University of Phoenix, Oracle, and the Russian Cybercrime Crisis That Should Never Have Been Allowed to Happen

The University of Phoenix breach is more than another entry in the long list of attacks on higher education. It is the clearest evidence yet of how private equity, aging enterprise software, and institutional neglect have converged to create a catastrophic cybersecurity landscape across American colleges and universities. What happened in the summer of 2025 was not an unavoidable act of foreign aggression. It was the culmination of years of cost-cutting, inadequate oversight, and a misplaced faith in legacy vendors that no longer control their own risks.

The story begins with the Russian-speaking Clop cyber-extortion group, one of the most sophisticated data-theft organizations operating today. In early August, Clop quietly began exploiting a previously unknown vulnerability in Oracle’s E-Business Suite, a platform widely used for payroll, procurement, student employment, vendor relations, and financial aid administration. Oracle’s EBS system, decades old and deeply embedded across higher education, was never designed for modern threat environments. As soon as Clop identified the flaw—later assigned CVE-2025-61882—the group launched a coordinated campaign that compromised dozens of major institutions before Oracle even acknowledged the problem.

Among the most heavily affected institutions was the University of Phoenix. Attackers gained access to administrative systems and exfiltrated highly sensitive data: names, Social Security numbers, bank accounts, routing numbers, vendor records, and financial-aid related information belonging to students, faculty, staff, and contractors. The breach took place in August, but Phoenix did not disclose the incident until November 21, and only after Clop publicly listed the university on its extortion site. Even after forced disclosure, Phoenix offered only vague assurances about “unauthorized access” and refused to provide concrete numbers or a full accounting of what had been stolen.

Phoenix was not alone. Harvard University confirmed that Clop had stolen more than a terabyte of data from its Oracle systems. Dartmouth College acknowledged that personal and financial information for more than a thousand individuals had been accessed, though the total is almost certainly much higher. At the University of Pennsylvania, administrators said only that unauthorized access had occurred, declining to detail the scale. What links these incidents is not prestige, geography, or mission. It is dependency on Oracle’s aging administrative software and a sector-wide failure to adapt to a threat environment dominated by globally coordinated cybercrime operations.

But Phoenix stands apart from its peers because Phoenix, Apollo Global Management, and The Vistria Group should have known better. This institution has long operated at a scale more comparable to a financial-services company than a school. It handles vast volumes of sensitive data connected to federal student aid, identity verification, private loans, tuition reimbursement programs, and employer partnerships. A university with this profile should have been treating cybersecurity as a core institutional function, not an afterthought.

Apollo Global Management, which owned Phoenix during a period of enrollment decline and regulatory exposure, was fully aware of the vulnerabilities associated with online enrollment, financial-aid processing, and aging ERP infrastructure. Apollo’s business model is built on risk analysis and mitigation, yet it consistently underinvested in sustainable IT modernization while focusing on financial engineering and cost extraction. Phoenix emerged from Apollo’s ownership with significant technical debt and a compliance culture centered on limiting institutional liability rather than strengthening institutional defenses.

When The Vistria Group, through Phoenix Education Partners, acquired the university, it promised a new era of stability and digital transformation. Instead, it delivered a familiar private-equity formula: leaner operations, staff reductions, increased reliance on contractors, and deferred infrastructure investment. All of this occurred as ransomware groups such as Clop, LockBit, BlackCat, and Vice Society were escalating attacks on universities. The MOVEit crisis, the Accellion breach, and dozens of ransomware incidents had already demonstrated that higher education was an increasingly profitable target. Vistria had every signal necessary to understand the stakes, yet Phoenix entered the summer of 2025 with outdated Oracle systems, slow patch deployment, inadequate monitoring, and minimal segmentation between financial-aid and general administrative systems.

The breach was not a surprise. It was an inevitability. A university holding the sensitive financial and identity data of hundreds of thousands of current and former students, staff, and vendors cannot protect itself with minimal investment and outdated architecture. When Clop exploited Oracle’s flaw, Phoenix lacked the tools to detect lateral movement early, the expertise to identify unusual activity quickly, and the governance structure to respond decisively. The institution did not discover the breach on its own; it reacted only when a criminal syndicate announced its presence to the world.

This incident exposes a broader truth about higher education infrastructure in the United States. Universities have grown dependent on enterprise vendors whose systems are increasingly brittle and whose security models no longer meet contemporary requirements. Meanwhile, private-equity owners emphasize cost containment and short-term returns over long-term stability. The University of Phoenix breach is the result of those conditions converging with a global cybercrime ecosystem that is more organized, better funded, and more technically agile than the institutions it targets.

Students, faculty, staff, and vendors will bear the consequences for years. Many will face identity theft, fraudulent activity, and the lingering fear that their most sensitive information is circulating indefinitely on criminal marketplaces. Phoenix, like other affected institutions, will offer credit monitoring and generic assurances. But the public disclosures arrived too late, and the underlying failures were years in the making.

Phoenix should have known better.
Apollo Global Management should have known better.
The Vistria Group should have known better.
And American higher education should finally recognize that it can no longer treat cybersecurity as a line-item expense. It is now one of the central pillars of institutional survival.

Sources
Bleeping Computer
Security Affairs
The Register
CPO Magazine
The Record
University of Phoenix breach notifications
Clop leak site monitoring data

Same Predators, New Logo: PXED — A $22 Billion Student‑Debt Gamble Investors Should Beware

Warning to Investors: Phoenix Education Partners (PXED) may present itself as a cutting‑edge solution in career-focused higher education, but it’s built on the same extractive infrastructure that powered the University of Phoenix. With nearly a million students still owing an estimated $22 billion in federal loans, backing PXED isn’t just a financial bet — it’s a moral and reputational risk.

PXED’s leadership includes powerful private-equity players: Martin H. Nesbitt (Co‑CEO of Vistria, PXED trustee, and friend of Barak Obama), Adnan Nisar (Vistria), and Theodore Kwon and Itai Wallach (Apollo Global Management). Also in the mix is Chris Lynne, PXED’s president and a former Phoenix CFO intimately familiar with UOP’s controversial enrollment and marketing strategies. These are not educational reformers — they are dealmakers aiming to extract value from a student-debt pipeline.

[Image: Power Player Marty Nesbitt]

Higher Education Inquirer’s College Meltdown Index highlights how PXED fits into a broader financialization of higher education. Rather than reforming the University of Phoenix, its backers have resurrected it under a new brand — one that continues to enroll vulnerable adult learners, harvest federal aid, and operate with considerably less public oversight. 

