Risepoint: The Rise and Fall of Another OPM?

In recent years, the online education sector has seen dramatic growth, largely fueled by partnerships between universities and Online Program Managers (OPMs) like Risepoint (formerly known as Academic Partnerships). These companies promised to help institutions expand their online offerings, providing technical support, marketing services, and student recruitment in exchange for a significant share of tuition revenue. However, as OPMs grew in power, their business models came under intense scrutiny for potentially exploitative and predatory practices.

The Rise of Risepoint

Risepoint, initially founded as Academic Partnerships (AP) in 2007 by Randy Best, became a leading player in the OPM space, helping universities launch and manage online degree programs. In return, Risepoint took a significant cut of the tuition fees, sometimes as much as 50%. The company’s model relied heavily on tuition-share agreements, which have long been controversial due to the significant financial burden they place on both institutions and students.

These arrangements became more contentious as the cost of higher education continued to rise, particularly in the case of online degrees. Critics argue that the large sums taken by OPMs like Risepoint divert essential funds from universities, leading to higher tuition fees and contributing to the growing student debt crisis. This concern has been amplified by the rise in aggressive recruitment tactics employed by OPMs, which often target low-income students with promises of easy access to higher education without fully disclosing the financial implications.

Randy Best's Ties to Republicans: A Controversial Network

Randy Best, the founder of Academic Partnerships, had close connections to prominent Republicans, including Jeb Bush, the former governor of Florida. Best has been a well-known advocate for education reform and has built a network of relationships within both political parties. His close ties to Bush, a key figure in education policy, have been part of a broader pattern of OPM companies gaining influence across the political spectrum.

This bipartisan network of political connections allowed Best and Academic Partnerships to navigate the political landscape and expand their reach in the higher education sector. However, critics argue that such ties may have contributed to a lack of accountability for OPM companies like AP/Risepoint, who have operated with little oversight while profiting off of public institutions.

Risepoint's Ownership: The Vistria Group and Its Ties to the Obama Administration

A key piece of Risepoint’s corporate structure lies in its ownership by Vistria Group, a Chicago-based venture capital firm with close ties to political and corporate elites, including former President Barack Obama. In 2019, Vistria Group acquired Academic Partnerships for its Vistria II fund, adding the company to a broader portfolio that includes a number of for-profit education assets such as Edmentum, Vanta Education, FullBloom Education, MSI Information Services, Apollo Education Group, and Unitek Learning.

Vistria’s co-founder, Marty Nesbitt, is a close friend of Barack Obama, and the firm has been associated with several high-profile political figures. Nesbitt himself is known to have worked closely with Obama on various initiatives, and his connections have helped Vistria expand its reach in the education sector. The firm’s investment in Risepoint underscores a broader trend of venture capital firms seeking profit from higher education, leading to concerns about the growing corporate influence on public institutions and their students.

The Controversy at the University of Texas-Arlington

The close connections between OPMs and university leaders have not been without scandal. In 2020, Vistasp Karbhari, the president of the University of Texas-Arlington, resigned following a controversy involving his relationship with Academic Partnerships. Karbhari had accepted two international trips paid for by the company, sparking an investigation into potential conflicts of interest. The university had paid Academic Partnerships more than $178 million over a five-year period for managing its online degree programs.

This situation drew public attention to the potential for improper financial relationships between university administrators and private OPM companies. The high cost of these partnerships, particularly the large amounts paid to OPMs like Academic Partnerships, raised questions about whether universities were prioritizing student outcomes or simply enriching private firms at the expense of public funds.

Minnesota Leads the Way: A State Takes Action

The controversy surrounding tuition-share deals reached a boiling point in 2024 when Minnesota became the first state to pass legislation restricting these agreements. St. Cloud State University in Minnesota had signed a tuition-share deal with Risepoint that resulted in the company receiving a substantial percentage of tuition revenue. Critics of the arrangement argued that the deal drained valuable resources from public universities, while enriching private companies at the expense of students.

In response to mounting pressure, Minnesota lawmakers passed a bill banning new tuition-share agreements with OPMs, signaling a shift toward greater oversight of these partnerships. The move was hailed by critics as a much-needed reform to protect public institutions and students from exploitative business models.

Senate Concerns and Growing Backlash

In addition to state-level efforts, U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, and Tina Smith raised concerns over OPM practices in a 2024 letter to eight major OPM companies, including Risepoint. The senators questioned whether the recruitment tactics and revenue-sharing models contributed to rising student debt and whether these companies were sufficiently transparent about how tuition funds were being used.

“We continue to have concerns about the impact of OPM partnerships on rising student debt loads,” the senators wrote. They specifically targeted the high percentage of tuition revenue taken by OPMs, arguing that this model created financial disincentives for universities to lower costs or improve educational outcomes for students.

In response, Risepoint and other OPM companies indicated a willingness to engage with policymakers, but the growing scrutiny of their business practices indicates that their influence in the higher education space may be waning.

Academic Partnerships Acquires Wiley’s Online Business

In an interesting turn of events, AP/Risepoint expanded its reach in November 2023 by acquiring Wiley’s online business for $150 million. This acquisition is part of a broader trend of consolidation in the OPM sector, as companies seek to maintain their competitive edge in an increasingly saturated market.

The deal underscores Risepoint’s ambition to broaden its portfolio of online education services, even as its business practices face growing criticism. While Risepoint sees this acquisition as a growth opportunity, others view it as a sign of the consolidation of power within the OPM sector—a market that has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of transparency and for its role in inflating costs for both universities and students.

