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Tuesday, December 16, 2025

Pyrrhic Defeat and the Student Loan Portfolio: How a Managed Meltdown Enables Unauthorized Asset Sales

In classical history, a Pyrrhic victory refers to a win so costly that it undermines the very cause it was meant to advance. Less discussed, but increasingly relevant to modern governance, is the inverse strategy: the Pyrrhic defeat. In this model, short-term failure is tolerated—or even cultivated—because it enables outcomes that would otherwise be politically, legally, or institutionally impossible. When applied to public finance, pyrrhic defeat theory helps explain how the apparent collapse of a system can be leveraged to justify radical restructuring, privatization, or liquidation of public assets.

Nowhere is this framework more relevant than in the management of the federal student loan portfolio.

The federal student loan portfolio, totaling roughly $1.6 to $1.7 trillion, is not merely an accounting entry. It is one of the largest consumer credit systems in the world and functions simultaneously as a public policy tool, a long-term revenue stream, a data infrastructure, and a political liability. It shapes who can access higher education, how risk is distributed across generations, and how the federal government exerts leverage over the postsecondary sector. Precisely because of its scale and visibility, the portfolio is uniquely vulnerable to narrative reframing.

That vulnerability was not accidental. It was constructed over decades through a series of policy decisions that stripped borrowers of normal consumer protections while preserving the financial attractiveness of student debt as an asset. Chief among these decisions was the gradual removal of bankruptcy protections for student loans. By rendering student debt effectively nondischargeable except under the narrow and punitive “undue hardship” standard, lawmakers transformed education loans into a uniquely durable financial instrument. Unlike mortgages, credit cards, or medical debt, student loans could follow borrowers for life, enforced through wage garnishment, tax refund seizure, and Social Security offsets.

This transformation made student loans exceptionally attractive for securitization. Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities, or SLABS, flourished precisely because the underlying loans were shielded from traditional credit risk. Investors could rely not on educational outcomes or borrower prosperity, but on the legal certainty that the debt would remain collectible. Even during economic downturns, SLABS were marketed as relatively stable instruments, insulated from the discharge risks that plagued other forms of consumer credit.

Private banks once dominated this market. Sallie Mae, originally a government-sponsored enterprise, became a central player in both originating and securitizing student loans, while Navient emerged as a major servicer and asset manager. Yet as Higher Education Inquirer documented in early 2025, banks ultimately lost control of student lending. Rising defaults, public outrage, state enforcement actions, and mounting evidence of predatory practices made the sector politically radioactive. The federal government stepped in not as a reformer, but as a backstop, absorbing the portfolio and stabilizing a system private finance could no longer manage without reputational and regulatory risk.

That history reveals a recurring pattern. When student lending fails in private hands, it becomes public. When the public system is allowed to fail, it becomes ripe for re-privatization.

A portfolio does not need to collapse to be declared unmanageable. It only needs to appear dysfunctional enough to justify extraordinary intervention.

The post-pandemic repayment restart, persistent servicing failures, legal challenges to income-driven repayment plans, and widespread borrower confusion have all contributed to a growing narrative of systemic breakdown. Servicers such as Maximus, operating under the Aidvantage brand, MOHELA, and others have struggled to process payments accurately, manage forgiveness programs, and provide reliable customer service. These failures are often framed as bureaucratic incompetence rather than as predictable consequences of outsourcing public functions to private contractors whose incentives are misaligned with borrower welfare.

Navient’s exit from federal servicing did not mark a retreat from the student loan ecosystem so much as a repositioning, as it continued to benefit from private loan portfolios and legacy SLABS exposure. Sallie Mae, rebranded and fully privatized, remains deeply embedded in the private student loan market, which continues to rely on the same nondischargeability framework that props up federal lending.

Crucially, these servicing failures cannot be separated from the earlier elimination of bankruptcy as a safety valve. In normal credit markets, distress is resolved through restructuring or discharge. In student lending, distress accumulates. Borrowers remain trapped, servicers remain paid, and policymakers are confronted with a swelling mass of unresolved debt that can be labeled a crisis at any politically convenient moment.

Under pyrrhic defeat theory, such a crisis is not merely tolerated. It is useful.

Once the federal portfolio is framed as broken beyond repair, the range of acceptable solutions expands. What would be politically impossible in a stable system becomes plausible in an emergency. Asset transfers, securitization of federal loans, expansion of SLABS-like instruments backed by government guarantees, or long-term conveyance of servicing and collection rights can be presented as pragmatic fixes rather than ideological choices.

A Trump administration would be particularly well positioned to exploit this dynamic. Skeptical of debt relief, hostile to administrative governance, and ideologically aligned with privatization, such an administration could recast the portfolio as a failed public experiment inherited from predecessors. In that framing, selling or offloading the portfolio is not an abdication of responsibility but an act of fiscal discipline.

Importantly, this need not take the form of an explicit, congressionally authorized sale. Risk can be shifted through securitization. Revenue streams can be monetized. Servicing authority can be extended indefinitely to private firms. Data control can migrate outside public oversight. Over time, these steps amount to de facto privatization, even if the loans remain nominally federal. The infrastructure, incentives, and profits move outward, while the political blame remains with the state.

This is where earlier McKinsey & Company studies reenter the conversation. Long before the current turmoil, McKinsey analyses identified high servicing costs, fragmented contractor oversight, weak borrower segmentation, and low political returns on administrative complexity. While framed as efficiency critiques, these studies implicitly favored market-oriented restructuring. In a crisis environment, such recommendations become blueprints for divestment.

The danger of a pyrrhic defeat strategy is that it delivers a short-term political win at the cost of long-term public capacity. Selling or functionally privatizing the student loan portfolio may improve fiscal optics, but it permanently weakens democratic control over higher education finance. Borrowers, already stripped of bankruptcy protections, lose what remains of public accountability. Policymakers lose leverage over tuition inflation and institutional behavior. The federal government relinquishes a powerful counter-cyclical tool. What remains is a debt regime optimized for extraction, enforced by servicers, securitized for investors, and detached from educational outcomes.

The defeat is real. It is borne by students, families, and future generations. The victory belongs to those who acquire distressed public assets and those who benefit ideologically from shrinking the public sphere.

Pyrrhic defeat theory reminds us that collapse is not always accidental. In the case of the federal student loan portfolio, what appears to be dysfunction or incompetence may instead be strategic surrender: a willingness to let a public system deteriorate so that it can be sold off, securitized, or outsourced under the banner of necessity. If that happens, it will not be remembered as a policy error, but as a deliberate transfer of public wealth and power—made possible by decades of legal engineering that began when bankruptcy protection was taken away and ended with student debt transformed into a permanent financial asset.


