The Expanding Crisis in U.S. Higher Education: OPMs, Student Loan Servicers, Deregulation, Robocolleges, AI, and the Collapse of Accountability

Across the United States, higher education is undergoing a dramatic and dangerous transformation. Corporate contractors, private equity firms, automated learning systems, and predatory loan servicers increasingly dictate how the system operates—while regulators remain absent and the media rarely reports the scale of the crisis. The result is a university system that serves investors and advertisers far more effectively than it serves students.

This evolution reflects a broader pattern documented by Harriet A. Washington, Alondra Nelson, Elisabeth Rosenthal, and Rebecca Skloot: institutions extracting value from vulnerable populations under the guise of public service. Today, many universities—especially those driven by online expansion—operate as financial instruments more than educational institutions.

The OPM Machine and Private Equity Consolidation

Online Program Managers (OPMs) remain central to this shift. Companies like 2U, Academic Partnerships—now Risepoint—and the restructured remnants of Wiley’s OPM division continue expanding into public universities hungry for tuition revenue. Revenue-sharing deals, often hidden from the public, let these companies keep up to 60% of tuition in exchange for aggressive online recruitment and mass-production of courses.

Much of this expansion is fueled by private equity, including Vistria Group, Apollo Global Management, and others that have poured billions into online contractors, publishing houses, test prep firms, and for-profit colleges. Their model prioritizes rapid enrollment growth, relentless marketing, and cost-cutting—regardless of educational quality.

Hyper-Deregulation and the Dismantling of ED

Under the Trump Administration, the federal government dismantled core student protections—Gainful Employment, Borrower Defense, incentive-compensation safeguards, and accreditation oversight. This “hyper-deregulation” created enormous loopholes that OPMs and for-profit companies exploited immediately.

Today, the Department of Education itself is being dismantled, leaving oversight fragmented, understaffed, and in some cases non-functional. With the cat away, the mice will play: predatory companies are accelerating recruitment and acquisition strategies faster than regulators can respond.

Servicers, Contractors, and Tech Platforms Feeding on Borrowers

A constellation of companies profit from the student loan system regardless of borrower outcomes:

• Maximus (AidVantage), which manages huge portfolios of federal student loans under opaque contracts.

• Navient, a longtime servicer repeatedly accused of steering borrowers into costly options.

• Sallie Mae, the original student loan giant, still profiting from private loans to risky borrowers.

• Chegg, which transitioned from textbook rental to an AI-driven homework-and-test assistance platform, driving new forms of academic dependency.

Each benefits from weak oversight and an increasingly automated, fragmented educational landscape.

Robocolleges, Robostudents, Roboworkers: The AI Cascade

Artificial Intelligence has magnified the crisis. Universities, under financial pressure, increasingly rely on automated instruction, chatbot advising, and algorithmic grading—what can be called robocolleges. Students, overwhelmed and unsupported, turn to AI tools for essays, homework, and exams—creating robostudents whose learning is outsourced to software rather than internalized.

Meanwhile, employers—especially those influenced by PE-backed workforce platforms—prioritize automation, making human workers interchangeable components in roboworker environments. This raises existential questions about whether higher education prepares people for stable futures or simply feeds them into unstable, algorithm-driven labor markets.

FAFSA Meltdowns, Fraud, and Academic Cheating

The collapse of the new FAFSA system, combined with widespread fraudulent applications, has destabilized enrollment nationwide. Colleges desperate for students have turned to risky recruitment pipelines that enable identity fraud, ghost students, and financial manipulation of aid systems.

Academic cheating, now industrialized through generative AI and contract-cheating platforms, further erodes the integrity of degrees while institutions look away to protect revenue.

Advertising and the Manufacture of “College Mania”

For decades, advertising has propped up the myth that a college degree—any degree, from any institution—guarantees social mobility. Universities, OPMs, lenders, test-prep companies, and ed-tech platforms spend billions on marketing annually. This relentless messaging drives families to take on debt and enroll in programs regardless of cost or quality.