New Department of Education Guidelines

As the federal government joined the conversation, the U.S. Department of Education took steps to regulate the OPM industry more closely. In January 2025, the department issued new guidance that could lead to penalties for colleges that allow their OPM partners to mislead students. The guidance prohibits OPM employees from using college email addresses or signatures that imply they are employed by the institution, as well as from misrepresenting the quality of online programs.

The Department of Education’s actions came in response to long-standing concerns about misleading marketing practices. Student advocacy groups have called for stronger oversight of OPMs, which often promise students high-quality education without fully disclosing the financial ramifications. “OPMs commonly mislead students about the quality of their online programs, and that is illegal,” said Carolyn Fast, director of higher education policy at The Century Foundation.

The Decline of OPM Growth

However, the OPM industry is showing signs of slowing down. A report by Validated Insights in October 2024 revealed that OPM growth has dramatically slowed, with 147 partnerships ending in 2023—the highest number of contract terminations since 2020. Additionally, new contracts for 2024 have dropped by more than 50%. This slowdown signals that many universities are reevaluating their reliance on OPMs like Risepoint, opting instead to bring online programs in-house or partner with alternative providers.

The reduction in OPM partnerships reflects broader trends in higher education, where increasing scrutiny over business models, rising student debt, and calls for greater accountability are reshaping the landscape. Universities are under increasing pressure to justify the cost and efficacy of online degree programs, and many are finding that the financial burden of partnering with OPMs may no longer be sustainable.

The Future of Risepoint and the OPM Industry

The scrutiny surrounding Risepoint and other OPMs is part of a larger conversation about the future of online education and the need for greater transparency in how these programs are marketed and funded. As states like Minnesota lead the charge to limit tuition-share agreements, and as federal agencies take a more active role in regulating the industry, the days of unchecked growth for OPMs may be numbered.

Risepoint, once a leader in the OPM space, now faces a rapidly changing regulatory environment that threatens its business model. While the company continues to acquire new assets like Wiley’s online business, the industry as a whole may be entering a period of retrenchment, with universities becoming more cautious about entering into partnerships with companies that take a large cut of tuition revenue.

As the OPM industry faces increasing scrutiny and regulatory challenges, the future of companies like Risepoint remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the once-booming market for online program management is shifting, and the predatory practices that have long been associated with OPMs are being closely examined. Whether Risepoint can adapt to these changes or whether the OPM model as a whole will undergo significant reform remains to be seen.

OPM Market Landscape And Dynamics: Spring 2023 Updates (Phil Hill)

Editor's Note:  This article first appeared in Phil Hill's On EdTech Blog. 

Wow. Just wow – the last twelve months have been something.

Was this forwarded to you by a friend? Sign up, and get your own copy of the news that mattered sent to your inbox every week. Sign up for the On EdTech newsletter. Interested in additional analysis? It’s free through May 24, 2023. Upgrade to the On EdTech+ newsletter.

On to the update. [full-page audio link]

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During several keynotes, podcast interviews, and panel sessions over the past two years, I have described how the Online Program Management (OPM) market was facing enormous pressures and would change dramatically. I took some heat in private conversations for overstating the case, but as the past 12 months have shown, it turns out that I understated the turmoil and change of the market.

With that in mind, it is time to update our two main OPM Market graphics that were last shared in the Summer 2022 update.

OPM Market Landscape

• Market valuations of publicly-traded OPM companies have continued to drop, with 2U/edX, Coursera, and Keypath all down 75% or more from March 2021.

• Pearson tapped out of the market, agreeing to sell its OPM business to private equity firm Regent.

• Zovio is no more. It has ceased to be.

• FutureLearn sold the remnants of its business to a for-profit system, and it now has the most obnoxious website of any OPM provider, past or present.

• Byju’s, which (according to multiple media accounts) had been considering an acquisition of 2U/edX or Coursera, abandoned these plans to go off and deal with its own financial crisis.

• Noodle acquired South Africa-based Hubble Studios.

• The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the OPM market, triggering (but not causing) official efforts to make massive regulatory changes.

As readers of On EdTech know, this last bullet is now the driver for market dynamics for 2023 and probably 2024.

As always, please note that this view is intended to give a visual overview of the market landscape and is not mean to be comprehensive in terms of vendors represented. This is particularly true in the smaller customer base and fee for service categories.

OPM Market Dynamics

When we first came up with the Mad Max graphic in 2018, it was intended to counter the golly gee, the OPM market is rich, well-funded, and growing like crazy coverage, or the flip side of these companies are all getting rich pulling profits out of the schools coverage that we saw in EdTech and national media through 2022.

This year there are two primary changes with the overall message of the graphic:

• Online enrollments in the largest OPM market (US graduate schools) are no longer growing – they’re dropping and in structural ways. OPMs are still chasing those enrollments and tuition revenue, but the dynamics change when the target has its own problems.

• The small threat from the Department of Education and its activist allies to the OPM market has become a major threat, with an all-out assault.

We still get a picture of a chaotic market that is not for the faint of heart, and one that is seeing consolidations and category changes, and these changes will continue. All of this in a Mad Max-style pursuit of college online course and program revenue (whether rev share or fee-for-service or a blend, and whether degree- or certificate-based).

Note the changes in the program revenue target:

as well as the central market threat from ED regulations, going after both revenue sharing and TPS status, all in the name of protecting the helpless:

with 2U being the chosen target to personify the regulatory actions:

We also see Pearson getting out of the OPM business:

Zovio’s crash:

and Byju’s flying away from the scene.

ASU+GSV Angle

Next week I (along with Glenda Morgan) will be at ASU+GSV, and I will be on a panel with Ryan Craig, Mike Goldstein, Katherine Lee Carey, and Toby Jackson. The session is titled “Decoding the Dear Colleague Letter – What’s a TPS?!”, scheduled for Wednesday at 11am PDT. I am eager to find out at the conference if the investment community is aware of the significance of ED’s targeting of the OPM market, at least for revenue sharing business models, and of the potential impact of TPS guidance.