Sources

Higher Education Inquirer. “When Banks Lost Control of Student Loan Lending.” January 2025.
https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2025/01/when-banks-lost-control-of-student-loan.html

U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid. FY 2024 Annual Agency Performance Report. January 13, 2025.

U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid. Federal Student Loan Portfolio Data and Statistics, various years.

Government Accountability Office. Student Loans: Key Weaknesses in Servicing and Oversight, multiple reports.

Congressional Budget Office. The Federal Student Loan Portfolio: Budgetary Costs and Policy Options.

U.S. Congress. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 and prior amendments affecting student loan dischargeability.

Pardo, Rafael I., and Michelle R. Lacey. “The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation.” American Bankruptcy Law Journal.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission materials on asset-backed securities and consumer credit markets.

McKinsey & Company. Student Loan Servicing, Portfolio Optimization, and Risk Management Analyses, prepared for federal agencies and financial institutions, 2010s–early 2020s.

Higher Education Inquirer archives on SLABS, servicers, privatization, deregulation, and student loan policy.

Wednesday, March 26, 2025

A Planned Failure? The Dangerous Path to Privatizing Student Loans

In a move that has raised eyebrows across Washington and beyond, President Donald Trump recently announced a plan to transfer the U.S. Department of Education’s vast student loan portfolio—totaling a staggering $1.8 trillion—to the Small Business Administration (SBA). Ostensibly, the goal is to "reorganize" and streamline the management of federal student loans. But behind the curtain, some experts and insiders are questioning whether this bold move is merely the beginning of a much darker plan: privatization at the expense of millions of American borrowers.

The Alleged 'Rescue' of the Loan Portfolio

The White House has framed the transfer as a necessary step to relieve the Department of Education (ED) of a heavy burden, positioning the Small Business Administration as the new "caretaker" of the nation’s student debt. According to President Trump, the SBA—under the leadership of Kelly Loeffler—will now handle the $1.8 trillion student loan portfolio, while the Department of Education focuses on other key educational initiatives.

For some, the move seems like a fresh approach to a problem that has long plagued U.S. higher education: the overwhelming student debt crisis. However, a deeper look into the mechanics of the transfer suggests that this could be the first step toward a far more troubling goal: the dismantling of the federal student loan system and the privatization of debt, a shift that could harm millions of consumers in the process.

The SBA’s Inexperience with Student Loans

For starters, the SBA has no real experience with managing educational debt. Historically, the agency has focused on small business loans, a niche financial product entirely different from student loans. The SBA is not equipped to handle the complex structure of federal student loans, which include income-driven repayment plans, loan forgiveness programs, and myriad protections for borrowers struggling to repay their debt.

While the SBA does have experience guaranteeing loans, it has never managed a portfolio of this size or complexity. With the agency also facing a 43% workforce reduction, including 2,700 staff members, it seems highly unlikely that the SBA will be able to competently manage the student loan system—especially when 40% of these loans are already in default or behind on payments.

This raises an obvious question: is the SBA being set up to fail?

The Planned Failure

According to several former senior officials within the Department of Education and others close to the discussions, the transfer of the student loan portfolio to the SBA could very well be a deliberate failure. These sources suggest that the true purpose of the transfer is not to improve the system, but to destabilize it—creating a crisis that would ultimately justify selling off the loan portfolio to private companies. In other words, the apparent "failure" of the SBA to manage the loans could be the prelude to a much broader and more damaging shift.

“This is the classic playbook of the privatization agenda: create a crisis, then say the only solution is to sell off the asset to the private sector,” one former senior Education Department employee explained. “If the SBA fails to manage the portfolio, it will create a narrative that only the private sector can do it effectively, and that will pave the way for Wall Street to swoop in.”

This strategy mirrors similar efforts in other sectors, where privatization has often been sold as a solution to government inefficiency. In the case of student loans, the "failure" of the SBA to properly manage the portfolio could lead to a private sector takeover, where for-profit companies would be free to set the terms of repayment, charge higher interest rates, and strip away borrower protections—all at the expense of consumers.

The Consumer Cost

While the government may pocket the short-term profits from selling off the portfolio, it is borrowers who will feel the brunt of the consequences. Private companies, driven by the desire for profits, would have little incentive to offer the same borrower-friendly protections currently available under the federal student loan system.

The end of income-driven repayment options, the loss of loan forgiveness programs, and an end to the temporary moratorium on student loan payments could push millions of borrowers into even deeper financial distress. Higher interest rates, less favorable repayment terms, and a complete lack of support for struggling borrowers are all potential outcomes if the loans are sold to the private sector.

Moreover, the move could disproportionately affect low-income borrowers and those already in default, who would likely face harsher terms under a privatized system. For many, this could mean years—or even decades—of paying off debt that continues to balloon, with no hope of relief.

A Dangerous Precedent

If this plan succeeds, it will set a dangerous precedent. The government's involvement in student loans has, for decades, been a safety net for borrowers. The idea of privatizing this essential system could open the floodgates for more essential public services to be sold off to private corporations, with little regard for the public good.

“Once you give the private sector control over something as critical as education debt, it’s hard to see where it stops,” said another insider. “This is not just about student loans. It’s about how we view the role of government in providing public services.”

The Long-Term Fallout

In the long run, the privatization of student loans could exacerbate the country’s growing wealth inequality, widen the racial wealth gap, and place an insurmountable burden on future generations of borrowers. For many, student loans are not just a financial issue—they are a life issue, affecting everything from career prospects to the ability to buy a home or start a family. The sale of the loan portfolio could result in an economic landscape where the cost of education becomes a permanent burden on a generation, with few avenues for relief.

A Predatory Scheme?

The proposed transfer of the student loan portfolio to the SBA may appear to be an effort to reform the system, but closer inspection reveals a much darker agenda: one that seeks to create a crisis that will pave the way for the privatization of federal student loans. While the government may stand to gain in the short term, the long-term consequences for borrowers could be devastating.

In the end, the real price of this maneuver will be paid by consumers, who could face higher costs, fewer protections, and more financial instability. If this plan moves forward as expected, it will be a devastating blow to the millions of Americans who rely on the federal student loan system—a Pyrrhic victory that benefits private interests, but leaves consumers to bear the consequences.

In the quest for privatization, the true cost of this gamble may well be borne by those who can least afford it: the borrowers.

