including Reps. Ritchie Torres (D-NY) and Darin LaHood (R-IL).
“We are in a new Cold War—and AI is the strategic technology at the center,” said Chairman Moolenaar. “The CCP doesn’t innovate—it steals, scales, and subverts. From IP theft and chip smuggling to embedding AI in surveillance and military platforms, the Chinese Communist Party is racing to weaponize this technology. We must draw a clear line: U.S. government systems cannot be powered by tools built to serve authoritarian interests.”
What the No Adversarial AI Act Does:
“Artificial intelligence controlled by foreign adversaries poses a direct threat to our national security, our data, and our government operations,” said Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi. “We cannot allow hostile regimes to embed their code in our most sensitive systems. This bipartisan legislation will create a clear firewall between foreign adversary AI and the U.S. government, protecting our institutions and the American people. Chinese, Russian, and other adversary AI systems simply do not belong on government devices, and certainly shouldn’t be entrusted with government data.”
Senator Rick Scott said, “The Communist Chinese regime will use any means necessary to spy, steal, and undermine the United States, and as AI technology advances, we must do more to protect our national security and stop adversarial regimes from using technology against us. With clear evidence that China can have access to U.S. user data on AI systems, it’s absolutely insane for our own federal agencies to be using these dangerous platforms and subject our government to Beijing’s control. Our No Adversarial AI Act will stop this direct threat to our national security and keep the American government’s sensitive data out of enemy hands.”
The legislation marks a major action in the Select Committee’s AI campaign, which aims to secure U.S. AI supply chains, enforce robust export controls, and ensure American innovation does not fuel authoritarian surveillance or military systems abroad.
Today’s hearing and legislation continues the series of new proposals and messaging the Committee will roll out this summer to confront the CCP’s exploitation of U.S. innovation and prevent American technology from fueling Beijing’s AI ambitions.
[Editor's note: The Higher Education Inquirer has attempted to contact the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party a number of times regarding our extensive investigation of Ambow Education and HybriU. As of this posting, we have never received a response.]
In the evolving landscape of U.S. higher education, one emerging force has attracted growing concern from the Higher Education Inquirer but remarkably little attention from policymakers: Ambow Education’s HybriU platform. Marketed as a next-generation AI-powered “phygital” learning solution designed to merge online and in-person instruction, HybriU raises serious questions about academic credibility, data governance, and foreign influence. Yet it has remained largely outside the scope of inquiry by the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.
Ambow Education has long operated in opaque corners of the for-profit higher education world. Headquartered in the Cayman Islands with a U.S. presence in Cupertino, California, the company’s governance and leadership history are tangled and controversial.
Under CEO and Board Chair Jin Huang, Ambow has repeatedly survived regulatory and institutional crises, prompting the HEI to liken her to “Harry Houdini” for her ability to evade sustained accountability even as schools under Ambow’s control deteriorated. Huang has at times held multiple executive and board roles simultaneously, a concentration of authority that has raised persistent governance concerns. Questions surrounding her academic credentials have also lingered, with no publicly verifiable evidence confirming completion of the doctoral degree she claims.
Ambow’s U.S. footprint includes Bay State College in Boston, which was fined by the Massachusetts Attorney General for deceptive marketing and closed in 2023 after losing accreditation, and the NewSchool of Architecture and Design in San Diego, which continues to operate under financial strain, low enrollment, leadership instability, and federal Heightened Cash Monitoring. These institutional failures form the backdrop against which HybriU is now being promoted as Ambow’s technological reinvention.
Introduced in 2024, HybriU is marketed as an AI-integrated hybrid learning ecosystem combining immersive digital environments, classroom analytics, and global connectivity into a unified platform. Ambow claims the HybriU Global Learning Network will allow U.S. institutions to expand enrollment by connecting international students to hybrid classrooms without traditional visa pathways. Yet independent reporting has found little publicly verifiable evidence of meaningful adoption at major U.S. universities, demonstrated learning outcomes, or independent assessments of HybriU’s educational value, cybersecurity posture, or data governance practices. Much of the platform’s public presentation relies on aspirational language, promotional imagery, and forward-looking statements rather than demonstrable results.