Update 4/13: Added bullet on Noodle acquiring Hubble Studios.

Caltech Settlement Spotlights Critical Need for OPM Transparency and Oversight in Higher Education

A recent Republic Report article by Jeremy Bauer-Wolf outlines the terms of a legal settlement between the California Institute of Technology and students enrolled in its Simplilearn-run cybersecurity bootcamp. The case and its resolution reveal larger systemic risks associated with university partnerships with Online Program Managers (OPMs), particularly those involving aggressive marketing, limited academic oversight, and questionable student outcomes.

The Caltech-Simplilearn bootcamp, launched under Caltech’s Center for Technology and Management Education, was marketed heavily using the university's brand. Students enrolled in the program alleged that Caltech misrepresented its level of involvement. The program was, in fact, designed and operated by Simplilearn, a for-profit OPM controlled by Blackstone and backed by GSV Ventures. The university seal and branding were used extensively in recruitment materials, leading some students to believe they were enrolling in a Caltech-created and Caltech-taught program. The class-action lawsuit contended that the program failed to live up to the expectations created by this branding.

As part of the settlement, Caltech and Simplilearn agreed to provide refunds to more than 260 students, totaling about $400,000. In addition to financial relief, the agreement requires clear disclosures that the bootcamp is “in collaboration with Simplilearn” and mandates that recruiters use Simplilearn email addresses rather than appearing to represent Caltech. The university must also ensure instructors possess verifiable professional credentials, not just certificates from prior bootcamp participation. Caltech is scheduled to wind down the program by the end of November 2025.

The Higher Education Inquirer previously reported in September 2024 that the Caltech-Simplilearn partnership was a case study in what can go wrong with white-labeled OPM programs. Simplilearn, which reported 35–45 percent annual revenue growth, had entered similar arrangements with Purdue, UMass, Brown, and UC San Diego. In many of these cases, the university’s brand was being used to sell pre-packaged courses created and delivered by the OPM. In Reddit forums and independent consumer reviews, former students regularly cited misleading marketing, lack of academic rigor, and poor support services. HEI's reporting raised concerns about the involvement of GSV Ventures, whose investors include high-profile education reformers like Arne Duncan and Michael Horn, as well as the private equity backing of Blackstone.

John Katzman, founder of the Noodle OPM, publicly warned about this model in 2024, saying, “White labeling is done everywhere… Still, I wouldn’t put my university’s name on other peoples’ programs without clear disclosure.” The Caltech case confirms that the reputational risks of such arrangements are real and can result in legal and financial liability.

The broader implications are significant. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, universities have increasingly turned to OPMs to expand their online offerings quickly and with limited internal resources. These partnerships often involve tuition-share agreements in which the OPM receives a large percentage of student revenue—sometimes as much as 80 percent. In return, the OPM provides marketing, recruitment, course development, and instructional support. However, as Caltech’s case illustrates, this model can easily sideline university faculty, diminish educational quality, and mislead students.

Policy makers have begun to respond. Minnesota has banned tuition-share arrangements in its public colleges. Ohio now requires OPM disclosure on university websites. A 2023 California state audit found that several public institutions were engaging in misleading marketing through their OPM partners. Yet federal regulations around OPMs remain limited and largely unenforced, despite calls for greater oversight.

The Caltech settlement reinforces the need for strong institutional governance over OPM partnerships. Universities must ensure full transparency in marketing, maintain academic control over curriculum and instruction, and build systems of accountability that protect students from misleading practices. Caltech’s retreat from its bootcamp partnership may serve as a warning to other elite institutions that have outsourced large portions of their online education operations with minimal oversight.

This episode also underscores the importance of investigative journalism in higher education. The Higher Education Inquirer’s early reporting on the Caltech-Simplilearn relationship helped expose a pattern of questionable practices that extend far beyond one institution. With private equity and venture capital deeply embedded in the OPM sector, the risks of commodifying higher education continue to grow.

Sources:
https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2024/09/cal-tech-simplilearn-blackstone-scandal.html
https://www.republicreport.org/2025/caltech-settlement-underscores-need-for-opm-oversight-in-higher-ed/
https://www.govtech.com/education/higher-ed/caltech-settles-lawsuit-over-cybersecurity-boot-camp-marketing
https://newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/

Erica Gallagher Speaks Out About 2U's Shady Practices at Department of Education Virtual Listening Meeting

Hello, my name Erica Gallagher and I am a graduate of the University of Southern California’s online Masters of Social Work program. Or to put it more accurately, I am a graduate of 2U’s online Masters of Social Work diploma mill. 

2U is the Online Program Management or OPM company that runs USC’s online MSW program. When I decided to attend USC, I had no idea that the online MSW program was actually run by 2U.

I didn’t know that my classes were going to be taught by instructors who were hired specifically for the OPM classes, rather than USC professors, or that they would be using outdated materials to teach me.

I didn’t know that OPM employees were the ones assigning us field placements, many of which had nothing to do with our experiences.

I didn’t know that the admissions representatives and the counselors I was emailing on a day-to-day basis were actually OPM employees, and not actual USC staff. That’s because they went to great efforts to make students believe this was fully a USC program, even arming 2U employees with USC email addresses. 

If I had known, I would have never enrolled. 

From the moment I looked into the program until the moment I graduated, I was lied to. I was promised a USC education that would open doors for me, and that’s not what I got. Instead, I got a shady, but equally as expensive, version of USC’s on-campus MSW program.