Friday, April 18, 2025

The Haves and Have Nots of Higher Education and Student Loan Debt

In a move that has raised eyebrows across Washington and beyond, President Donald Trump recently announced a plan to transfer the U.S. Department of Education’s vast student loan portfolio—totaling a staggering $1.8 trillion—to the Small Business Administration (SBA). This bold step is ostensibly designed to streamline the management of federal student loans, but it is also seen by many as the first move in a larger effort to dismantle the Department of Education entirely, reduce federal oversight, and privatize key aspects of the student loan system. Alongside this plan, there are growing discussions about eliminating essential borrower protections, including programs like Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), Pay As You Earn (PAYE), Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), and the Borrower Defense to Repayment program, all of which have offered critical relief to millions of students. Additionally, the rollback of Gainful Employment regulations—which were designed to protect students from predatory for-profit institutions—further signals a shift toward private sector control, which has historically benefited lenders over borrowers.


The Alleged 'Rescue' of the Loan Portfolio

The White House has framed the transfer of the student loan portfolio to the SBA as a necessary step to relieve the Department of Education (ED) of a heavy burden, positioning the SBA as the new “caretaker” of the nation’s student debt. According to President Trump, the SBA—under the leadership of Kelly Loeffler—will now handle the $1.8 trillion student loan portfolio, while the Department of Education focuses on other key educational initiatives.

For some, the move seems like a fresh approach to a problem that has long plagued U.S. higher education: the overwhelming student debt crisis. However, a deeper look into the mechanics of the transfer suggests that this could be the first step toward a far more troubling goal: the dismantling of the federal student loan system and the privatization of debt, a shift that could harm millions of consumers in the process.


The SBA’s Inexperience with Student Loans

The SBA, traditionally tasked with managing small business loans, lacks the expertise to effectively manage the complex structure of federal student loans, which include income-driven repayment plans, loan forgiveness programs, and various protections for struggling borrowers. With the agency also facing significant staffing cuts, it’s highly unlikely that the SBA will be able to competently handle such a vast and complicated portfolio—especially when 40% of these loans are already in default or behind on payments.

This raises an obvious question: is the SBA being set up to fail? Some insiders suggest that the failure of the SBA to properly manage the student loan portfolio could be deliberate—creating a crisis that would justify selling off the portfolio to private companies, thus privatizing the entire system.


The Planned Failure: A Strategy for Privatization?

According to several former senior officials within the Department of Education, the transfer of the student loan portfolio to the SBA could be a calculated move to destabilize the federal loan system. The apparent failure of the SBA to manage the loans would then serve as a justification for transferring the loans to the private sector. This mirrors tactics used in other sectors where privatization was pursued under the guise of government inefficiency. The fear is that this move could ultimately lead to for-profit companies taking over the loan system, with borrowers facing higher interest rates, stricter repayment terms, and the loss of essential protections.


Who Stands to Gain from Privatizing Student Loans?

The shift toward privatizing student loans stands to benefit several key players in the financial and educational sectors, particularly for-profit companies and private lenders who have long pushed for deregulation and profit-driven management of student debt. The primary beneficiaries would include:

  1. Private Lenders and Financial Institutions: Banks, investment firms, and loan servicing companies are the most obvious winners in a privatized student loan system. With the federal government stepping back, these entities would gain control over the $1.8 trillion portfolio, allowing them to set higher interest rates, stricter repayment terms, and impose fees on borrowers. This would turn student loans into even more lucrative financial products for the private sector.

  2. For-Profit Educational Institutions: For-profit colleges, which often rely on student loans to fund their operations, could also stand to gain. These institutions—many of which have faced significant scrutiny for high tuition costs and poor student outcomes—would benefit from a less regulated environment. Without the Gainful Employment regulations, which were designed to hold these institutions accountable for their job placement and earnings data, they would face fewer restrictions on their recruitment practices and financial dealings, potentially allowing them to continue enrolling students in expensive, low-quality programs.

  3. Servicers and Debt Collection Agencies: Loan servicers and debt collection agencies that would likely take over the management of student loans in a privatized system stand to profit greatly. By controlling the servicing of student loans, these companies can increase their fees and aggressively pursue defaulting borrowers, further exacerbating the financial hardship for many students. These entities would benefit from a less regulated environment where the focus would shift toward profitability, often at the expense of borrowers.

  4. Political Donors and Lobbyists: Financial institutions and for-profit education providers have historically been major political donors and lobbyists, particularly to policymakers who have pushed for deregulation of student loan systems. Privatization could provide these stakeholders with the opportunity to consolidate their power over the student loan industry, influencing policy decisions in their favor and ensuring continued access to profits from the student loan market.


A History of Struggles: Lack of Oversight and Privatization Since the 1980s

The idea of privatizing student loans and dismantling federal oversight is not entirely new. In fact, the U.S. student loan system has been struggling for decades due to a lack of oversight and a trend toward privatization dating back to the 1980s. The federal government’s role as a guarantor of student loans—starting with the creation of the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program in the 1960s—was eventually scaled back, leading to a rise in private student loans. As private lenders entered the student loan market, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, the system became increasingly unregulated, leading to rising debt levels and predatory lending practices.

By the 1980s, the federal government’s reliance on private institutions to handle student loans led to a lack of transparency, accountability, and consumer protections. In particular, private lenders began to offer loans with fewer safeguards, contributing to the explosion of student loan debt and the proliferation of for-profit colleges that preyed on vulnerable students. The government, despite its involvement, increasingly stepped back from actively managing the loan system, leaving students with limited options for relief when they fell into financial distress.


The Consequences of Deregulation: Elite Colleges and the Growing Educated Underclass

One of the most significant byproducts of the shift toward privatization and deregulation in U.S. higher education has been the growth of a growing educated underclass. While elite colleges have continued to thrive, expanding their endowments and increasing their tuition fees, a large segment of the population is left with a degree and overwhelming debt that fails to deliver on its promise. Over the past several decades, prestigious universities have only gotten wealthier, with many now sitting on endowments of billions of dollars. These institutions benefit from the student loan system, which allows students to take on more debt to afford high tuition costs, all while their wealthy alumni networks and expansive endowments only grow larger.

At the same time, a growing number of students from lower-income backgrounds—many of whom attend for-profit or underfunded public colleges—are graduating with significant debt and few prospects for stable, high-paying careers. This has created a growing “educated underclass,” where graduates with degrees struggle to find employment that pays enough to manage their loan repayment, further exacerbating wealth inequality.


The Dangers of Future Issues: AI, Automation, and the Loss of Good Jobs

Looking to the future, the privatization of student loans and the increasing burden of student debt could be exacerbated by emerging technological shifts, particularly in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and automation. As industries evolve and more jobs become automated, many middle-class careers traditionally accessible to graduates may disappear or evolve into low-wage, low-security positions. This could lead to an even larger divide between the "haves" and "have-nots" in society, where only those with connections or elite educational backgrounds can secure stable, high-paying employment.