College mania is not organic—it is manufactured. Advertising convinces the public to ignore warning signs that would be obvious in any other consumer market.

A Media Coverage Vacuum

Despite the scale of the crisis, mainstream media offers shockingly little coverage. Investigative journalism units have shrunk, education reporters are overstretched, and major outlets rely heavily on university advertising revenue. The result is a structural conflict of interest: the same companies responsible for predatory practices often fund the media organizations tasked with reporting on them.

When scandals surface—FAFSA failures, servicer misconduct, OPM exploitation—they often disappear within a day’s news cycle. The public remains unaware of how deeply corporate interests now shape higher education.

The Emerging Picture

The U.S. higher education system is no longer simply under strain—it is undergoing a corporate and technological takeover. Private equity owns the pipelines. OPMs run the online infrastructure. Tech companies moderate academic integrity. Servicers profit whether borrowers succeed or fail. Advertisers manufacture demand. Regulators are missing. The media is silent.

In contrast, many other countries maintain strong limits on privatization, enforce strict quality standards, and protect students as consumers. As Washington and Rosenthal argue, exploitation persists not because it is inevitable but because institutions allow—and profit from—it.

Unless the U.S. restores meaningful oversight, reins in private equity, ends predatory revenue-sharing models, rebuilds the Department of Education, and demands transparency across all contractors, the system will continue to deteriorate. And students, especially those already marginalized, will pay the price.

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Sources (Selection)

Harriet A. Washington – Medical Apartheid; Carte Blanche
Rebecca Skloot – The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks
Elisabeth Rosenthal – An American Sickness
Alondra Nelson – Body and Soul
Stephanie Hall & The Century Foundation – work on OPMs and revenue sharing
Robert Shireman – analyses of for-profit colleges and PE ownership
GAO (Government Accountability Office) reports on OPMs and student loan servicing
ED OIG and FTC public reports on oversight failures (various years)
National Student Legal Defense Network investigations
Federal Student Aid servicer audits and public documentation

Pyrrhic Defeat and the Student Loan Portfolio: How a Managed Meltdown Enables Unauthorized Asset Sales

In classical history, a Pyrrhic victory refers to a win so costly that it undermines the very cause it was meant to advance. Less discussed, but increasingly relevant to modern governance, is the inverse strategy: the Pyrrhic defeat. In this model, short-term failure is tolerated—or even cultivated—because it enables outcomes that would otherwise be politically, legally, or institutionally impossible. When applied to public finance, pyrrhic defeat theory helps explain how the apparent collapse of a system can be leveraged to justify radical restructuring, privatization, or liquidation of public assets.

Nowhere is this framework more relevant than in the management of the federal student loan portfolio.

The federal student loan portfolio, totaling roughly $1.6 to $1.7 trillion, is not merely an accounting entry. It is one of the largest consumer credit systems in the world and functions simultaneously as a public policy tool, a long-term revenue stream, a data infrastructure, and a political liability. It shapes who can access higher education, how risk is distributed across generations, and how the federal government exerts leverage over the postsecondary sector. Precisely because of its scale and visibility, the portfolio is uniquely vulnerable to narrative reframing.

That vulnerability was not accidental. It was constructed over decades through a series of policy decisions that stripped borrowers of normal consumer protections while preserving the financial attractiveness of student debt as an asset. Chief among these decisions was the gradual removal of bankruptcy protections for student loans. By rendering student debt effectively nondischargeable except under the narrow and punitive “undue hardship” standard, lawmakers transformed education loans into a uniquely durable financial instrument. Unlike mortgages, credit cards, or medical debt, student loans could follow borrowers for life, enforced through wage garnishment, tax refund seizure, and Social Security offsets.

This transformation made student loans exceptionally attractive for securitization. Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities, or SLABS, flourished precisely because the underlying loans were shielded from traditional credit risk. Investors could rely not on educational outcomes or borrower prosperity, but on the legal certainty that the debt would remain collectible. Even during economic downturns, SLABS were marketed as relatively stable instruments, insulated from the discharge risks that plagued other forms of consumer credit.