Whistleblowers previously documented that Phoenix pressured recruitment staff to falsify student credentials, enrolling people who wouldn’t otherwise qualify for federal aid. Courses were allegedly kept deliberately easy — not to teach, but to keep students “active” enough to trigger aid disbursements. Internal marketing also exaggerated job prospects and corporate partnerships (e.g., with Microsoft and AT&T) to entice students. 

PXED may lean on a three‑year default rate (often cited around 12–13%), but that number is deeply misleading. Many UOP students stay stuck in deferment, forbearance, or income-driven repayment, masking the real long-term risk of non-payment. This is not just a short-term liability — it’s a potentially massive, multiyear financial exposure for PXED’s backers.

There was a significant FTC settlement that canceled $141 million in student debt and refunded $50 million to some students. But the scale of harm far exceeds that payout. Untold numbers of borrowers still have unresolved Borrower Defense claims, and the reputational risk remains profound.

Beyond financial concerns, there’s a major ethical dimension. HEI’s Divestment from Predatory Education argument makes a compelling case that investing in companies like PXED — or in loan servicers that profit from student debt — is not just risky, but morally indefensible. According to HEI, institutional investors (including university endowments, pension funds, and foundations) are complicit in a system that monetizes students’ aspirations and perpetuates financial harm. 

For investors, the message is clear: Phoenix is not merely an education play — it’s a high-stakes, ethically fraught extraction machine built on a legacy of indebtedness and regulatory vulnerability.

Unless PXED commits to real transparency, independent reporting on student outcomes, and accountability mechanisms — including reparations or debt relief — it should be approached not as a social-growth story, but as a dangerous gamble.

---

Sources

• HEI. “Divestment from Predatory Education Stocks: A Moral Imperative.” Higher Education Inquirer

• HEI. “The College Meltdown Index: Profiting from the Wreckage of American Higher Education.” Higher Education Inquirer

• HEI. “What Do the University of Phoenix and Risepoint Have in Common? The Answer Is a Compelling Story of Greed and Politics.” Higher Education Inquirer

• HEI. “University of Phoenix Uses ‘Sandwich Moms’ to Sell a Debt Trap.” Higher Education Inquirer

• HEI. “New Data Show Nearly a Million University of Phoenix Debtors Owe $21.6 Billion.” Higher Education

The College Meltdown Index: Profiting from the Wreckage of American Higher Education

“Education, once defended as a public good, now functions as a vehicle for private gain.”

---

From Collapse to Contagion

The College Meltdown never truly ended—it evolved.

After a decade of spectacular for-profit implosions, the higher education sector has reconstituted itself around new instruments of profit: debt servicing, edtech speculation, and corporate “partnerships” that disguise privatization as innovation.

The College Meltdown Index—tracking a mix of education providers, servicers, and learning platforms—reveals a sector in quiet decay.

Legacy for-profits like National American University (NAUH) and Aspen Group (ASPU) trade at penny-stock levels, while Lincoln Educational (LINC) and Perdoceo (PRDO) stumble through cost-cutting cycles.

Even the supposed disruptors—Chegg (CHGG), Udemy (UDMY), and Coursera (COUR)—are faltering as user growth plateaus and AI reshapes their value proposition.

Meanwhile, SoFi (SOFI), Sallie Mae (SLM), and Maximus (MMS) thrive—not through learning, but through the management of debt.

---

The Meltdown Graveyard

Below lies a sampling of the education sector’s ghost tickers—the silent casualties of a system that turned public trust into private loss.

Symbol	Institution	Status	Approx. Closure/Delisting
CLAS.U	Class Technologies	Defunct	2024
INST	Instructure (pre-acquisition)	Acquired by Thoma Bravo	2020
TWOUQ	2U, Inc.	Bankrupt	2025
CPLA	Capella University	Merged with Strayer (Strategic Ed.)	2018
ESI-OLD	ITT Technical Institute	Defunct	2016
EDMC	Education Management Corporation	Defunct	2018
COCO-OLD	Corinthian Colleges	Defunct	2015
APOL	Apollo Education Group (U. of Phoenix)	Taken Private	2017

Each ticker represents not only a failed business model—but a generation of indebted students.

---

The Phoenix That Shouldn’t Have Risen

No institution better symbolizes this moral decay than the University of Phoenix and Phoenix Education Partners (PXED).

At its height, Phoenix enrolled nearly half a million students. By 2017, following federal investigations and mass defaults, Apollo Education Group—its parent company—collapsed under scrutiny.

But rather than disappearing, Phoenix was quietly resurrected through a private equity buyout led by Apollo Global Management, Vistria Group, and Najafi Companies.

Freed from public oversight, the university continued to enroll vulnerable adult learners, harvesting federal aid while shedding accountability.

In 2023, the University of Idaho’s proposed acquisition of Phoenix provoked national outrage, forcing state officials to confront a basic question: Should a public university absorb a for-profit brand built on exploitation?

The deal collapsed—but the temptation to monetize Phoenix’s infrastructure remains. In 2025, a small portion became publicly traded.  Its call centers and online systems remain models of enrollment efficiency, designed to extract just enough engagement to secure tuition payments.

---

From Education to Extraction

The sector’s transformation reveals a deeper moral hazard.

If students succeed, investors profit.
If students fail, federal subsidies and servicer contracts ensure the money keeps flowing.

Executives face no downside. Shareholders are protected. The losses fall on students and taxpayers.

In this sense, the “meltdown” is not a market failure—it’s a market design.

“The winners are those who most efficiently extract value from hope.”

Public universities increasingly partner with private Online Program Managers (OPMs), leasing their brands to companies that control marketing, pricing, and student data. The once-clear line between public and for-profit education has blurred beyond recognition.

---

The Quiet Winners of Collapse

A few companies continue to prosper by aligning with “practical” or “mission-safe” sectors:

• Adtalem (ATGE) in nursing and health education,

• Grand Canyon Education (LOPE) in faith-branded online degrees,

• Bright Horizons (BFAM) in corporate childcare and workforce training.

Yet all remain heavily dependent on public dollars and tax incentives. The state subsidizes their existence; the market collects the rewards.

Meanwhile, 2U’s bankruptcy leaves elite universities scrambling to explain how a publicly traded OPM, once championed as the future of online learning, could disintegrate overnight—taking with it a network of high-priced “nonprofit” certificate programs.

---

A Reckoning Deferred

The College Meltdown Index exposes a system that has internalized its own failures.
Fraud has been replaced by financial engineering, transparency by outsourcing, and accountability by spin.