For students entering the workforce with massive student loan debt, this would present a troubling scenario where their ability to repay their loans becomes even more difficult as fewer well-paying jobs are available. This, in turn, would increase the financial strain on future generations of students who are already navigating a rapidly changing job market. For many, student loans could become an insurmountable barrier, keeping them trapped in cycles of debt that are impossible to escape.

Moreover, the increasing reliance on private companies to manage student loans, with their focus on profitability, could exacerbate these issues by offering fewer opportunities for income-driven repayment plans or relief options that account for the economic realities of an AI-powered, automation-driven economy. As the job market continues to shrink and evolve, the need for federal programs to support borrowers through tough economic times will only grow.


The Impact of Eliminating Borrower Protections

The elimination of borrower protections—such as PSLF, PAYE, ICR, and Borrower Defense to Repayment—would significantly worsen the student loan crisis. Public Service Loan Forgiveness, for example, allows individuals working in essential public service careers to receive loan forgiveness after ten years of qualifying payments. Without this program, many public servants would face a lifetime of insurmountable debt. Similarly, income-driven repayment programs allow borrowers to repay loans based on their income, making it easier for those in low-paying fields to manage their debt.

The Borrower Defense to Repayment program provides vital relief to students who were defrauded by their institutions. Without strong enforcement of this program, students may have no recourse to seek relief from predatory schools. The rollback of Gainful Employment regulations could further expose students to the risks of attending for-profit institutions that fail to deliver on their promises.


The Long-Term Fallout: A Dangerous Precedent

The long-term consequences of privatizing student loans could include exacerbating wealth inequality, widening the racial wealth gap, and creating an economic landscape where education debt is a permanent burden on a generation of students. If privatization moves forward, the financial burden of education will likely become a far more persistent and overwhelming problem, especially for those who can least afford it.

What’s particularly concerning is that in past crises, it’s the elites—wealthy colleges, financial institutions, and large corporations—that have consistently received the bulk of government bailouts. The same institutions that contribute the least to solving the country’s educational inequities continue to benefit from taxpayer-funded relief. If privatization moves forward, we cannot allow the same pattern to repeat itself. The majority of relief should go to those most burdened by student debt, not those who already have the means to navigate the system with ease.


The Future of Higher Education Debt: A Call to Protect Federal Loan Programs

At the Higher Education Inquirer, we stand in full support of federal student loan forgiveness and repayment programs, including PSLF, PAYE, and ICR, as they offer essential pathways for borrowers, especially public service workers and low-income individuals. These programs provide vital relief to borrowers, allowing them to focus on their careers without the burden of overwhelming debt. We urge policymakers to protect, enhance, and expand these vital initiatives to ensure that education remains accessible and equitable for all.

As we continue to face challenges in higher education financing, it is crucial to learn from past mistakes and advocate for systems that prioritize the well-being of students, not profit. The proposed privatization of the student loan system threatens to undo decades of progress and burden future generations with lifelong debt. It is essential that we protect these programs and work toward a solution that prioritizes education and fairness over corporate interests.

Tuesday, March 4, 2025

The Future of Federal Student Loans

The U.S. student loan system, now exceeding $1.7 trillion in debt and affecting over 40 million borrowers, is facing significant challenges. As political pressures rise, the management of student loans could be significantly altered. A combination of potential privatization, the elimination of the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and a new role for the Department of the Treasury raises critical questions about the future of the system.

U.S. Department of Education: Strained Resources and Outsourcing

The U.S. Department of Education (ED) is responsible for managing federal student loan servicing, loan forgiveness programs, and borrower defense to repayment (BDR) claims. However, ED has faced ongoing issues with understaffing and inefficiency, particularly as many functions have been outsourced to contractors. Companies like Maximus (including subsidiaries like AidVantage) manage much of the administrative burden for loan servicing. This has raised concerns about accountability and the impact on borrowers, especially those seeking loan relief.

In recent years, ED has also experienced staff reductions and funding cuts, making it difficult to process claims or maintain high-quality service. The potential for further cuts or even the elimination of the department could exacerbate these problems. If ED’s role is diminished, other entities, such as the Department of the Treasury, could assume responsibility for managing the student loan portfolio, though this would present its own set of challenges.

Potential for Privatization of the Student Loan Portfolio

One of the most discussed options for addressing the student loan crisis is the privatization of the federal student loan portfolio. Under previous administration discussions, including those during President Trump’s tenure, there were talks about selling off parts of the student loan portfolio to private companies. This would be done with the aim of reducing the federal deficit.

In 2019, McKinsey & Company was hired by the Trump administration to analyze the value of the student loan portfolio, considering factors such as default rates and economic conditions. While the report's findings were never made public, the idea of transferring the loans to private companies—such as banks or investment firms—remains a possibility.

The consequences of privatizing federal student loans could be significant. Private companies would likely focus on profitability, which could result in stricter repayment terms or less flexibility for borrowers seeking loan forgiveness or other relief options. This shift may reduce borrower protections, making it harder for students to challenge repayment terms or pursue loan discharges.

The Department of the Treasury and its Potential Role

If the U.S. Department of Education is restructured or eliminated, there is a possibility that the Department of the Treasury could step in to manage some aspects of the student loan portfolio. The Treasury is responsible for the country’s financial systems and debt management, so it could, in theory, handle the federal student loan portfolio from a financial oversight perspective.

However, while the Treasury has experience in financial management, it lacks the specialized knowledge of student loans and borrower protections that the Department of Education currently provides. For example, the Treasury would need to find ways to process complex Borrower Defense to Repayment claims, a responsibility ED currently manages. In 2023, over 750,000 Borrower Defense claims were pending, with thousands of claims related to predatory practices at for-profit colleges such as University of Phoenix, ITT Tech, and Kaplan University (now known as Purdue Global). Additionally, some of these for-profit schools were able to reorganize and continue operating under different names, further complicating the situation.

The Treasury could also contract out loan servicing, but this could increase reliance on profit-driven companies, possibly compromising the interests of borrowers in favor of financial performance.

Borrower Defense Claims and the Impact of For-Profit Schools

A large portion of the Borrower Defense to Repayment claims comes from students who attended for-profit colleges with a history of deceptive practices. These institutions, often referred to as subprime colleges, misled students about job prospects, program outcomes, and accreditation, leaving many with significant student debt but poor employment outcomes.