Private banks once dominated this market. Sallie Mae, originally a government-sponsored enterprise, became a central player in both originating and securitizing student loans, while Navient emerged as a major servicer and asset manager. Yet as Higher Education Inquirer documented in early 2025, banks ultimately lost control of student lending. Rising defaults, public outrage, state enforcement actions, and mounting evidence of predatory practices made the sector politically radioactive. The federal government stepped in not as a reformer, but as a backstop, absorbing the portfolio and stabilizing a system private finance could no longer manage without reputational and regulatory risk.

That history reveals a recurring pattern. When student lending fails in private hands, it becomes public. When the public system is allowed to fail, it becomes ripe for re-privatization.

A portfolio does not need to collapse to be declared unmanageable. It only needs to appear dysfunctional enough to justify extraordinary intervention.

The post-pandemic repayment restart, persistent servicing failures, legal challenges to income-driven repayment plans, and widespread borrower confusion have all contributed to a growing narrative of systemic breakdown. Servicers such as Maximus, operating under the Aidvantage brand, MOHELA, and others have struggled to process payments accurately, manage forgiveness programs, and provide reliable customer service. These failures are often framed as bureaucratic incompetence rather than as predictable consequences of outsourcing public functions to private contractors whose incentives are misaligned with borrower welfare.

Navient’s exit from federal servicing did not mark a retreat from the student loan ecosystem so much as a repositioning, as it continued to benefit from private loan portfolios and legacy SLABS exposure. Sallie Mae, rebranded and fully privatized, remains deeply embedded in the private student loan market, which continues to rely on the same nondischargeability framework that props up federal lending.

Crucially, these servicing failures cannot be separated from the earlier elimination of bankruptcy as a safety valve. In normal credit markets, distress is resolved through restructuring or discharge. In student lending, distress accumulates. Borrowers remain trapped, servicers remain paid, and policymakers are confronted with a swelling mass of unresolved debt that can be labeled a crisis at any politically convenient moment.

Under pyrrhic defeat theory, such a crisis is not merely tolerated. It is useful.

Once the federal portfolio is framed as broken beyond repair, the range of acceptable solutions expands. What would be politically impossible in a stable system becomes plausible in an emergency. Asset transfers, securitization of federal loans, expansion of SLABS-like instruments backed by government guarantees, or long-term conveyance of servicing and collection rights can be presented as pragmatic fixes rather than ideological choices.

A Trump administration would be particularly well positioned to exploit this dynamic. Skeptical of debt relief, hostile to administrative governance, and ideologically aligned with privatization, such an administration could recast the portfolio as a failed public experiment inherited from predecessors. In that framing, selling or offloading the portfolio is not an abdication of responsibility but an act of fiscal discipline.

Importantly, this need not take the form of an explicit, congressionally authorized sale. Risk can be shifted through securitization. Revenue streams can be monetized. Servicing authority can be extended indefinitely to private firms. Data control can migrate outside public oversight. Over time, these steps amount to de facto privatization, even if the loans remain nominally federal. The infrastructure, incentives, and profits move outward, while the political blame remains with the state.

This is where earlier McKinsey & Company studies reenter the conversation. Long before the current turmoil, McKinsey analyses identified high servicing costs, fragmented contractor oversight, weak borrower segmentation, and low political returns on administrative complexity. While framed as efficiency critiques, these studies implicitly favored market-oriented restructuring. In a crisis environment, such recommendations become blueprints for divestment.

The danger of a pyrrhic defeat strategy is that it delivers a short-term political win at the cost of long-term public capacity. Selling or functionally privatizing the student loan portfolio may improve fiscal optics, but it permanently weakens democratic control over higher education finance. Borrowers, already stripped of bankruptcy protections, lose what remains of public accountability. Policymakers lose leverage over tuition inflation and institutional behavior. The federal government relinquishes a powerful counter-cyclical tool. What remains is a debt regime optimized for extraction, enforced by servicers, securitized for investors, and detached from educational outcomes.

The defeat is real. It is borne by students, families, and future generations. The victory belongs to those who acquire distressed public assets and those who benefit ideologically from shrinking the public sphere.