The real collapse is not in the market—but in moral logic. Education, once the cornerstone of social mobility, has become a speculative instrument traded between hedge funds and holding companies.

Until policymakers—and universities themselves—confront the ethics of profit in higher education, the meltdown will persist, slowly consuming what remains of the public good.

---

“The real question is not whether the system will collapse, but who will rebuild it—and for whom.”

---

Sources:

• Higher Education Inquirer, College Meltdown 2.0 Index (Nov. 2025)

• SEC Filings (2010–2025)

• U.S. Department of Education, Heightened Cash Monitoring Reports

• An American Sickness – Elisabeth Rosenthal

• The Goosestep – Upton Sinclair

• Medical Apartheid – Harriet A. Washington

• Body and Soul – Alondra Nelson

• The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks – Rebecca Skloot

Pigs on Parade: The University of Phoenix IPO

Apollo Global Management and Vistria have an offer only a pig would consider: the Phoenix Education Partners IPO.

Touted by Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bank of Montreal, Jefferies, and Apollo Global Securities, the offering of Phoenix Education Partners brings the University of Phoenix (PXED) back to public markets—but few fans remain in the audience.

---

A Decade of Decline: From Expansion to Erosion

In the early 2000s, the University of Phoenix was hailed as a pioneering force in adult education—cozy campuses near freeway exits and an advanced online infrastructure for working learners earned praise. Its founder John Sperling was seen as visionary.

But by 2010 enrollment had already begun plummeting after reaching nearly 470,000 students, and the school’s academic quality and recruiting ethics were under the microscope. Critics decried “The Matrix,” a perverse scheme where recruiters were aggressively incentivized to push enrollments—no matter the cost.

By 2018, more than 450 locations had shuttered, enrollment was down by approximately 80%, and half the remaining sites were no longer accepting new students. Even Hawaii, Jersey City, Detroit, and other major cities were on the closure list.

---

Regulatory Fallout: Lawsuits, Settlements, and Borrower Defenses

From the early 2010s onward, the University of Phoenix (aka UoPX) saw an avalanche of legal scrutiny. In 2019, the FTC leveled a $191 million settlement against it for misleading advertising, including deceptive claims about job placement and corporate partnerships.

By late 2023, 73,740 borrower-defense claims had been filed by former students under federal programs. Many of these were settled under the Sweet v. Cardona class action, with estimates of the university’s potential liability ranging from $200 million to over $1 billion. Meanwhile, nearly one million debtors owed a combined $21.6 billion in student loans—about $22,000 per borrower on average.

Another flashpoint: UoPX agreed to pay $4.5 million in 2024 to settle investigations by California’s Attorney General over military-targeted recruiting tactics.

---

The Ownership Unicorn: Apollo, Vistria, and Political Backing

After Apollo Global Management and the Vistria Group acquired UoPX in 2016, the school became a commodified unit in a larger private equity portfolio. The deal brought in figures like Tony Miller, a political insider, as chairman—signaling strategic power play as much as financial management.

Vistria’s broader stable included Risepoint (previously Academic Partnerships), meaning both UoPX and OPM entities were controlled by one private-equity firm—drawing criticism for creating a “for-profit, online-education industrial complex.”

---

The IPO Circus: “Pigs on Parade”

Enter the Phoenix Education Partners IPO (PXED), steered onto the market with all the pomp of a carnival but none of the substance. The front-line banks—Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, BMO, Jefferies, Apollo Global Securities—are being paid handsomely to dress up this distressed asset as a growth opportunity.

But here’s what those colorful floats hide:

• Collapse, not comeback. Enrollment and campus infrastructure have withered.

• Debt, not opportunity. Nearly a million debt-laden alumni owe $21.6 billion.

• Liability, not credibility. Borrower defense claims and state investigations continue to mount.

• Profit, not public good. Ownership is consolidated in private equity with political access, not academic mission.

This is a pig in parade attire. Investors are being asked to cheer for ribbon-cutting and banners, while the mud-stained hooves of exploitative business models trudge behind.

---

The HEI Verdict

This PXED IPO isn’t a pivot toward better education—it’s a rebrand of an exploitative legacy. From aggressive recruitment of vulnerable populations (“sandwich moms,” military servicemembers) to mounting legal liabilities, the University of Phoenix remains the same broken system.

Investors, regulators, and the public must not be dazzled by slick packaging. The real story is one of failed promises, students carrying lifelong debt, and private equity cashing out. In education, as in livestock, parades are meant to show off—just make sure you're not cheering at the wrong spectacle.

---

Sources

• Higher Education Inquirer. Search: University of Phoenix

• Higher Education Inquirer. “The Slow-Motion Collapse of America’s Largest University” (2018)

• Higher Education Inquirer. “University of Phoenix Collapse Kept Quiet” (2019)

• Higher Education Inquirer. “Fraud Claims Against University of Phoenix” (2023)

• Higher Education Inquirer. “University of Phoenix Uses ‘Sandwich Moms’ in Recruiting” (2025)

• Higher Education Inquirer. “What Do the University of Phoenix and Risepoint Have in Common?” (2025)

• Federal Trade Commission. “FTC Obtains $191 Million Settlement from University of Phoenix” (2019)

• Sweet v. Cardona Settlement Documents (2022–2023)

• California Attorney General. “University of Phoenix to Pay $4.5 Million Over Deceptive Military Recruiting” (2024)

The Dirty World of Billionaire Leon Black and Jeffrey Epstein: Profits Over People

Leon Black, the billionaire co-founder and former chief executive officer of Apollo Global Management, maintained a financial relationship with convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein that lasted for years and ultimately contributed to Black’s resignation from the firm. Why should HEI be covering this old story?  Because the theme, of profits over people, is a major theme in the dirty world of business that permeates US higher education. 

Profits Over People

Apollo Global Management, the firm Black co-founded, is one of the world’s largest alternative asset managers, with hundreds of billions of dollars in assets under management across private equity, credit, and real estate. In 2016, Apollo, along with the Vistria Group and Najafi Companies, acquired Apollo Education Group, the parent company of the University of Phoenix, for over $1.1 billion. The University of Phoenix remains under the control of these owners and continues to operate as a for-profit institution.

Critics of private equity and venture capital in education argue that such firms are driven by short-term profitability rather than long-term institutional quality. This can lead to aggressive marketing, high tuition, cuts to faculty and staff, and diminished student outcomes. In the case of Apollo Global Management’s ownership of the University of Phoenix, concerns have persisted about the potential for cost-cutting and profit-maximizing strategies to undermine the educational mission. For-profit colleges owned by large investment firms have been accused in the past of prioritizing shareholder returns over student success, adding another layer to the public scrutiny of both Apollo and the institutions it controls.