Data from 2023 revealed that over 750,000 Borrower Defense claims were filed with the Department of Education, many of them against for-profit institutions. The Sweet v. Cardona case showed that more than 200,000 borrowers were expected to receive debt relief after years of waiting. However, the process was slow, with an estimated 16,000 new claims being filed each month, and only 35 ED workers handling these claims. These delays, combined with the uncertainty around the future of ED, leave borrowers vulnerable to prolonged financial hardship. 

Lack of Transparency and Accountability in the System

While the U.S. Department of Education tracks Borrower Defense claims, it does not publish institutional-level data, making it difficult to identify which schools are responsible for the most fraudulent activity. 

In response to this, FOIA requests have been filed by organizations like the National Student Legal Defense Network and the Higher Education Inquirer to obtain detailed information about which institutions are disproportionately affecting borrowers. 

In one such request, the Higher Education Inquirer asked for information regarding claims filed against the University of Phoenix, a school with a significant number of Borrower Defense claims.

The lack of transparency in the system makes it harder for borrowers to make informed decisions about which institutions to attend and limits accountability for schools that have harmed students. If the Treasury or private companies take over management of the loan portfolio, these transparency issues could worsen, as private entities are less likely to prioritize public accountability.

Conclusion

The future of the U.S. student loan system is uncertain, particularly as the Department of Education faces the potential of funding cuts, staff reductions, or even complete dissolution. If ED’s role diminishes or disappears, the Department of the Treasury could take over some functions, but this would raise questions about the fairness and transparency of the system.

The possibility of privatizing the student loan portfolio also looms large, which could shift the focus away from borrower protections and toward financial gain for private companies. For-profit schools, many of which have a history of predatory practices, are responsible for a disproportionate number of Borrower Defense claims, and any move to privatize the loan portfolio could exacerbate the challenges faced by borrowers seeking relief from these institutions.

Ultimately, there is a need for greater transparency and accountability in how the student loan system operates. Whether managed by the Department of Education, the Treasury, or private companies, protecting borrowers and ensuring fairness should remain central to any future reforms. If these issues are not addressed, millions of borrowers will continue to face significant financial hardship.

Wednesday, February 21, 2024

Trump 2024 and the Student Loan Portfolio

The US Department of Education (ED) handles the student loans of about 40 million US citizens, holding on to about $1.6 Trillion in debt--which is considered an asset to the US government.  And ED-FSA (Federal Student Aid) hires tens of thousands of workers, mostly contractors, to service the debt. But that could change in a few years. If Donald Trump is elected President.  

Under President Trump, debtors might expect that their loans to be transferred over to large corporations--at some point--with the sale being used to reduce the federal deficit, and to cut labor at ED. This would aid in the effort to eliminate the US Department of Education, as Trump has promised on the campaign trail.

Selling off the student loan debt portfolio may or may not require approval from anyone outside of the President. At least one study, by McKinsey & Company, has already been conducted regarding this possibility. 

In 2019, the Trump administration hired McKinsey to analyze the $1.5 trillion federal student loan portfolio. This analysis was part of a broader effort to explore options for managing the portfolio, including potentially selling off some of the debt. Results were never published. The analysis was conducted alongside a study by FI Consulting, which focused on the economic value of the portfolio, noting that the valuation could vary depending on future default rates, prepayment rates, and economic conditions.

The new owners of the sold off debt would most likely be big banks and other large companies, both domestic and foreign, that find value in the debt. There would be political and social resistance.  And many questions would need to be answered, in detail.

Would large banks or other large corporations be better stewards of the debt?

Would the bidding be transparent?  

Would consumers be able to challenge loan repayments or ask for forgiveness?  

What would happen to the contracts of the existing debt servicers?  

Will this expand the existing Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities market? 


Related link:

The Student Loan Mess Updated: Debt as a Form of Social Control and Political Action

Monday, November 15, 2021

More Transparency About the Student Debt Portfolio Is Needed: Student Debt By Institution

It's commonly known that US student loan debt is now about $1.7 trillion and that more than 44 million Americans are laden with this debt.  It's also known that student debt is not a problem for everyone who goes to college or everyone who takes out loans.  

Student loan debt is not equally distributed: while the children of elites can go to school without incurring debt and find meaningful work after graduation, working families are burdened because so many cannot find decent, gainful employment after dropping out or even after graduating from college--work that would enable them to repay their loans.

Student loan debt is also not distributed equally among the schools that generate the debt.  Working class people who have the opportunity to get to elite schools may incur less debt there than by attending state universities--but others who attend these elite schools, especially online at the graduate level, may not be so lucky.  

Those who attend subprime colleges, and who take the wrong majors, may incur debt they can never repay.  

And the multitude of debtors in between, the many millions going to less than elite schools, are having to restrict their dreams as they pay back their loans.  

The US Department of Education and other organizations publish important information on student loan debt.  The College Scorecard, for example, gives consumers information on the debt they can expect, gainful employment after attending, and the numbers on student loan repayment.   The Washington Monthly also ranks colleges, and important numbers, like social mobility rankings and amount of principal paid are in the rankings. The Century Foundation and The Institute for College Access and Success (TICAS) also contribute to our knowledge. 

But there are glaring gaps in our current knowledge about student loan debt, knowledge necessary for establishing greater transparency and accountability.  

One of the most important knowledge gaps is in learning about student debt by institution.  In 2016, Adam Looney and Constantine Yannelis presented a conference paper on student loan debt that listed student loan debt by institution.  

Table 5 in this report showed an important aspect of the debt, of accumulated debt, the percent of principal still owed on debt, and the 5-year student loan default rate.  University of Phoenix attendees had an estimated $35 billion in accumulated debt, outpacing Walden University.  And Argosy, Strayer, Capella, DeVry, American Intercontinental, and Nova Southeastern attendees owed more money than the principal of their loans, 5 years after the loans were taken out.  Kaplan University (know known as Purdue University Global) had a 5-year student loan default rate of 53 percent, and Ashford University (know known as University of Arizona, Global Campus) and Colorado Technical Institute had 5-year student loan default rates of 47 percent.  These subprime colleges, in effect, were draining the student loan portfolio while providing a service that hurt many of their customers.  

Even some big brand name schools like NYU, University of Southern California, Penn State, Arizona State University, Ohio State, University of Minnesota, Michigan State, Rutgers, Temple, UCLA, and Indiana University had students with enormous amounts of debt that they were having to pay off.  


The data in this study were from 2009 and 2014.  What has happened since then at the institutional level?  What schools today are draining the student loan portfolio and financially crippling those who have attended?  Consumers and tax payers should be allowed to know.  