Pyrrhic defeat theory reminds us that collapse is not always accidental. In the case of the federal student loan portfolio, what appears to be dysfunction or incompetence may instead be strategic surrender: a willingness to let a public system deteriorate so that it can be sold off, securitized, or outsourced under the banner of necessity. If that happens, it will not be remembered as a policy error, but as a deliberate transfer of public wealth and power—made possible by decades of legal engineering that began when bankruptcy protection was taken away and ended with student debt transformed into a permanent financial asset.

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Sources

Higher Education Inquirer. “When Banks Lost Control of Student Loan Lending.” January 2025.
https://www.highereducationinquirer.org/2025/01/when-banks-lost-control-of-student-loan.html

U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid. FY 2024 Annual Agency Performance Report. January 13, 2025.

U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid. Federal Student Loan Portfolio Data and Statistics, various years.

Government Accountability Office. Student Loans: Key Weaknesses in Servicing and Oversight, multiple reports.

Congressional Budget Office. The Federal Student Loan Portfolio: Budgetary Costs and Policy Options.

U.S. Congress. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 and prior amendments affecting student loan dischargeability.

Pardo, Rafael I., and Michelle R. Lacey. “The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation.” American Bankruptcy Law Journal.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission materials on asset-backed securities and consumer credit markets.

McKinsey & Company. Student Loan Servicing, Portfolio Optimization, and Risk Management Analyses, prepared for federal agencies and financial institutions, 2010s–early 2020s.

Higher Education Inquirer archives on SLABS, servicers, privatization, deregulation, and student loan policy.

Hyper-Deregulation and the College Meltdown

In March 2025, Studio Enterprise—the online program manager behind South University—published an article titled “A New Era for Higher Education: Embracing Deregulation Amid the DOE’s Transformation.” Written in anticipation of a shifting political landscape, the article framed coming deregulation as an “opportunity” for flexibility and innovation. Studio Enterprise CEO Bryan Newman presented the moment as a chance for institutions and their contractors to do more with fewer federal constraints, implying that regulatory retreat would improve student choice and institutional agility.

What was framed as a strategic easing of oversight has instead arrived as a form of collapse. By late 2025, the U.S. Department of Education has become, in functional terms, a zombie agency—still existing on paper, but stripped of its capacity to regulate, enforce, or even communicate. Consumer protection, accreditation monitoring, program review, financial oversight, and FOIA responses have slowed or stopped entirely. The agency is walking, but no longer awake.

This vacuum has emboldened not only online program managers like Studio Enterprise and giants like 2U, but also a wide array of entities that rely on federal inaction to profit from students. The University of Phoenix—long emblematic of regulatory cat-and-mouse games in the for-profit sector—now faces minimal scrutiny, continuing to recruit aggressively while the federal watchdog sleeps. Elite universities contracting with 2U continue to launch expensive online degrees and certificates whose marketing and outcomes would once have been examined more closely.

Student loan servicers and private lenders have also moved quickly to capitalize on the chaos. Companies like Aidvantage (Maximus), Nelnet, and MOHELA now operate in an environment where enforcement actions, compliance reviews, and borrower complaint investigations have slowed to a near standstill. Servicers once accused of steering borrowers into costly forbearances or mishandling IDR accounts now face fewer barriers and far less public oversight. The dismantling of the Department has also disrupted the small channels borrowers once had for correcting servicing errors or disputing inaccurate records.

Private lenders—including Sallie Mae, Navient, and a growing constellation of fintech-style student loan companies—have seized the opportunity to expand high-interest refinance and private loan products. Without active federal oversight, marketing claims, credit evaluation practices, and default-related consequences have become increasingly opaque. Borrowers with limited financial literacy or unstable incomes are again being targeted with products that resemble the subprime boom of the early 2010s, but with even fewer regulatory guardrails.