Ties Between Leon Black and Jeffrey Epstein

Between 2012 and 2017, Black paid Jeffrey Epstein approximately $158 million for what he described as financial advice, including tax and estate planning services. A March 2025 report from the Senate Finance Committee revealed that the total amount transferred to Epstein was closer to $170 million, about $12 million more than previously disclosed. In 2023, Black agreed to pay $62.5 million to the U.S. Virgin Islands to settle claims that some of his payments to Epstein were used to support Epstein’s illicit operations. Black has said publicly that his association with Epstein was a “horrible mistake” and has emphasized that had he known more about Epstein’s criminal activities, he would have cut ties sooner.

Although Black has described his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein as limited, records show that Epstein became one of the original trustees of the Leon Black Family Foundation in 1997. Black also contributed a handwritten poem to a 2003 “50th birthday book” for Epstein, an item that included greetings from other prominent figures. In January 2021, following an independent review by the law firm Dechert LLP that detailed the payments to Epstein, Black announced that he would step down as CEO of Apollo Global Management.

Black has faced several legal challenges connected to allegations of sexual misconduct, many of which reference Epstein. In 2023, “Jane Doe” filed a lawsuit claiming she was assaulted by Black at Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse; in April 2025, her lawyers sought to withdraw from the case. In another case, accuser Cheri Pierson alleged rape but withdrew her lawsuit in early 2024. A separate suit filed by Guzel Ganieva, which accused Black of abuse and coercion involving Epstein, was dismissed in 2023. Black has consistently denied any wrongdoing.

Sources
Business Insider
The Daily Beast
ABC News
Wikipedia – Leon Black
Wikipedia – Apollo Global Management
EdSurge
Republic Report

The Pritzker Family Paradox: Elite Power, Higher Education, and Political Ambition

          [JB and Penny Pritzker] 

The Pritzker family stands as a symbol of wealth, influence, and access in American public life. From the luxury of Hyatt Hotels to the boardrooms of private equity and the highest ranks of government, their reach extends across economic sectors and institutional spheres. But beneath the carefully managed public image lies a troubling contradiction—one that implicates higher education, for-profit exploitation, and national politics.

Penny Pritzger

Penny Pritzker, a former U.S. Secretary of Commerce and current trustee of Harvard University, has been a key figure in shaping education policy from elite perches. She also had a working relationship with Vistria Group, a private equity firm that now owns the University of Phoenix and Risepoint. These two entities have been central to the subprime college industry—profiting from the hopes of working-class students while delivering poor outcomes and burdensome debt.

Pritzker’s relationship with Vistria runs deeper than simple association. In the late 1990s, she partnered with Vistria co-founder Marty Nesbitt to launch The Parking Spot, a national airport parking venture that brought them both business success and public recognition. When Nesbitt founded Vistria in 2013, he brought with him the experience and elite networks formed during that earlier partnership. Penny Pritzker’s family foundation—Pritzker Traubert—was among the early funders of Vistria, helping to establish its brand as a more “socially conscious” private equity firm. Although she stepped away from any formal role when she joined the Obama administration, her involvement in Vistria’s formation and funding set the stage for the firm’s expansion into sectors like for-profit education and healthcare.

Vistria’s acquisition of the University of Phoenix, and later Risepoint, positioned it as a major player in the privatization of American higher education. The firm continues to profit from schools that promise economic mobility but often deliver student debt and limited job prospects. This is not just a critique of business practices, but a systemic indictment of how elite networks shape education policy, finance, and outcomes.

Penny’s role as a trustee on the Harvard Corporation only sharpens this contradiction. Harvard, a university that markets itself as a global champion of meritocracy and inclusion, remains silent about one of its trustees helping to finance and support a firm that monetizes educational inequality. The governing body has not publicly addressed any potential conflict of interest between her Harvard role and her involvement with Vistria.

JB Pritzger

These contradictions are not limited to Penny. Her brother, J.B. Pritzker, is currently the governor of Illinois and one of the wealthiest elected officials in the country. Though he has no documented personal financial stake in Vistria, his administration has significant ties to the firm. Jesse Ruiz, J.B. Pritzker’s Deputy Governor for Education during his first term, left state government in 2022 to take a top leadership position at Vistria as General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer.

This revolving-door dynamic—where a senior education policymaker transitions directly from a progressive administration to a private equity firm profiting from for-profit colleges—underscores the ideological alignment and operational synergy between the Pritzker political machine and firms like Vistria. While the governor publicly champions equity and expanded public education access, his administration’s former top education official is now helping manage legal and compliance operations for a firm that extracts value from struggling students and public loan programs.

J.B. Pritzker has announced plans to run for a third term as governor in 2026, but many observers believe he is positioning himself for a 2028 presidential campaign. His high-profile public appearances, pointed critiques of Donald Trump, and increased visibility in early primary states all suggest a national campaign is being tested. With his vast personal wealth, Pritzker could self-fund a serious run while drawing on elite networks built over decades—networks that include both his sister’s role at Harvard and their shared business and political allies.

Elites in US Higher Education, A Familiar Theme 

What emerges is a deeply American story—one in which the same elite networks shape both the problems and the proposed solutions. The Pritzkers are not alone in this dynamic, but their dual influence in higher education and politics makes them a case study in elite capture. They are architects and beneficiaries of a system in which public office, private equity, and nonprofit institutions converge to consolidate power.

The for-profit education sector continues to exploit regulatory gaps, marketing expensive credentials to desperate individuals while avoiding the scrutiny that traditional nonprofit colleges face. When private equity firms like Vistria acquire troubled institutions, they repackage them, restructure their branding, and keep extracting value from public loan dollars. The government lends, students borrow, and investors profit. The people left behind are those without political clout—low-income students, veterans, working parents—who believed the marketing and now face debt with little return.

Harvard’s silence, University of Phoenix’s reinvention, the rebranding of Academic Partnerships/Risepoint, and J.B. Pritzker’s ambitions all signal a troubling direction for American democracy. As more billionaires enter politics and public institutions become more dependent on private capital, the line between public service and private gain continues to erode.

The Higher Education Inquirer believes this moment demands not only scrutiny, but structural change. Until elite universities hold their trustees accountable, until political candidates reject the influence of exploitative industries, and until the public reclaims its voice in higher education policy, the Pritzker paradox will continue to define the American experience—where access to opportunity is sold to the highest bidder, and democracy is reshaped by those who can afford to buy it.