Related link: The College Dream is Over (Gary Roth)

Related Link: USC Pushed a $115,000 Online Degree. Graduates Got Low Salaries, Huge Debt (Wall Street Journal-Lisa Bannon and Andrea Fuller) 

Related link: A crisis in student loans? How changes in the characteristics of borrowers and in the institutions they attended contributed to rising loan default ( Looney and Yannelis, 2016)

Related link: College Meltdown Expands to Elite Universities

Related link: What happens when Big 10 grads think "college is bullsh*t"?

Monday, April 3, 2023

Higher Education FOIA Requests to US Department of Education

The Higher Education Inquirer has made a number of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the US Department of Education.  Here's our current list.  

 

23-01436-F 

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting copies of the current contracts between the US Department of Education and Maximus (including but not limited to subsidiaries such as AidVantage). If this is not possible we would like the reported dollar amount for each contract. This request is part of a larger effort to assess the student loan debt portfolio. (Date Range for Record Search: From 01/01/2010 To 04/03/2023)

23-01426-F  

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting the dollar amount of student loan funds issued to for-profit colleges each year from 1972 to 2021.  We will accept interim or partial data.  (Date Range for Record Search: From 01/01/1973 To 04/03/2022)


23-01369-F  
 
The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting an estimate of the number of student loans in the student loan portfolio that originated (1) before 1978, (2) before 1983, (3) before 1988, and (4) before 1993.  This is part of a larger effort to understand the estimated $674B in unrecoverable student loan debt.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 01/01/2023 To 03/28/2023)

23-01324-F  
 
The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting a count of the number of Borrower Defense to Repayment claims against South University and the Art Institutes, in the Consumer Engagement Management System (CEMS) up to January 1, 2023.  We would also like to know if their parent company, Education Principle Foundation (EPF), is listed as the owner of both schools in the CEMS computer database.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 01/01/2023 To 03/22/2023)

23-01263-F
 
The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting a list of all the variables/categories in the Consumer Engagement Management System (CEMS).  CEMS is mentioned in FOIA 22-01683F filed by the National Student Legal Defense Network.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 01/01/2023 To 03/16/2023)

23-00865-F 
 
We are requesting an accounting of US Department of Education Borrower Defense to Repayment (BD) claims against the University of Phoenix.  Specifically, we are asking for the (1) number of BD claims, (2) the number processed, and (3) the number approved.  The date range is from February 20, 2016 to January 26, 2023. If there is a reasonable way to estimate the total dollar amount in a timely manner, we would also like that.  This request is similar to FOIA request 22-03203-F, and is a result of discovering that the University of Arkansas System has been in negotiations to acquire University of Phoenix through a nonprofit organization.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 02/20/2016 To 01/26/2023)
 
Related links:
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

Monday, April 28, 2025

Maximus AidVantage

[Image of AidVantage operations in Greenville, Texas. Note the barbed wire fence.]

The recent decision to have the Small Business Administration (SBA) take over the federal student loan portfolio has sent shockwaves through the world of education finance. As the SBA — an agency traditionally focused on supporting small businesses — begins to manage a multi-billion dollar portfolio of student loans, borrowers, consumer protection advocates, and financial experts alike are left to question what this transition means for the future of loan servicing, borrower protections, and higher education financing.

At the heart of this shift is the role of Maximus AidVantage, one of the major student loan servicers handling federal loans. Maximus has already come under scrutiny for its inefficiency, poor customer service, and mishandling of crucial borrower programs, such as Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) and Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans. The company’s track record has led to widespread frustration, with many borrowers reporting significant issues, including misinformation, lost paperwork, and mistakes that have placed them at risk of financial hardship.

Yet, despite these concerns, Maximus has maintained its position at the helm of federal student loan servicing. Its CEO, Bruce Caswell, has been compensated handsomely for overseeing the company’s role in this controversial space. According to recent financial reports, Caswell’s total compensation has included a base salary of over $1.3 million, with total compensation often exceeding $8 million when accounting for bonuses, stock options, and other forms of remuneration. This high pay, especially in light of the company’s poor performance in customer service and loan servicing, raises questions about the priorities of both the company and the federal government, which continues to entrust Maximus with managing the finances of millions of borrowers.

The Shift to the SBA: A Lack of Expertise

The most immediate concern surrounding the SBA’s takeover of student loan management is its lack of expertise in this field. The SBA’s core mission has been to assist small businesses, offering loan guarantees and financial support to promote economic growth. While it is well-equipped to manage business loans, the agency has no experience dealing with the unique and complex needs of student loan borrowers. Federal student loans involve intricate repayment plans, borrower protections, and specialized programs like PSLF, all of which require a deep understanding of the educational sector and the financial struggles of students and graduates.

Transferring such an important and complex responsibility to the SBA without a clear plan for adaptation could lead to mismanagement, inefficiencies, and disruptions for millions of borrowers. The SBA simply isn’t set up to handle issues like loan forgiveness, income-driven repayment plans, and the variety of special accommodations that are necessary for student borrowers. If the SBA isn’t adequately staffed or resourced to take on these new responsibilities, students could be left in the lurch, facing delays, confusion, and even errors in their loan servicing.

A Confusing Transition for Borrowers

For those already dealing with the intricacies of federal student loans, this transition to the SBA is likely to create a significant amount of confusion. Student loan borrowers rely on clear communication, accurate account management, and timely assistance when navigating repayment plans. The Department of Education has long been the agency responsible for ensuring that these programs are managed effectively, but with the SBA taking over, borrowers may face new systems, new contacts, and, potentially, a lack of clarity about their loan status.

One of the biggest risks in this transition is the potential disruption of critical loan repayment programs, such as PSLF, which allows public service workers to have their loans forgiven after ten years of payments. These programs require careful management to ensure that borrowers meet the necessary qualifications. The SBA is not accustomed to handling such programs and may struggle to maintain the same level of efficiency and accuracy, especially if the agency does not prioritize dedicated support for student loan borrowers.

Diminished Consumer Protections

Perhaps the most concerning outcome of the SBA taking over student loans is the potential erosion of consumer protections. The Department of Education has a specific mandate to protect borrowers, which includes holding loan servicers accountable for mishandling accounts and ensuring transparency in loan servicing practices. The SBA, however, has never been tasked with such consumer-focused regulations, and its shift to managing student loans raises concerns that borrower rights might not be adequately enforced.

For example, the SBA may not have the resources or inclination to monitor loan servicers like Maximus closely, allowing them to continue engaging in deceptive practices without fear of regulatory repercussions. The agency might also be less likely to step in when borrowers face issues such as misapplied payments, incorrect information about forgiveness programs, or poorly managed accounts. With the SBA’s focus on business rather than consumer welfare, student loan borrowers may find themselves facing more hurdles without the protections that the Department of Education once provided.