Compounding these concerns is Ambow’s extreme financial fragility. The company’s market capitalization currently stands at approximately US$9.54 million, placing it below the US$10 million threshold widely regarded by investors as a major risk category. Companies at this scale are often lightly scrutinized, thinly traded, and highly vulnerable to operational disruption. Ambow’s share price has also been highly volatile, with an average weekly price change of roughly 22 percent over the past three months, signaling instability and speculative trading rather than confidence in long-term fundamentals. For a company pitching itself as a provider of mission-critical educational infrastructure, such volatility raises serious questions about continuity, vendor risk, and institutional exposure should the company falter or fail.
Ambow’s own financial disclosures report modest HybriU revenues and cite partnerships with institutions such as Colorado State University and the University of the West. However, the terms, scope, and safeguards associated with these relationships have not been publicly disclosed or independently validated. At the same time, Ambow’s reported research and development spending remains minimal relative to its technological claims, reinforcing concerns that HybriU may be more marketing construct than mature platform.
The risks posed by HybriU extend beyond performance and balance sheets. Ambow’s corporate structure, leadership history, and prior disclosures acknowledging Chinese influence in earlier filings raise unresolved governance and jurisdictional questions. While the company asserts it divested its China-based education operations in 2022, executive ties, auditing arrangements, and opaque ownership structures remain. When a platform seeks deep integration into classroom systems, student engagement tools, and institutional data flows, opacity combined with financial fragility becomes a systemic risk rather than a marginal one.
This risk is heightened by the current political environment. With the Trump Administration signaling a softer, more transactional posture toward the CCP—particularly in areas involving business interests, deregulation, and foreign capital—platforms like HybriU may face even less scrutiny going forward. While rhetorical concern about China persists, enforcement priorities appear selective, and ed-tech platforms embedded quietly into academic infrastructure may escape meaningful oversight altogether.
Despite its mandate to investigate CCP influence across U.S. institutions, the House Select Committee on the CCP has not publicly examined Ambow Education or HybriU. There has been no hearing, subpoena, or formal inquiry into the platform’s governance, data practices, financial viability, or long-term risks. This silence reflects a broader blind spot: influence in higher education increasingly arrives not through visible programs or exchanges, but through software platforms and digital infrastructure that operate beneath the political radar.
For colleges and universities considering partnerships with HybriU, the implications are clear. Institutions must treat Ambow not merely as a technology vendor but as a financially fragile, opaque, and lightly scrutinized actor seeking deep integration into core academic systems. Independent audits, transparent governance disclosures, enforceable data-ownership guarantees, and contingency planning for vendor failure are not optional—they are essential.
Education deserves transparency, stability, and accountability, not hype layered atop risk. And oversight bodies charged with protecting U.S. institutions must recognize that the future of influence and vulnerability in higher education may be written not in classrooms, but in code, contracts, and balance sheets.
Higher Education Inquirer, “Jin Huang, Higher Education’s Harry Houdini” (August 2025)
https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2025/08/jin-huang-higher-educations-harry.html
Higher Education Inquirer, “Ambow Education Continues to Fish in Murky Waters” (January 2025)
https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2025/01/ambow-education-continues-to-fish-in.html
Higher Education Inquirer, “Smoke, Mirrors, and the HybriU Hustle: Ambow’s Global Learning Pitch Raises Red Flags” (July 2025)
https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2025/07/smoke-mirrors-and-hybriu-hustle-ambows.html
Ambow Education, 2024–2025 Annual and Interim Financial Reports
https://www.ambow.com
Market capitalization and volatility data, publicly available market analytics
Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, Bay State College settlement
U.S. Department of Education, Heightened Cash Monitoring disclosures
House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, mandate and public hearings
Ambow Education, once linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is aggressively exporting its AI-driven education platform, HybriU™, to global markets—even as its footprint in the United States remains small and opaque. The company’s international ambitions raise questions about transparency, governance, and potential political influence.