Hyper-deregulation has also destabilized the federal loan system itself. Processing backlogs have grown. Borrower defense and closed-school discharge petitions sit in limbo. Decisions are delayed, reversed, or ignored. Automated notices go out while human review has hollowed out entirely. Students struggling with servicer errors find there is no functioning authority to appeal to—not even the already stretched ombudsman’s office, which is now overwhelmed and under-directed.

Across the sector, the same pattern is visible: institutions and corporations functioning without meaningful oversight. OPMs determine academic structures that universities should control. Lead generators push deceptive marketing campaigns with impunity. Universities desperate for enrollment sign long-term revenue-sharing deals without public transparency. Servicers mismanage accounts and communications while borrowers bear the consequences. Private lenders accelerate their expansion into communities least able to withstand financial harm.

Students feel the effect first and most painfully. They face rising costs, misleading claims, aggressive recruitment, and a federal loan system that can no longer assure accuracy or fairness. The collapse of oversight is not theoretical. It manifests in missed payments, lost paperwork, incorrect balances, unresolved appeals, and ballooning debt. For many, there is now no reliable path to recourse.

Studio Enterprise saw deregulation coming. What it left unsaid is that removing federal guardrails does not produce innovation. It produces confusion, predation, and unequal power. Hyper-deregulation rewards those who operate in the shadows—OPMs, for-profit chains, high-fee servicers, and private lenders—while those seeking education and mobility carry the burden.

This moment is not an evolution. It is an abandonment. Higher education is drifting into an environment where profit extraction flourishes while public protection evaporates. Unless new sources of oversight emerge—federal, state, journalistic, or civic—the most vulnerable students will continue to pay the highest price for the disappearance of the referee.

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Sources

Studio Enterprise, A New Era for Higher Education: Embracing Deregulation Amid the DOE’s Transformation (March 2025).
HEI archives on OPMs, for-profit colleges, and regulatory capture (2010–2025).
Public reporting and advocacy analyses on student loan servicers, including Navient, MOHELA, Nelnet, Aidvantage/Maximus, and Sallie Mae (2015–2025).
FOIA request logs, non-responses, and stalled borrower relief cases documented by HEI and partner organizations (2024–2025).
Federal higher education enforcement trends, 2023–2025.

Is the Federal Trade Commission FOIA program still in operation?

In light of recent developments at the Federal Trade Commission under the current administration — including staffing reductions and a temporary 2025 government shutdown — many observers and researchers are questioning whether the FTC’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) program is still functioning. The answer remains: yes — the FOIA program is still formally operational, but its capacity and responsiveness appear diminished under current conditions.

The FTC continues to administer FOIA through its Office of General Counsel (OGC), which processes all FOIA requests. As of the 2024 fiscal year, the FTC’s FOIA Unit comprised four attorneys, five government-information specialists, and one paralegal, with occasional support from contractors and other staff. In that year, the agency processed 1,919 requests (and 29 appeals), up from 1,812 in 2023. The agency’s publicly available “FOIA Handbook,” last updated in April 2025, continues to outline how requests should be submitted, what records are on the public record, and how exemptions are applied.

The FTC’s website still provides instructions for submitting a FOIA request via its online portal, email, fax, or mail. That means requests remain legally eligible — including those related to for-profit colleges, student loan servicers, institutional behavior, complaints, or decision-making memos.

However, HEI’s own experience in 2025 highlights some of the challenges with the FTC’s current FOIA responsiveness. In January 2025, we submitted a FOIA request asking for a record of complaints against the University of Phoenix, but have no record of a response. In August 2025 we did receive a substantive response related to complaints regarding a student loan company, but the number of complaints appeared lower than we expected. On November 30, 2025, we received an automated response to our FOIA request about AidVantage, a student loan servicer and subsidiary of Maximus. While we did receive a reply, it reflected a stale message stating they would respond after the government reopened — even though the government had reopened on November 13.

These examples illustrate that while FOIA is formally operational, actual responsiveness has deteriorated. For years, HEI had a good relationship with the FTC, obtaining critical information for a number of investigations in a timely manner. It remains to be seen whether that reliability can be restored.