The Impact on Repayment and Forgiveness Programs

Another pressing issue is the potential disruption of repayment and forgiveness programs under SBA oversight. Programs like Income-Driven Repayment (IDR), designed to help borrowers pay off their loans based on their income, require careful management and regular updates. Similarly, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program is highly specific and requires rigorous tracking of borrowers’ payments and work history to ensure they qualify for forgiveness after ten years.

If the SBA is not adequately equipped to handle these specialized programs, borrowers might find themselves in a precarious position, especially if their loans are mismanaged or if they are denied forgiveness due to administrative errors. The confusion caused by the transition could delay or even derail borrowers’ efforts to achieve loan forgiveness, leaving them stuck with debt for longer than expected.

The Role of Maximus: Financial Incentives Amidst Failure

Amidst the uncertainty of this transition, Maximus continues to play a key role in servicing the federal student loan portfolio. Yet, despite its persistent failures in managing accounts and borrower relations, Maximus has remained highly profitable, with Bruce Caswell’s executive compensation reflecting this success in terms of revenue but not in terms of customer satisfaction.

Maximus’s reported $8 million in total compensation for Caswell, despite the company’s history of customer complaints, raises serious questions about priorities. While Maximus rakes in millions from servicing federal loans, borrowers are left to deal with the consequences of mistakes, misinformation, and poor service. In a system where the stakes are incredibly high for borrowers, this disparity between executive pay and customer service is concerning, especially in light of the SBA’s takeover, which promises more uncertainty.

Adding to the controversy, Maximus has also been involved in labor disputes with the Communications Workers of America (CWA), its workers' union. These disputes, which have centered on issues such as wages, benefits, and working conditions, further complicate the company’s already tarnished reputation. Workers have accused Maximus of engaging in unfair labor practices and failing to adequately support employees who are tasked with assisting borrowers. If these labor disputes continue to affect employee morale and productivity, it could lead to even worse service for borrowers who are already dealing with a complicated and frustrating loan servicing process. The combination of poor customer service, labor unrest, and executive compensation that seems out of sync with the company’s performance paints a troubling picture for the future of student loan management under Maximus.

The Threat of Reduced Loan Forgiveness and IDR Plans

Adding to the turmoil surrounding the future of student loans is the growing effort by the U.S. government to reduce or even eliminate key student loan forgiveness programs like Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) and Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans. These programs were designed to provide crucial relief for borrowers working in public service or those struggling with debt relative to their income. However, recent reports suggest that the government may look to reduce eligibility for these programs, impose stricter requirements, or completely eliminate them altogether as part of broader fiscal policy adjustments.

The removal of or reductions to these programs would leave borrowers with fewer avenues to manage their debt, potentially increasing default rates and extending the time it takes for borrowers to repay their loans. For individuals in public service jobs or those facing financial hardship, these changes would have a devastating impact on their ability to achieve financial stability and pay down their student loans. If the SBA, with its lack of focus on education finance, inherits this responsibility without reinforcing these programs, borrowers might find themselves in a far worse position than ever before.

Furthermore, this reduction in borrower protections and streamlining of repayment options may also be part of a broader strategy to push more borrowers into private loan options, which could further exacerbate financial hardship for those who are already struggling. With private loans often carrying higher interest rates, less favorable repayment terms, and fewer options for deferral or forgiveness, such a shift would mark a significant pivot towards privatization, benefiting financial institutions while leaving borrowers with even fewer protections and much higher costs.

A Plan to Push Consumers Toward Private Loans?

Many experts are beginning to question whether the government’s plans for overhauling student loan servicing are part of a larger agenda to move borrowers toward private loans. By reducing or eliminating federal loan protections, forgiveness programs, and income-driven repayment options, the government may be attempting to create a vacuum in which private lenders can step in and offer alternative (and likely more expensive) financing options.

This push toward privatization could significantly increase profits for private lenders while making it harder for borrowers to repay their loans. With private loans lacking many of the protections and flexible repayment options offered by federal loans, such a shift could result in higher default rates and greater financial instability for borrowers, particularly for those with already high debt levels.

Conclusion: A New Era of Uncertainty

The transition of student loan servicing to the Small Business Administration represents a significant shift in the federal student loan system, one that could lead to inefficiencies, confusion, and a reduction in protections for borrowers. With agencies like Maximus AidVantage continuing to profit from loan servicing despite failing borrowers, ongoing labor disputes, and a focus on executive compensation over customer service, and the SBA stepping into a complex arena with limited experience, the future of student loan servicing seems fraught with challenges.

The push to reduce or eliminate key student loan forgiveness programs like PSLF and IDR only adds to the uncertainty, leaving millions of borrowers facing a potentially more difficult future. Moreover, the possibility of moving consumers toward private loans with fewer protections and harsher terms would deepen the financial struggles of many borrowers. This move underscores the importance of effective oversight and the need for federal agencies to prioritize the well-being of borrowers over financial interests. The student loan system should be about more than just revenue generation — it should be about supporting borrowers and ensuring that they can achieve financial freedom, not be left trapped in a cycle of debt and frustration. Without proper management, this new era of student loan servicing risks deepening the crisis for millions of Americans who are already struggling to keep up with their education-related debts.

Sunday, January 30, 2022

How University of Phoenix Failed. It's a Long Story. But It's Important for the Future of Higher Education.

The failure of University of Phoenix (UoPX) is more than a dark moment in higher education history.  It should act as a lesson learned in the higher ed business. Executives at 2U, Guild Education, Coursera, Liberty University, Purdue University Global, University of Arizona Global, Chegg, Academic Partnerships, Pearson PLCNavientMaximus and other for-profit and non-profit entities must take heed of the mistakes and the hubris of Phoenix, the wisdom of its cofounder John D. Murphy, and the silencing of important worker voices.  

For several decades of the 20th century, hundreds of University of Phoenix campuses dotted the American landscape, conveniently located in cities and growing suburbs, off major highways. Founded in 1973, America's largest university became a for-profit darling of Wall Street in the 1980s and 1990s, and the provider of career education for mid-level managers in corporate America and public service. A Phoenix degree was the ticket to promotions and salary increases.  