It’s so important for people to realize how much this OPM model hurts students. It rewards greed and profit at the expense of a quality education. It incentivizes schools to sign up as many people as they can, charging top dollar for subpar programs, while hiding their deception and profiteering behind the nonprofit brands of well-regarded schools.





The fact that they did this with a social work program — to people who were trying to build a career motivated by helping others — adds even more insult to injury.

Having this degree was supposed to change my life, but all it has done is complicate it. All I’ve gotten with this diploma is a mountain of debt and anxiety.

Related link: 

OPMS: The Next Frontier of Predatory Practices in Higher Education  (PPSL Blog)

2U Virus Expands College Meltdown to Elite Universities  

Colleges Are Outsourcing Their Teaching Mission to For-Profit Companies. Is That A Good Thing? (Richard Fossey)

Borrower Defense Claims Surpass 750,000. Consumers Empowered. Subprime Colleges and Programs Threatened.

The Expanding Crisis in U.S. Higher Education: OPMs, Student Loan Servicers, Deregulation, Robocolleges, AI, and the Collapse of Accountability

Across the United States, higher education is undergoing a dramatic and dangerous transformation. Corporate contractors, private equity firms, automated learning systems, and predatory loan servicers increasingly dictate how the system operates—while regulators remain absent and the media rarely reports the scale of the crisis. The result is a university system that serves investors and advertisers far more effectively than it serves students.

This evolution reflects a broader pattern documented by Harriet A. Washington, Alondra Nelson, Elisabeth Rosenthal, and Rebecca Skloot: institutions extracting value from vulnerable populations under the guise of public service. Today, many universities—especially those driven by online expansion—operate as financial instruments more than educational institutions.

The OPM Machine and Private Equity Consolidation

Online Program Managers (OPMs) remain central to this shift. Companies like 2U, Academic Partnerships—now Risepoint—and the restructured remnants of Wiley’s OPM division continue expanding into public universities hungry for tuition revenue. Revenue-sharing deals, often hidden from the public, let these companies keep up to 60% of tuition in exchange for aggressive online recruitment and mass-production of courses.

Much of this expansion is fueled by private equity, including Vistria Group, Apollo Global Management, and others that have poured billions into online contractors, publishing houses, test prep firms, and for-profit colleges. Their model prioritizes rapid enrollment growth, relentless marketing, and cost-cutting—regardless of educational quality.

Hyper-Deregulation and the Dismantling of ED

Under the Trump Administration, the federal government dismantled core student protections—Gainful Employment, Borrower Defense, incentive-compensation safeguards, and accreditation oversight. This “hyper-deregulation” created enormous loopholes that OPMs and for-profit companies exploited immediately.

Today, the Department of Education itself is being dismantled, leaving oversight fragmented, understaffed, and in some cases non-functional. With the cat away, the mice will play: predatory companies are accelerating recruitment and acquisition strategies faster than regulators can respond.

Servicers, Contractors, and Tech Platforms Feeding on Borrowers

A constellation of companies profit from the student loan system regardless of borrower outcomes:

• Maximus (AidVantage), which manages huge portfolios of federal student loans under opaque contracts.

• Navient, a longtime servicer repeatedly accused of steering borrowers into costly options.

• Sallie Mae, the original student loan giant, still profiting from private loans to risky borrowers.

• Chegg, which transitioned from textbook rental to an AI-driven homework-and-test assistance platform, driving new forms of academic dependency.

Each benefits from weak oversight and an increasingly automated, fragmented educational landscape.

Robocolleges, Robostudents, Roboworkers: The AI Cascade

Artificial Intelligence has magnified the crisis. Universities, under financial pressure, increasingly rely on automated instruction, chatbot advising, and algorithmic grading—what can be called robocolleges. Students, overwhelmed and unsupported, turn to AI tools for essays, homework, and exams—creating robostudents whose learning is outsourced to software rather than internalized.

Meanwhile, employers—especially those influenced by PE-backed workforce platforms—prioritize automation, making human workers interchangeable components in roboworker environments. This raises existential questions about whether higher education prepares people for stable futures or simply feeds them into unstable, algorithm-driven labor markets.

FAFSA Meltdowns, Fraud, and Academic Cheating

The collapse of the new FAFSA system, combined with widespread fraudulent applications, has destabilized enrollment nationwide. Colleges desperate for students have turned to risky recruitment pipelines that enable identity fraud, ghost students, and financial manipulation of aid systems.

Academic cheating, now industrialized through generative AI and contract-cheating platforms, further erodes the integrity of degrees while institutions look away to protect revenue.

Advertising and the Manufacture of “College Mania”

For decades, advertising has propped up the myth that a college degree—any degree, from any institution—guarantees social mobility. Universities, OPMs, lenders, test-prep companies, and ed-tech platforms spend billions on marketing annually. This relentless messaging drives families to take on debt and enroll in programs regardless of cost or quality.

College mania is not organic—it is manufactured. Advertising convinces the public to ignore warning signs that would be obvious in any other consumer market.

A Media Coverage Vacuum

Despite the scale of the crisis, mainstream media offers shockingly little coverage. Investigative journalism units have shrunk, education reporters are overstretched, and major outlets rely heavily on university advertising revenue. The result is a structural conflict of interest: the same companies responsible for predatory practices often fund the media organizations tasked with reporting on them.

When scandals surface—FAFSA failures, servicer misconduct, OPM exploitation—they often disappear within a day’s news cycle. The public remains unaware of how deeply corporate interests now shape higher education.

The Emerging Picture

The U.S. higher education system is no longer simply under strain—it is undergoing a corporate and technological takeover. Private equity owns the pipelines. OPMs run the online infrastructure. Tech companies moderate academic integrity. Servicers profit whether borrowers succeed or fail. Advertisers manufacture demand. Regulators are missing. The media is silent.