Sources
– U.S. Department of Education College Scorecard
– University of Phoenix outcome data (IPEDS, 2024)
– Harvard University governance and trustee records
– Vistria Group investor reports and public filings
– Wall Street Journal, “America’s Second-Richest Elected Official Is Acting Like He Wants to Be President” (2025)
– Associated Press, “Governor J.B. Pritzker positions himself as national Democratic leader” (2025)
– Vistria.com, “Marty Nesbitt on his friendship with Obama and what he learned from the Pritzkers”
– Politico, “Former Obama Insiders Seek Administration’s Blessing of For-Profit College Takeover” (2016)
– Vistria Group announcement, “Jesse Ruiz Joins Vistria as General Counsel and CCO” (2022)

University of Phoenix Uses “Sandwich Moms” to Sell a Debt Trap

In a recent blog post republished on LinkedIn, the University of Phoenix casts itself as a champion for the “sandwich generation” of working mothers—those who are simultaneously raising children and caring for aging parents. The post, co-branded with the lifestyle platform Motherly, portrays the for-profit university as a source of hope for exhausted, career-stalled caregivers. It offers empathy, statistics, and stories about resilience. But what it doesn’t offer is transparency about the financial harm the University of Phoenix has caused to hundreds of thousands of women just like them.

Behind the compassionate messaging is a decades-long record of exploitation, debt, and broken promises. According to data obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests and analyzed by the Higher Education Inquirer, nearly one million former University of Phoenix students owe a combined $21.6 billion in student loan debt. That includes many single mothers and caregivers who were targeted by Phoenix recruiters with promises of flexible degrees and life-changing job opportunities.

The average borrower carries more than $22,000 in federal student debt, and many have seen little to no return on that investment. Worse, tens of thousands of former students have filed Borrower Defense claims with the U.S. Department of Education, asserting that they were defrauded by the university. At least 19,000 of these claims have already been approved as part of the Sweet v. Cardona class action settlement. Phoenix was one of dozens of schools whose practices were deemed harmful enough to merit loan cancellation.

Despite this troubling history, the University of Phoenix continues to market itself as a solution to the very problems it helps perpetuate. The blog post in question focuses on how caregiving responsibilities are limiting women’s careers and how many moms are afraid to speak openly about their dual roles at work. These are serious and well-documented social issues. But the proposed solution—enrolling in a Phoenix program—too often leads to more financial pressure rather than less.

The Higher Education Inquirer has filed multiple FOIA requests related to the University of Phoenix and its pending acquisition by the University of Idaho through Apollo Global Management and the Vistria Group. These include documents related to the total student debt associated with the university, the volume and status of fraud claims, and protective provisions tied to federal liabilities. Taxpayers in Idaho may soon be responsible for this debt legacy, should the controversial acquisition proceed.

None of this is disclosed in Phoenix’s marketing materials. There is no mention of the $191 million settlement with the Federal Trade Commission for deceptive advertising. There is no reference to the school's declining enrollment, cratering reputation, or the tens of thousands of students who left without a degree. Instead, sandwich generation moms are offered inspiration and vague promises of career advancement through convenient online programs.

But convenience is no substitute for credibility. What mothers need are real systemic supports: paid family leave, affordable childcare and eldercare, union protections, and public investment in affordable education. They don’t need another layer of student loan debt imposed by a university with a well-documented record of exploiting their aspirations.

Phoenix’s message may resonate emotionally, but it is ultimately a predatory sales pitch disguised as empowerment. Until for-profit schools like Phoenix are held fully accountable—and until working families have access to genuine public alternatives—we must remain critical of marketing campaigns that prey on the vulnerable.

Sources
Higher Education Inquirer. “New Data Show Nearly a Million University of Phoenix Debtors Owe $21.6 Billion.” July 2024. https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2024/07/new-data-show-nearly-million-university.html
Higher Education Inquirer. “Pending FOIAs Regarding the University of Phoenix.” December 2024. https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2024/12/pending-foias-regarding-university-of.html
Federal Trade Commission. “University of Phoenix and Parent Company to Pay $191 Million to Settle FTC Charges.” December 2019. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/12/university-phoenix-parent-company-pay-191-million-settle-ftc-charges-they-deceived-prospective-students
U.S. Department of Education. College Scorecard. https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/

What do the University of Phoenix and Risepoint have in common? The answer is a compelling story of greed and politics.

In the increasingly commodified world of higher education, the University of Phoenix and Risepoint (formerly Academic Partnerships) represent parallel tales of how private equity, political influence, and deceptive practices have shaped the online college landscape. While their paths have diverged in branding and institutional affiliation, the underlying motives and outcomes share disturbing similarities.

---

The University of Phoenix: A Legacy of Legal and Ethical Trouble

The University of Phoenix (UOP) has been a central player in the for-profit college boom, particularly during and after the 2000s. Under the ownership of Apollo Education Group, and later the Vistria Group, UOP has faced a relentless stream of lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny, and public outrage.

In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reached a $191 million settlement with UOP over allegations of deceptive advertising. UOP falsely claimed partnerships with major corporations like Microsoft, AT&T, and Twitter to entice students. The result was $50 million in restitution and $141 million in student debt relief.

But the legal troubles didn’t stop there. In 2022 and 2023, the U.S. Department of Education included UOP in a broader class action that granted $37 million in borrower defense discharges. These claims stemmed from deceptive marketing and predatory recruitment practices.

Meanwhile, in 2024, the California Attorney General settled with UOP for $4.5 million over allegations of illegally targeting military service members between 2012 and 2015. The university’s controversial relationship with the military community also led to a temporary VA suspension of GI Bill enrollments in 2020.

The legal history includes False Claims Act suits brought by whistleblowers, including former employees alleging falsified records, incentive-based recruiter pay, and exaggerated graduation and job placement statistics. In 2019, Apollo Education settled a securities fraud lawsuit for $7.4 million.

More recently, UOP has been embroiled in political controversy in Idaho. In 2023 and 2024, the Idaho Attorney General challenged the state's attempt to acquire UOP, citing Open Meetings Act violations and lack of transparency. Though a federal judge initially dismissed the suit, Idaho’s Supreme Court allowed an appeal to proceed.

Through all of this, Vistria Group—UOP’s private equity owner since 2017—has reaped massive profits. Vistria was co-founded by Marty Nesbitt, a close confidant of Barack Obama, underscoring the bipartisan political protection that shields for-profit education from lasting accountability.