Ambow’s recent partnership with Bamboo System Technology aims to scale HybriU’s AI-education ecosystem across Southeast Asia, touting a deeper technology stack and expanded distribution. Yet outside China, Ambow’s record is spotty, and critics warn that the firm’s rapid expansion may outpace oversight or educational rigor.
In the U.S., Ambow reportedly explored a partnership with Colorado State University (CSU), though details remain murky. Engagements like these, combined with its involvement with specialized institutions such as the NewSchool of Architecture and Design, suggest a strategy of targeting schools where oversight may be limited and innovation promises can be oversold.
That strategy has already seen major fallout. Bay State College, which Ambow once owned, officially closed its doors in 2024 after years of financial instability, regulatory scrutiny, and declining enrollment. The college’s demise, following Ambow’s acquisition and subsequent divestment, underscores the risks faced by institutions entangled with opaque foreign education firms that promise modernization but deliver financial collapse.
Despite these global ambitions, Ambow’s American presence is modest: a small office tucked in Cupertino, California, suggesting the company may be testing the waters in the U.S. market rather than committing to a major operational footprint.
Recent corporate moves add to the uncertainty. In October 2025, Ambow filed a stock offering for up to $80 million, a move that could significantly dilute existing shareholders and raise questions about its capital needs, liquidity, and long-term strategy. While the offering may be designed to fund global expansion of HybriU™, analysts have noted the lack of clear financial disclosures and the company’s history of volatile performance.
Promotional efforts also raise eyebrows. Former Adtalem executive James Bartholomew has been enlisted to boost Ambow’s profile, but whether his role is purely marketing or part of a broader legitimacy campaign remains unclear.
For U.S. institutions, Ambow’s history—including prior CCP ties, the collapse of Bay State College, and its aggressive share issuance—presents a cautionary tale: a company that combines ambitious AI promises with a murky past and minimal transparency. Ambow’s expansion illustrates a growing challenge in higher education—navigating partnerships with foreign edtech firms while safeguarding institutional integrity, regulatory compliance, and academic quality.
Sources: Ambow Education press releases, SEC filings, Bamboo System Technology announcements, Higher Education Inquirer reporting, and U.S. Department of Education data.
WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, Chairman Moolenaar of the Select Committee on China, Chairman Walberg of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and Chairman Babin of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology sent two letters investigating the potential agroterrorism incident in Michigan earlier this month.
The first urges the National Institute of Health and the National Science Foundation to review grants awarded to two University of Michigan professors whose labs hosted Chinese nationals recently charged by the Department of Justice with smuggling biological materials.
"The Committees found that Jian and Liu conducted research under the supervision of, or in concert with, UM professors funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). It is our position that Chinese researchers tied to the PRC defense research and industrial base have no business participating in U.S. taxpayer-funded research with clear national security implications—especially those related to dangerous biological materials," says the first letter.
The letter reveals that the Chinese nationals were tied to professors who received approximately $9.6 million in federal research funding.
The second requests information directly from the University of Michigan regarding its oversight, compliance practices, and any internal reviews related to those individuals. It comes after previous research security concerns were raised regarding the university's relationships to the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Earlier this year, the university announced it had closed its joint institute with Shanghai Jiao Tong University following a letter from Chairman Moolenaar that outlined the school's ties to Chinese military modernization efforts.
"We are deeply alarmed about recent reports and related criminal charges involving Chinese nationals with direct ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) allegedly smuggling dangerous biological materials into the United States for use at UM laboratories," the letter writes. "Given the recent criminal charges within the span of a week, the Committees have respectfully urged the NIH and NSF to initiate a full review of any grants related to these incidents. To support this effort, we request that UM produce all documents and records of any due diligence, investigations, or other reviews—conducted by or on behalf of UM—concerning conflicts of interest or commitment involving any UM faculty, researchers, or individuals granted access to UM facilities."
The letters were signed by twenty-five Members of Congress from the three committees.