In contrast, many other countries maintain strong limits on privatization, enforce strict quality standards, and protect students as consumers. As Washington and Rosenthal argue, exploitation persists not because it is inevitable but because institutions allow—and profit from—it.

Unless the U.S. restores meaningful oversight, reins in private equity, ends predatory revenue-sharing models, rebuilds the Department of Education, and demands transparency across all contractors, the system will continue to deteriorate. And students, especially those already marginalized, will pay the price.

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Sources (Selection)

Harriet A. Washington – Medical Apartheid; Carte Blanche
Rebecca Skloot – The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks
Elisabeth Rosenthal – An American Sickness
Alondra Nelson – Body and Soul
Stephanie Hall & The Century Foundation – work on OPMs and revenue sharing
Robert Shireman – analyses of for-profit colleges and PE ownership
GAO (Government Accountability Office) reports on OPMs and student loan servicing
ED OIG and FTC public reports on oversight failures (various years)
National Student Legal Defense Network investigations
Federal Student Aid servicer audits and public documentation

2U Expands College Meltdown to Elite Universities

Related article: Education is a Racket

Related Article: Observations of the College Meltdown in Real Time

Related Article: Many People Saw The Crash Of A Billion Dollar EdTech Company Coming (Derek Newton, Forbes)

Related Article: TCF Analysis of 70+ University-OPM Contracts Reveals Increasing Risks to Students, Public Education

Related Article: How They (Online Graduate Programs) Get You (Katerina Manoff, The Atlantic)

Once restricted to for-profit colleges and community colleges, the College Meltdown has advanced to elite colleges like Harvard and Cal Berkeley. These schools have enormous firewalls (e.g. large endowments, strong alumni associations, and powerful donors), but that does not shield them from skepticism about overpriced online graduate degrees and certificates. Adam Looney at Brookings has already outed USC about their outrageously priced MSW program, but that's just one example. The collapse of 2U, the online program manager (OPM) for several elite colleges, exposes this subprime elite degree mess even more.

With 2U, we are not talking about subprime colleges like University of Phoenix or Purdue University Global, but prestigious schools like American University, Baylor University, George Washington University, Harvard University, Pepperdine University, Rice University, Syracuse University, University of California, Berkeley, University of North Carolina, University of Southern California, and Washington University.

2U also has prominent players on their board, including Valerie Jarrett and Earl Lewis (President of the Andrew Mellon Foundation). 

A recent entry for 2U at the layoff.com, found below, speaks volumes about rampant corruption in US higher education, particularly in online education. Whistleblowers are coming out and looking for lawyers. They are also describing in detail about the questionable business practices used to target consumers and the obscene prices that are offered for elite online degrees in fields that offer limited returns. 

"Steer clear for your own sanity"

Admissions Counselors at 2U perform work much closer to fraud telemarketing than "counseling." The volume bleeds the human element out of every phone call because you will constantly be striving to hit metrics and enrollment goals.

3) 2U programs are godawful expensive. For many programs, 2U also has multiple offerings for the same discipline, so ACs working for the more expensive option are often out of luck if a student is admitted to a cheaper competing program. Kinda hard to convince someone to take out 40k more in loans than they have to. You will be tacitly encouraged to manipulate students into taking on more debt just to meet your goal. They want you to do everything just shy of outright lying. Admissions is a breeding ground for exaggerated claims, half-truths, and lies by omission. In short, you will be kicking water uphill every day in this role, trying to meet laughably unrealistic targets made by leadership.

That's not even to touch on the sham "Core Values" 2U shoves down your throat. They literally have these values in neon tube lights on the walls in HQ. Now, of course every company has their own brand of BS, but 2U is insane about theirs. It is cult-like. People use the phrase “drink the Kool-Aid” unironically. Maybe it’s just me, but using the language of a mass s–c-de in a positive sense...doesn’t exactly sit right. Anyway, here are my thoughts on the core values.

1) ”Cherish every opportunity"–so long as you make 75 calls every day, annoying the heck out of people who just wanted a brochure about the program! Also, if someone has a low GPA or GRE scores and cannot help you meet your goal, that is not an opportunity, so don’t cherish it. This would be an accurate value if it said, "Cherish every opportunity that can make the company money. Forget everything else."

2) ”Be candid, honest, and open" —Honestly, for this one I might as well just post the précis of the pending lawsuit against this company: “[2U] throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Company faced increasing competition in online education and particularly regarding graduate programs; (2) the Company faced certain program-specific issues that negatively impacted its performance; (3) as a result, the Company’s business model was not sustainable; (4) the Company would slow its program launches; and (5) as a result, 2U’s public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.”

2U also doesn’t want you being “candid honest and open” with the students. Generally speaking, none of these students even know 2U exists, let alone that it gets a large chunk of their tuition money. You are lying by omission on every phone call, every time you send an email from your university email address. Students assume you are directly tied to the actual campus of the program you represent, because 2U spoofs the phone numbers, so every AC calling from say, Maryland, has an area code local to the school they are representing. Here's another hilarious thing: in September 2019, after mass firing 67 tenured employees and, again GETTING SUED BY ITS INVESTORS, 2U put out a "Framework for Transparency," which asserts, "2U has always publicly listed the degree and non-degree offerings we power," which, while technically true, is exactly the sort of PR/optics sophistry you should expect from this company. Yes, they list their university partners on their website. But at no point in an AC's correspondence with a prospective student is the name 2U ever brought up. Students would have to already know what an OPM is, and what 2U is for this "transparency" to actually do anything. As it stands, this Framework for Transparency looks to me like just another PR maneuver designed to give 2U rhetorical wiggle room to claim they’re being forthcoming while actually being the opposite.