---

Risepoint and the Online Program Management Model

Risepoint, formerly Academic Partnerships (AP), tells a similarly troubling story, albeit from the Online Program Manager (OPM) side of the education-industrial complex. Founded in 2007 by Randy Best, a well-connected Republican donor with ties to Jeb Bush, AP helped universities build online degree programs in exchange for a significant cut of tuition—sometimes up to 50%.

This tuition-share model, though legal, has raised ethical red flags. Critics argue it diverts millions in public education dollars into private hands, inflates student debt, and incentivizes aggressive, misleading recruitment. The most infamous case was the University of Texas-Arlington, which paid AP more than $178 million over five years. President Vistasp Karbhari resigned in 2020 after it was revealed he had taken international trips funded by AP.

Risepoint was acquired by Vistria Group in 2019, placing it in the same portfolio as the University of Phoenix and other education businesses. The firm’s growing influence in higher education—fueled by Democratic-aligned private equity—reflects a deeper entanglement of politics, policy, and profiteering.

In 2024, Minnesota became the first state to ban new tuition-share agreements with OPMs like Risepoint. This legislative action followed backlash from a controversial deal between Risepoint and St. Cloud State University, where critics accused the firm of extracting excessive revenue while offering questionable value.

Further pressure came from the federal level. In 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, and Tina Smith issued letters to major OPMs demanding transparency about recruitment tactics and tuition-share models. The Department of Education followed in January 2025 with new guidance restricting misleading marketing by OPMs, including impersonation of university staff.

Despite this, Risepoint continued expanding. In late 2023, the company purchased Wiley’s online program business for $150 million, signaling consolidation in a turbulent industry. Yet a 2024 report showed 147 OPM-university contracts had been terminated in 2023, and new contracts fell by over 50%.

---

What Ties Them Together: Vistria Group

Vistria Group sits at the center of both sagas. The Chicago-based private equity firm has made education—especially online and for-profit education—a core pillar of its investment strategy. With connections to both Democratic and Republican power brokers, Vistria has deftly navigated the regulatory landscape while profiting from public education dollars.

Its ownership of the University of Phoenix and Risepoint demonstrates a clear strategy: acquire distressed or controversial education companies, clean up their public image, and extract revenue while avoiding deep reforms. Through Vistria, private equity gains access to billions in federal student aid with minimal oversight and a bipartisan shield.

The result is a higher education ecosystem where political influence, corporate profit, and public exploitation collide. And whether through online degrees from the University of Phoenix or public-private partnerships with Risepoint, students are often the ones left bearing the cost.

---

As scrutiny intensifies and state and federal lawmakers demand reform, the futures of Risepoint and the University of Phoenix remain uncertain. But one thing is clear: their shared story reveals how higher education has become a battleground of greed, power, and politics.

Higher Education Inquirer continues to follow IPO/sale of University of Phoenix

On March 6, 2025, Apollo and Vistria publicly announced a possible IPO or sale of the University of Phoenix.  These companies have been trying to sell the University of Phoenix since 2021, but there have been no takers. The owners claim the school is worth $1.5B to $1.7B, but we (and experts we know) are skeptical, given the financials we have seen so far. The University of Phoenix was previously on sale for about $500M-$700M but the University of Arkansas System, the State of Idaho, and apparently other colleges declined the offers. 

The University of Phoenix offers subprime education to folks, historically targeting servicemembers, veterans, and people of color. While some students may profit from these robocollege credentials, one wonders what these workers actually learn. The current student-teacher ratio at the University of Phoenix, according to the US Department of Education, is 132 to 1.   

The University of Phoenix has faced a number of scandals, sometimes getting away with no penalty, and other times paying large fines.  

In 2023 we made a Freedom of Action (FOIA) request to the US Department of Education (ED) to get Phoenix's most recent audited financials. In March 2025, more than 20 months later, we were provided with a 35-page report, audited by Deloitte, with numbers from 2021 and 2022. 

HEI has filed a number of FOIAs with ED and discovered that almost 1 million former University of Phoenix students owe approximately $21.6 Billion in student loan debt. In addition, about 19,000 borrowers have had their student loans forgiven as a result of the Sweet v Cardona Borrower Defense to Repayment case.  According to ED FOIA 23-02373-F, more than 73,000 have filed fraud claims against the school. 

This month the Higher Education Inquirer followed up with a Freedom of Information request with the ED to obtain more up-to-date financial numbers for the University of Phoenix. We hope they will be responsive and timely enough to get the word out to the public.   

Risepoint: The Rise and Fall of Another OPM?

In recent years, the online education sector has seen dramatic growth, largely fueled by partnerships between universities and Online Program Managers (OPMs) like Risepoint (formerly known as Academic Partnerships). These companies promised to help institutions expand their online offerings, providing technical support, marketing services, and student recruitment in exchange for a significant share of tuition revenue. However, as OPMs grew in power, their business models came under intense scrutiny for potentially exploitative and predatory practices.

The Rise of Risepoint

Risepoint, initially founded as Academic Partnerships (AP) in 2007 by Randy Best, became a leading player in the OPM space, helping universities launch and manage online degree programs. In return, Risepoint took a significant cut of the tuition fees, sometimes as much as 50%. The company’s model relied heavily on tuition-share agreements, which have long been controversial due to the significant financial burden they place on both institutions and students.

These arrangements became more contentious as the cost of higher education continued to rise, particularly in the case of online degrees. Critics argue that the large sums taken by OPMs like Risepoint divert essential funds from universities, leading to higher tuition fees and contributing to the growing student debt crisis. This concern has been amplified by the rise in aggressive recruitment tactics employed by OPMs, which often target low-income students with promises of easy access to higher education without fully disclosing the financial implications.

Randy Best's Ties to Republicans: A Controversial Network

Randy Best, the founder of Academic Partnerships, had close connections to prominent Republicans, including Jeb Bush, the former governor of Florida. Best has been a well-known advocate for education reform and has built a network of relationships within both political parties. His close ties to Bush, a key figure in education policy, have been part of a broader pattern of OPM companies gaining influence across the political spectrum.

This bipartisan network of political connections allowed Best and Academic Partnerships to navigate the political landscape and expand their reach in the higher education sector. However, critics argue that such ties may have contributed to a lack of accountability for OPM companies like AP/Risepoint, who have operated with little oversight while profiting off of public institutions.

Risepoint's Ownership: The Vistria Group and Its Ties to the Obama Administration

A key piece of Risepoint’s corporate structure lies in its ownership by Vistria Group, a Chicago-based venture capital firm with close ties to political and corporate elites, including former President Barack Obama. In 2019, Vistria Group acquired Academic Partnerships for its Vistria II fund, adding the company to a broader portfolio that includes a number of for-profit education assets such as Edmentum, Vanta Education, FullBloom Education, MSI Information Services, Apollo Education Group, and Unitek Learning.