During its zenith, the school was backed by dozens of lawyers and DC lobbyists and a number of politicians and celebrities--including Nancy Pelosi, John McCain, Shaquille O'Neil, Al Sharpton, and Suze Orman. UoPX bought the naming rights to the Arizona Cardinals' pro football stadium in 2006. And in 2010, enrollment at the University of Phoenix stood at nearly a half million students.  The school even had an enormous presence at US military installations across the globe. University of Phoenix's presence was everywhere.* 

Phoenix's stock rose for many reasons. It was a leader in educational innovation. It was convenient and affordable for upwardly social mobile workers.  Its profits were large, and its labor costs were relatively low because UoPX hired business leaders and experts in the field, not tenured scholars, to teach part-time.  

But something went horribly wrong along the way.

In the 2010s, University faced government and media scrutiny for its questionable business practices, its declining graduation rates, and its part in creating billions in student loan debt. And when workers voiced their concerns, they were silenced in a variety of ways, from threats and intimidation to firings. 

This enrollment collapse has now lasted a dozen years and counting.  

Today, as a miniscule portion of Apollo Global Management's portfolio, UoPX's enrollment numbers are less than 100,000--and few of its physical campuses remain open during the Covid pandemic. It's not known how many campuses, if any, are financially viable.  

University of Phoenix enrollment, 2009-2016 (Source: US Department of Education) 

There are a several reasons why University of Phoenix is just a shadow of what it was. Businesspeople and lobbyists blame government regulation and oversight; others blame the relentless pursuit of quarterly profits and corrupt Apollo Group CEOs, including Todd Nelson.

Having talked to co-founder John D. Murphy and read his book Mission Forsaken, what I found out was that University of Phoenix began failing three decades earlier, during the Ronald Reagan era, when US companies chose to invest less in their workforces.  When this post-Fordist shift happened, US companies reduced benefits for workers, and divested in the education and training of mid-level executives.

In order to keep the company growing in the face of this retrenchment, UoPX shifted its mission, from educating America's upwardly mobile workers to enrolling anyone--at any cost. The company could only decline as it preyed upon consumers and silenced its workers.   After 2010, enrollment counselors were signing up people who were woefully unprepared academically and financially for college work.  

By 2014, about 1 million University of Phoenix's alumni were saddled with more than $35 billion in student loan debt    

US Student Loan Debt by Institution (Source: Brookings, Looney and Yannelis, 2015)

In 2017, Apollo Group sold the company to Apollo Global Management, an investment behemoth, along with Vistria Group and the Najafi Companies.   As part of its holdings, the school was a tiny portion of its portfolio. Barak Obama's close friend, Anthony Miller, was paid to be Board president.  

Among national universities, UoPX is now ranked near the bottom in social mobility according to the Washington Monthly.

In January 2022, as a sign of its continued unraveling, Apollo Education appointed George Burnett, a former executive of three failed or predatory companies, including Alta College and Academic Partnerships, to be Phoenix's newest President. 

UoPX's problems are a symptom of an economic system that despite the hype cares little about workers: a system that today looks at labor costs as something to be reduced--rather than an investment. With few exceptions, America's most powerful corporations: Amazon, Walmart, Target, Yum Brands, McDonalds--rely on low-wage labor and automation to make a huge profit. Companies in medicine, finance, and tech have smaller labor numbers--and while work may be lucrative at the moment, it's becoming more precarious.

*In the early 2010s, Apollo Group, Phoenix's former parent company, spent between $376 million and $655 million a year on ads and marketing.  









Related link: Guild Education 

Thursday, March 16, 2023

Borrower Defense Claims Surpass 750,000. Consumers Empowered. Subprime Colleges and Programs Threatened.

The Higher Education Inquirer has posted a number of articles about student loan debt. In 2023, the student loan mess has reached epic proportions. Not only has the US Federal Student Aid debt portfolio reached more than $1.6 Trillion, we learned that $674 Billion was estimated to be unrecoverable. 

In California, the US District Court in Sweet v Cardona agreed to a $6 Billion settlement between student debtors and the US Department of Education. 

In Texas, a group representing for-profit colleges has sued the US Department of Education for their actions in settling Borrower Defense claims. 

And across the US, about 40 million student debtors and their families are awaiting a decision from the US Supreme Court—a decision that will not likely favor the debtors.

Borrower Defense, Subprime Colleges, Subprime Programs

Borrower Defense to Repayment claims are claims by student loan debtors that their school misled them or engaged in other misconduct in violation of certain state laws. The Department of Education may discharge all or some of the student loan debt and hold the school and its owners responsible. 

As of January 2023, there are more than three quarters of a million Borrower Defense claims against schools. And each month, about 16,000 new claims are added.  Evidence from the Sweet v Cardona case revealed that only about 35 workers were responsible for processing hundreds of thousands of claims. Those claims have been disproportionately made against a number of for-profit colleges and formerly for-profit colleges, what we call “subprime colleges.”   

Some of these subprime schools have closed (Everest College, ITT Tech, and Westwood College for example), some remain in business as for-profit colleges (like University of Phoenix and Colorado Tech), some have changed names and become covert for-profit colleges or robocolleges (like Purdue University Global, University of Arizona Global Campus, and the Art Institutes), and some schools act act like subprime colleges regardless of tax status. This includes low-return on investment programs at several US robocolleges and overly expensive graduate programs offered by 2U, an online program manager for elite colleges.  

In the Sweet v Cardona case, more than 200,000 student borrowers are expecting to receive full debt relief after years of struggling.  A Facebook group Borrower Defense-Sweet vs. Cardona currently has more than 14,000 members. 


Named plaintiffs Theresa Sweet (L) and Alicia Davis (R) outside the federal district court in San Francisco on November 6, 2022, three days before the final approval hearing in Sweet v Cardona (Image credit: Ashley Pizzuti)

Transparency and Accountability 

The US Department of Education keeps an accounting of Borrower Defense claims, but only publishes the aggregate numbers, not institutional numbers. Those institutional numbers do make a difference in promoting transparency and accountability for the largest bad actors. So why does the Department of Education not publish those institutional numbers?
 
The National Student Legal Defense Network submitted a FOIA (22-01683F) to the US Department of Education (ED) in January 2022 asking just for that information. And what HEI has discovered is that just a small number of schools garnered the lion's share of the Borrower Defense claims. To get a digital copy of that information, please email us for a free download.

Related links:

Borrower Defense-Sweet vs Cardona (Facebook private group)  

Project on Predatory Student Lending

Sweet v. Cardona Victory (Matter of Life and Debt podcast)

I Went on Strike to Cancel My Student Debt and Won. Every Debtor Deserves the Same. (Ann Bowers)

An Email of Concern to the People of Arkansas about the University of Phoenix (Tarah Gramza)


The Growth of "RoboColleges" and "Robostudents"