3) ”Give a Damn!” – but not about all those poor schmucks with low GPAs who can't help you meet your goal.

4) “Relationships matter!” - remember where I said above they mass fired 67 employees one day? Yeah, they gave these people no notice– people who had been with the company for years, had helped build the business, and had bought into all of 2U's pompous, self-aggrandizing rhetoric about how they are "changing the world!" True believers, hard workers, in other words, fired en masse with no notice. These unfortunate individuals were literally called into an auditorium, let go, and informed “You’re welcome to work for the rest of the day if you want!”

5) “Don’t let the skeptic win!” — by which they mean don’t question anything or think for yourself, peon! Drink the Kool-Aid! DRINK IT I SAID! SHUT UP AND DRINK IT!!! HAVE YOU MADE YOUR DIALS FOR THE DAY YET?!

6) “Be bold and fearless” — I guess it was pretty bold and fearless to abruptly and callously fire a significant chunk of their loyal workforce, so kudos to 2U on this one. And it was pretty brazen to lie to their investors too. So, all right, I've give them this one.

7) “Make service your mission” — in other words, do good volunteer work and take pictures wearing 2U swag so we can take credit and get those sweet sweet PR social justice brownie points. 2U spends a lot of money promoting itself, getting named as a Great Workplace in magazines, maintaining this veneer that they are an ethical, socially conscious organization, when in reality, like most other companies, business is the first priority. Ethics and social consciousness are a very, VERY distant second. Actually, probably more like a very distant tenth or eleventh. This wouldn't even be annoying if they were just honest about it. I get it. A company exists and makes decisions solely to grow its business. So why does 2U seem to demand that its employees pretend otherwise?

8) “Have fun!” – you know the phrase “bread and circuses?” It means to generate public approval, not by excellence in public service or public policy but by diversion, distraction, or by satisfying the most immediate or base requirements of a populace— by offering a palliative: for example, food (bread) or entertainment (circuses). Thanks Wikipedia. Yeah, that is 2U’s main operating strategy. They do all these extravagant events, e.g. random dance parties in HQ, renting out Six Flags for Halloween, or flying everyone to some destination once a year for company meeting. Superficially these are nice, until you remember that these events are bonkers expensive, and that 2U will then lay off 67 people at a moment’s notice due to monetary concerns. I feel reasonably safe in saying those employees would rather have kept their jobs than gotten to see Flo-Rida live in concert. Moreover, the events, particularly company meeting, are basically thinly veiled attempts at brainwashing, stoking the CEO's messiah complex. They give a lot of ra-ra, gosh-aren’t-we-awesome speeches and make you stand in an auditorium chanting company slogans (again, DRINK THE KOOL-AID, SERF). They get great performers and speakers—Michelle Obama in 2018, for example—who lend specious legitimacy to 2U’s alleged mission and values, but are probably told nothing about the company beyond its claims of being "an innovative tech start up increasing accessibility in higher ed."

9) “Strive for excellence!” — in other words, light yourself on fire daily to keep the higher-ups warm. Break your back to carry the company.

In short, this company is an object lesson in disingenuous corporate doublespeak, bad faith business practices, and dogmatic, cultish conformity. Their core values are a bad joke, and if you are an independent thinker at all, you will not like it here. Also, for the record, I was not fired. I left of my own accord before all the firings and lawsuits started. This is not some disgruntled, terminated ex-employee sounding off. This is just an honest appraisal of how 2U does business from my perspective. Work here at your own peril.

What do the University of Phoenix and Risepoint have in common? The answer is a compelling story of greed and politics.

In the increasingly commodified world of higher education, the University of Phoenix and Risepoint (formerly Academic Partnerships) represent parallel tales of how private equity, political influence, and deceptive practices have shaped the online college landscape. While their paths have diverged in branding and institutional affiliation, the underlying motives and outcomes share disturbing similarities.

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The University of Phoenix: A Legacy of Legal and Ethical Trouble

The University of Phoenix (UOP) has been a central player in the for-profit college boom, particularly during and after the 2000s. Under the ownership of Apollo Education Group, and later the Vistria Group, UOP has faced a relentless stream of lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny, and public outrage.

In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reached a $191 million settlement with UOP over allegations of deceptive advertising. UOP falsely claimed partnerships with major corporations like Microsoft, AT&T, and Twitter to entice students. The result was $50 million in restitution and $141 million in student debt relief.

But the legal troubles didn’t stop there. In 2022 and 2023, the U.S. Department of Education included UOP in a broader class action that granted $37 million in borrower defense discharges. These claims stemmed from deceptive marketing and predatory recruitment practices.

Meanwhile, in 2024, the California Attorney General settled with UOP for $4.5 million over allegations of illegally targeting military service members between 2012 and 2015. The university’s controversial relationship with the military community also led to a temporary VA suspension of GI Bill enrollments in 2020.

The legal history includes False Claims Act suits brought by whistleblowers, including former employees alleging falsified records, incentive-based recruiter pay, and exaggerated graduation and job placement statistics. In 2019, Apollo Education settled a securities fraud lawsuit for $7.4 million.

More recently, UOP has been embroiled in political controversy in Idaho. In 2023 and 2024, the Idaho Attorney General challenged the state's attempt to acquire UOP, citing Open Meetings Act violations and lack of transparency. Though a federal judge initially dismissed the suit, Idaho’s Supreme Court allowed an appeal to proceed.