Vistria’s co-founder, Marty Nesbitt, is a close friend of Barack Obama, and the firm has been associated with several high-profile political figures. Nesbitt himself is known to have worked closely with Obama on various initiatives, and his connections have helped Vistria expand its reach in the education sector. The firm’s investment in Risepoint underscores a broader trend of venture capital firms seeking profit from higher education, leading to concerns about the growing corporate influence on public institutions and their students.

The Controversy at the University of Texas-Arlington

The close connections between OPMs and university leaders have not been without scandal. In 2020, Vistasp Karbhari, the president of the University of Texas-Arlington, resigned following a controversy involving his relationship with Academic Partnerships. Karbhari had accepted two international trips paid for by the company, sparking an investigation into potential conflicts of interest. The university had paid Academic Partnerships more than $178 million over a five-year period for managing its online degree programs.

This situation drew public attention to the potential for improper financial relationships between university administrators and private OPM companies. The high cost of these partnerships, particularly the large amounts paid to OPMs like Academic Partnerships, raised questions about whether universities were prioritizing student outcomes or simply enriching private firms at the expense of public funds.

Minnesota Leads the Way: A State Takes Action

The controversy surrounding tuition-share deals reached a boiling point in 2024 when Minnesota became the first state to pass legislation restricting these agreements. St. Cloud State University in Minnesota had signed a tuition-share deal with Risepoint that resulted in the company receiving a substantial percentage of tuition revenue. Critics of the arrangement argued that the deal drained valuable resources from public universities, while enriching private companies at the expense of students.

In response to mounting pressure, Minnesota lawmakers passed a bill banning new tuition-share agreements with OPMs, signaling a shift toward greater oversight of these partnerships. The move was hailed by critics as a much-needed reform to protect public institutions and students from exploitative business models.

Senate Concerns and Growing Backlash

In addition to state-level efforts, U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, and Tina Smith raised concerns over OPM practices in a 2024 letter to eight major OPM companies, including Risepoint. The senators questioned whether the recruitment tactics and revenue-sharing models contributed to rising student debt and whether these companies were sufficiently transparent about how tuition funds were being used.

“We continue to have concerns about the impact of OPM partnerships on rising student debt loads,” the senators wrote. They specifically targeted the high percentage of tuition revenue taken by OPMs, arguing that this model created financial disincentives for universities to lower costs or improve educational outcomes for students.

In response, Risepoint and other OPM companies indicated a willingness to engage with policymakers, but the growing scrutiny of their business practices indicates that their influence in the higher education space may be waning.

Academic Partnerships Acquires Wiley’s Online Business

In an interesting turn of events, AP/Risepoint expanded its reach in November 2023 by acquiring Wiley’s online business for $150 million. This acquisition is part of a broader trend of consolidation in the OPM sector, as companies seek to maintain their competitive edge in an increasingly saturated market.

The deal underscores Risepoint’s ambition to broaden its portfolio of online education services, even as its business practices face growing criticism. While Risepoint sees this acquisition as a growth opportunity, others view it as a sign of the consolidation of power within the OPM sector—a market that has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of transparency and for its role in inflating costs for both universities and students.

New Department of Education Guidelines

As the federal government joined the conversation, the U.S. Department of Education took steps to regulate the OPM industry more closely. In January 2025, the department issued new guidance that could lead to penalties for colleges that allow their OPM partners to mislead students. The guidance prohibits OPM employees from using college email addresses or signatures that imply they are employed by the institution, as well as from misrepresenting the quality of online programs.

The Department of Education’s actions came in response to long-standing concerns about misleading marketing practices. Student advocacy groups have called for stronger oversight of OPMs, which often promise students high-quality education without fully disclosing the financial ramifications. “OPMs commonly mislead students about the quality of their online programs, and that is illegal,” said Carolyn Fast, director of higher education policy at The Century Foundation.

The Decline of OPM Growth

However, the OPM industry is showing signs of slowing down. A report by Validated Insights in October 2024 revealed that OPM growth has dramatically slowed, with 147 partnerships ending in 2023—the highest number of contract terminations since 2020. Additionally, new contracts for 2024 have dropped by more than 50%. This slowdown signals that many universities are reevaluating their reliance on OPMs like Risepoint, opting instead to bring online programs in-house or partner with alternative providers.

The reduction in OPM partnerships reflects broader trends in higher education, where increasing scrutiny over business models, rising student debt, and calls for greater accountability are reshaping the landscape. Universities are under increasing pressure to justify the cost and efficacy of online degree programs, and many are finding that the financial burden of partnering with OPMs may no longer be sustainable.

The Future of Risepoint and the OPM Industry

The scrutiny surrounding Risepoint and other OPMs is part of a larger conversation about the future of online education and the need for greater transparency in how these programs are marketed and funded. As states like Minnesota lead the charge to limit tuition-share agreements, and as federal agencies take a more active role in regulating the industry, the days of unchecked growth for OPMs may be numbered.

Risepoint, once a leader in the OPM space, now faces a rapidly changing regulatory environment that threatens its business model. While the company continues to acquire new assets like Wiley’s online business, the industry as a whole may be entering a period of retrenchment, with universities becoming more cautious about entering into partnerships with companies that take a large cut of tuition revenue.

As the OPM industry faces increasing scrutiny and regulatory challenges, the future of companies like Risepoint remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the once-booming market for online program management is shifting, and the predatory practices that have long been associated with OPMs are being closely examined. Whether Risepoint can adapt to these changes or whether the OPM model as a whole will undergo significant reform remains to be seen.

University of Phoenix Reportedly Considering Public Offering or New Buyer (David Halperin)

Bloomberg reports that the private equity firms Apollo Global Management and Vistria Group are considering a sale or an initial public offering for the for-profit school they jointly own, the University of Phoenix. Unnamed sources told Bloomberg an IPO could occur as soon as the third quarter of 2025.

For the past two years, Phoenix’s owners have been in talks with the University of Idaho about the state university acquiring the for-profit school. While U of Idaho President C. Scott Green has touted the deal as a revenue raiser and step into the future, the sale has bogged down amid concerns by legislators and others in the state. Last June, the two sides agreed to continue negotiations but that Phoenix’s owners could talk with other potential suitors.