Through all of this, Vistria Group—UOP’s private equity owner since 2017—has reaped massive profits. Vistria was co-founded by Marty Nesbitt, a close confidant of Barack Obama, underscoring the bipartisan political protection that shields for-profit education from lasting accountability.

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Risepoint and the Online Program Management Model

Risepoint, formerly Academic Partnerships (AP), tells a similarly troubling story, albeit from the Online Program Manager (OPM) side of the education-industrial complex. Founded in 2007 by Randy Best, a well-connected Republican donor with ties to Jeb Bush, AP helped universities build online degree programs in exchange for a significant cut of tuition—sometimes up to 50%.

This tuition-share model, though legal, has raised ethical red flags. Critics argue it diverts millions in public education dollars into private hands, inflates student debt, and incentivizes aggressive, misleading recruitment. The most infamous case was the University of Texas-Arlington, which paid AP more than $178 million over five years. President Vistasp Karbhari resigned in 2020 after it was revealed he had taken international trips funded by AP.

Risepoint was acquired by Vistria Group in 2019, placing it in the same portfolio as the University of Phoenix and other education businesses. The firm’s growing influence in higher education—fueled by Democratic-aligned private equity—reflects a deeper entanglement of politics, policy, and profiteering.

In 2024, Minnesota became the first state to ban new tuition-share agreements with OPMs like Risepoint. This legislative action followed backlash from a controversial deal between Risepoint and St. Cloud State University, where critics accused the firm of extracting excessive revenue while offering questionable value.

Further pressure came from the federal level. In 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, and Tina Smith issued letters to major OPMs demanding transparency about recruitment tactics and tuition-share models. The Department of Education followed in January 2025 with new guidance restricting misleading marketing by OPMs, including impersonation of university staff.

Despite this, Risepoint continued expanding. In late 2023, the company purchased Wiley’s online program business for $150 million, signaling consolidation in a turbulent industry. Yet a 2024 report showed 147 OPM-university contracts had been terminated in 2023, and new contracts fell by over 50%.

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What Ties Them Together: Vistria Group

Vistria Group sits at the center of both sagas. The Chicago-based private equity firm has made education—especially online and for-profit education—a core pillar of its investment strategy. With connections to both Democratic and Republican power brokers, Vistria has deftly navigated the regulatory landscape while profiting from public education dollars.

Its ownership of the University of Phoenix and Risepoint demonstrates a clear strategy: acquire distressed or controversial education companies, clean up their public image, and extract revenue while avoiding deep reforms. Through Vistria, private equity gains access to billions in federal student aid with minimal oversight and a bipartisan shield.

The result is a higher education ecosystem where political influence, corporate profit, and public exploitation collide. And whether through online degrees from the University of Phoenix or public-private partnerships with Risepoint, students are often the ones left bearing the cost.

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As scrutiny intensifies and state and federal lawmakers demand reform, the futures of Risepoint and the University of Phoenix remain uncertain. But one thing is clear: their shared story reveals how higher education has become a battleground of greed, power, and politics.

From EdTech Darling to Distressed Asset — A Post-Bankruptcy Autopsy

The fall of 2U, once a poster child of education technology innovation, is a cautionary tale for investors, policymakers, and students alike. After riding a wave of optimism in the online education bo-m, the company declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in mid-2024, emerging weeks later as a privately held firm now controlled by distressed asset investors. While many of the company’s top executives have been replaced or reshuffled, the story is far from over—and the damage done to public trust in university–edtech partnerships remains.

Founded in 2008 and based in Lanham, Maryland, 2U positioned itself as a premier Online Program Manager (OPM), contracting with top-tier universities to run their online degree programs. By 2019, the company was a billion-dollar operation, boasting partnerships with USC, Georgetown, and Yale. But cracks began to show as questions about cost, transparency, student outcomes, and aggressive recruiting practices became harder to ignore.

By 2023, 2U was bleeding cash, facing multiple lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny, and plummeting investor confidence. The final blow came when the company defaulted on over $450 million in debt. In July 2024, 2U entered and quickly exited Chapter 11 bankruptcy through a pre-packaged deal. The result: 2U is now a private company, with ownership largely transferred to distressed debt investors—Mudrick Capital Management, Greenvale Capital, and Bayside Capital (an affiliate of H.I.G. Capital).

These firms are known not for a commitment to education but for expertise in distressed asset recovery and aggressive restructuring. Mudrick Capital, for instance, made headlines for its role in the AMC “meme stock” frenzy. Bayside Capital has long operated in the shadows of high-risk debt markets, favoring fast-moving deals in stressed financial environments. Greenvale Capital, a lesser-known but analytically rigorous hedge fund, rounds out the group.

Following the takeover, 2U appointed Kees Bol as its new CEO and installed Brian Napack—a veteran of the education sector and former CEO of Wiley—as Executive Chairman of the Board. Whether this new leadership can turn 2U around remains unclear. For now, they are signaling a pivot toward non-degree credentials and corporate upskilling markets, away from costly master’s degree programs that saddled students with debt and poor returns.

But 2U’s shift is not merely a business story. Its implosion exposes broader flaws in the higher education–tech ecosystem. OPMs like 2U operated in a legal gray area, exploiting Title IV federal student aid without direct regulatory oversight. Critics, including lawmakers and consumer protection advocates, argue that these firms served more as enrollment mills than academic partners. The Department of Education’s efforts to rein in the industry through “bundled services” guidance and potential Gainful Employment rules came too late to prevent massive financial fallout.

The universities that partnered with 2U are also complicit. Many ceded control of curriculum design, admissions, and marketing to a for-profit company in exchange for a share of the revenue. In doing so, they risked their reputations—and in some cases, knowingly funneled students into programs with dubious value. These relationships, many of which are still active, should now be reexamined in light of 2U’s restructuring.

Students who enrolled in these programs, often with the promise of career advancement and elite credentials, are left with debt and degrees that may not deliver the expected return. As 2U retools its strategy under the control of financial firms, it's unclear whether these students—or future ones—will benefit at all.

Meanwhile, the venture capitalists and financial engineers behind the scenes have already cashed out or secured their positions in the restructured entity. Like so many stories in the for-profit education sector, 2U’s downfall was not just predictable—it was profitable for those who knew how to play the system.

Have you worked with 2U—or been affected by it?

The Higher Education Inquirer is continuing its investigation into 2U and the wider online program management (OPM) industry. If you are a former or current employee of 2U, Trilogy Education, EdX, or a related company, a university staff or faculty member who collaborated with 2U, a student or graduate of a 2U-powered program, a marketing contractor, admissions specialist, or vendor affiliated with 2U or its partners, or someone with knowledge of the company's restructuring or operations—we want to hear from you.

We are especially interested in experiences involving enrollment pressure tactics, misleading marketing, internal operations, financial mismanagement, compliance concerns, and revenue-sharing agreements with universities. If 2U’s collapse or restructuring affected your job, finances, or education, your story matters.

You can share information confidentially by contacting us. Anonymity will be protected upon request.

When American Greed is the Norm

Greed is no longer a sin in America—it’s a system. It’s a curriculum. It’s a badge of success. In the American higher education marketplace, greed is not the exception. It’s the norm.

We see it in the bloated salaries of university presidents who deliver austerity to everyone but themselves. We see it in billion-dollar endowments hoarded like dragon’s gold while students drown in debt. We see it in the metastasizing ranks of middlemen—consultants, online program managers, enrollment optimization firms—who profit off the dreams and desperation of working-class families.

But greed in American higher education is more than a few bad actors or golden parachutes. It is institutionalized, normalized, and weaponized.

The Student as Customer, the Campus as Marketplace

It began with the rebranding of education as a “return on investment,” a transaction rather than a transformation. The purpose of college was no longer to liberate the mind but to monetize the degree.

By the 1990s, under bipartisan neoliberal consensus, public colleges were defunded and forced to adopt the private sector’s logic: cut costs, raise prices, sell more. Tuition rose. Debt exploded. The ranks of administrators swelled while faculty were downsized and adjunctified. The market had spoken.

But even that wasn’t enough. A generation of edu-preneurs emerged—Silicon Valley-funded disruptors, for-profit college chains, and online program managers—who turned learning into a scalable commodity. Robocolleges like Southern New Hampshire University, Purdue Global, and the University of Phoenix began operating more like tech platforms than institutions of thought.

The result? Diploma mills at the front end and collection agencies at the back.

Greed in the Name of God and Country

Greed doesn’t always look like Wall Street. Sometimes it wears the face of morality. Religious colleges, some of them under the protection of nonprofit status, have become breeding grounds for political operatives and ideological grooming—while raking in millions through taxpayer-funded financial aid.

Liberty University, Grand Canyon University, and a host of lesser-known Bible colleges operate under a warped theology of prosperity, turning salvation into a subscription plan. Meanwhile, they push anti-democratic ideologies and funnel money toward political causes far removed from the mission of education.

Accreditation as a Shell Game

The accreditors—the supposed watchdogs of educational quality—have been largely asleep at the wheel or complicit. When greed is the norm, accountability is an inconvenience. For-profit schools regularly reinvent themselves as nonprofits. Online program managers operate in regulatory gray zones. Mergers and acquisitions disguise collapse as growth.

Accreditation agencies rubber-stamp it all, as long as the paperwork is tidy and the lobbyists are well-compensated.

Debt as Discipline

More than 43 million Americans carry federal student loan debt. Many will never escape it. This debt is not just financial—it’s ideological. It keeps the workforce compliant. It disciplines dissent. It renders critical thought a luxury.

And those who push for debt relief? They are met with moral lectures about personal responsibility—from the same lawmakers who handed trillions to banks, defense contractors, and fossil fuel companies.

Silicon Valley's Hungry Mouth

The new frontier of greed is AI. Tech giants like Google, Amazon Web Services, and Meta are embedding themselves deeper into education—not to empower learning, but to extract data, monetize behavior, and deepen surveillance. Every click, every quiz, every attendance record is a monetizable moment.

Universities, starved for funding and afraid of obsolescence, are selling access to students in exchange for access to cloud infrastructure and algorithmic tools they barely understand.

Greed Isn’t Broken—It’s Working as Designed

In this system, who wins? Not students. Not faculty. Not society.

The winners are those who turn knowledge into a commodity, compliance into virtue, and inequality into inevitability. Those who build castles from the bones of public education, then retreat behind walls of donor-backed endowments and think tanks. The winners are few. But they write the rules.

A Different Future Is Possible

If American greed is the norm, then what remains of education’s soul must be found in the margins—in the community college professor working three jobs. In the librarian defending open access. In the adjunct organizing a union. In the students refusing to be pawns in someone else’s game.

The antidote to greed is not charity—it’s solidarity.

Until justice is funded as well as football. Until learning is valued more than branding. Until access is more than a talking point on a donor brochure—then greed will remain not just a sin, but a system.

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Sources

• U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics

• The Century Foundation, “The OPM Industry: Profits Over Students” (2023)

• Chronicle of Higher Education, “Administrative Bloat and the Adjunct Crisis”

• IRS Nonprofit Filings, Liberty University and Grand Canyon University

• Debt Collective, “The State of Student Debt” (2025)

• Public records and audits of Title IV institutions, 2022–2024

• Higher Education Inquirer archives