The leak to Bloomberg may be a sign that Phoenix’s owners are ready to move on. But it could instead be a bluff aimed at fooling Green, a self-styled dealmaker, into revitalizing efforts to buy the school.

Green’s plan has been thwarted again and again, with negative votes in the Idaho legislature, a successful court challenge by the state’s attorney general, criticism from the state treasurer, and sharp scrutiny from news outlets in the state.

The Green school deal has assumed that operation of Phoenix would bring millions in new revenue to fund his university. But it ignores that running a for-profit college, one that has repeatedly gotten in trouble with law enforcement for deceiving students, would be a tremendous challenge: If Green pushed to end Phoenix’s predatory practices and improve student outcomes, it probably would start losing money, because predatory practices, coupled with high prices and low spending on education, have made up the school’s secret sauce. But if Green allowed the deceptive conduct to persist, the school could face more legal peril. And, whatever route he took, Green’s school might end up assuming massive liability for student loan debt the government has cancelled based on past abuses at Phoenix.

At its peak, Phoenix was the largest for-profit college in the country and got upwards of $2 billion a year in federal student aid, while reporting dismal graduation rates and high levels of loan defaults.

Phoenix’s owners pursued a deal with Idaho only after the trustees of the University of Arkansas rejected a similar purchase negotiated by that school’s president.

Phoenix’s parent company, Apollo Education Group, had been publicly traded until Apollo and Vistria took the company private in 2017.

There have been previous marriages between big state universities and large predatory for-profit colleges that were seeking to evade the stigma and regulations that the industry’s bad behavior has provoked. The University of Arizona’s purchase of Ashford University has turned into a fiasco both for Arizona, which rebranded the school University of Ariziona Global Campus (UAGC), and for Ashford’s previous owner, now-shuttered Zovio. Meanwhile, Graham Holdings sold predatory Kaplan University to Purdue, while locking that Indiana state school into a 30-year service contract that allows Graham to keep making big money. The arrangement harms Purdue’s reputation, and Purdue Global has struggled financially. Both Purdue Global and UAGC continue to enroll students in their sub-par, overpriced programs.

[Editor's note: This article originally appeared on Republic Report.]  

Pending FOIAs Regarding the University of Phoenix

The Higher Education Inquirer is awaiting five Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) responses from the US Department of Education (ED) regarding the University of Phoenix. All of these pending requests were made in 2023. 

ED has already provided important and substantial information, including an estimate of $21.6B in student loan debt by more than 900,000 University of Phoenix debtors and tens of thousands of Borrower Defense fraud claims, many that have already been settled in favor of the student debtors in Sweet et al. v Cardona. 

To any organization considering an acquisition of the school, we suggest that they read this information as part of their due diligence. 

Copies of this article have been sent to University of Idaho President C. Scott Green and Idaho Governor Brad Little. 

23-02053F

R

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting a digital copy of the most recent Program Participation Agreement between the University of Phoenix and the US Department of Education.  This request is being made for transparency and accountability related to a proposed sale of the University of Phoenix by Apollo Global Management and Vistria Partners.  The most current potential buyer is the University of Idaho, which will create a new organization that will issue bonds.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 06/22/2016 To 06/22/2023)

23-02283-F

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting the Fiscal Year 2022 equity value of the University of Phoenix.  The number may be rounded to the nearest ten million dollars. We would also like restricted and unrestricted cash numbers for the school if they are available.  IPEDS has the equity value numbers up to FY 2021.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 06/01/2022 To 07/16/2023)

23-02345-F

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting a copy of the completed Pre-Acquisition Review application the University of Idaho has submitted for the acquisition of University of Phoenix.  The review was mentioned in the Idaho Statesman, by Jodi Walker, a University of Idaho spokesperson.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 05/01/2023 To 07/23/2023)

23-02537-F

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting any and all correspondence between the US Department of Education and the University of Idaho, 43 Education, or NewU regarding a proposed purchase of the University of Phoenix. This includes any and all information about a Pre-Acquisition Review. The University of Idaho created NewU and 43 Education as an intermediary organization to shield itself from liability.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 05/11/2023 To 08/11/2023)

23-02548-F

The Higher Education Inquirer is requesting an estimate of the total number of cases and the total dollar amount of Borrower Defense to Repayment claims against the University of Phoenix that were approved in the Sweet v Cardona settlement.   (Date Range for Record Search: From 01/01/2023 To 08/14/2023)

New Data Show Nearly a Million University of Phoenix Debtors Owe $21.6 Billion Dollars

The Higher Education Inquirer has just received a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) response from the US Department of Education, stating that about 971,000 current student loan debtors who have attended the University of Phoenix have accumulated an estimated $21.6B in debt. The FOIA is Department of Education FOIA 23-02912-F. These debt numbers are consistent with a previous HEI analysis. 

We have been unable to learn whether this accumulated debt includes the hundreds of millions in debt that has already been forgiven--and that its present and future owners may be liable for. In 2023, we reported that approximately 73,000 debtors from the University of Phoenix had filed borrower defense fraud claims, and that more than 19,000 cases were granted immediate relief in the Sweet v Cardona settlement.

Through another FOIA request, we also discovered 6,265 consumer complaints in the Federal Trade Commission database made after its current owners took over. In 2019, the FTC and the University of Phoenix settled a claim for $191M for deceptive employment claims. It would appear that Phoenix has not done enough to clean up its act.  

The Higher Education Inquirer has been working for more than six years to get data about the school's noncompliance with the Department of Defense Tuition Assistance (TA) program, where servicemembers have been systematically preyed upon--and where Trump officials and their surrogates worked to cover up malfeasance by subprime schools--including the University of Phoenix. We hope to report on this topic later.  

The University of Phoenix is presently owned by Apollo Global Management and Vistria Group, who have been unsuccessfully trying to sell the school for at least three years. Previous potential suitors, held to secrecy, have included Tuskegee University, UMass Global, and the University of Arkansas System. 

Apollo Global Management is currently negotiating with the State of Idaho, which would incur $685M in debt to acquire the school. State officials are wary of the deal, and those with strong principles are unlikely to approve. But it's possible that other politicians may change their minds: if they or their families are properly compensated, directly or indirectly, for taking the risks to their reputations and careers. 

Related links:

ED Completes Pre-Acquisition Review for University of Phoenix Deal. University of Idaho Continues Hiding Details of Transaction Fees, 43 Education "High-Risk" Bonds.

How University of Phoenix Failed. It's a Long Story. But It's Important for the Future of Higher Education.

Fraud Claims Against University of Phoenix Continue to Mount

University of Phoenix articles 

Borrower Defense articles