Compounding the issue are broader staffing and operational changes at the FTC. In testimony before Congress in May 2025, FTC Chair Andrew N. Ferguson reported that the agency began FY 2025 with about 1,315 personnel but had reduced to 1,221 full-time staff, with plans to potentially reduce further to around 1,100 — the lowest level in a decade. These staffing reductions coincide with scaled-back discretionary activities, such as rulemaking, public guidance publishing, and outreach. During the October 2025 lapse in government funding, the FTC announced that FOIA requests could still be submitted but would not be processed until appropriations resumed.

For researchers, journalists, and advocates — including those pursuing records related to for-profit colleges, student loan servicers, regulatory decisions, or historical investigations — FOIA remains a legally viable tool. The path is open, though response times are slower, staff resources are constrained, and releases may be more limited, especially for sensitive or exempt material.

Sources

Congressional budget testimony on FTC staffing and budget: https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/118225/witnesses/HHRG-119-AP23-Wstate-FergusonA-20250515.pdf

FTC FOIA Handbook (April 2025): https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/FOIA-Handbook-April-2025.pdf

FTC 2024 Chief FOIA Officer Report (staffing, request volume): https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/chief-foia-officer-report-fy2024.pdf

FTC website instructions for submitting FOIA requests: https://www.ftc.gov/foia/make-foia-request

FTC 2025 shutdown plan showing FOIA processing paused during funding lapse: https://www.ftc.gov/ftc-is-closed

Reporting on FTC removal of business-guidance blogs in 2025: https://www.wired.com/story/federal-trade-commission-removed-blogs-critical-of-ai-amazon-microsoft/

"Crooks, Pigs, and Cockroaches": A Raw Exchange on the Resurgence of the For-Profit Grift

It started with a grim but familiar warning from a longtime borrower—someone who’s watched the student loan system implode in slow motion and seen the worst actors escape accountability:

“Well this isn't good.
New accrediting agency for colleges run and operated by for-profit college goons....
I’m sure we will see scammy colleges take off again!”

The warning was in response to recent developments in higher ed accreditation: the rise of a new accreditor with leadership tied to the same for-profit institutions that helped build a trillion-dollar debt crisis. The borrower’s tone was weary, but not surprised.

I responded, because this wasn’t news to me either:

“Thanks. That’s how neoliberalism works. It never ends. So we have to continue fighting until we can’t fight anymore.”

But I didn’t stop there. I wrote what I’ve long felt—what I’ve heard from whistleblowers, from insiders, and from people still bound by NDAs that keep the truth buried:

“Yes, crooks and pigs and cockroaches have been around forever, and they all smell money.
Even people who claim to be on our side are not really on our side. That’s why so little good happens.
I have an NDA so I can't tell you everything.

Like so many others who’ve tried to expose the rot, I’ve spoken with whistleblowers across multiple campuses. I’ve seen clear cases of fraud swept under the rug.

“Should have buried the University of Phoenix with this one,” I wrote, referencing an investigation into schools using fake enrollment paperwork to defraud taxpayers.
“And someone should have taken this story,” I added, pointing to our own work at The Higher Education Inquirer:
What the Pentagon Doesn’t Want You to See: For-Profit Colleges in the Military-Industrial-Education Complex.
“More than 30 years of grift and eight years of coverups.”

That article, like so many others exposing corruption in higher ed, was met mostly with silence. Whistleblowers risk everything, and still the stories too often disappear into the noise.

I used to have a trusted contact inside the U.S. Department of Education. But that channel dried up when the Trump administration came in and the revolving door between industry and government started spinning even faster.

So where does that leave us?

“What I’d like to see,” I wrote, “is for us to send a mole to work at AidVantage or one of the other student loan servicers.”

It’s not fantasy—it’s necessity. When the system protects grifters, when accreditors are captured, and when servicers lose records, miscalculate forgiveness, and dodge accountability, we need more than hope. We need infiltration. We need whistleblowers. We need truth.

The scam isn’t over. It’s reloading.

And we at The Higher Education Inquirer will keep exposing the crooks, pigs, and cockroaches—until we can’t fight anymore.

Sources:

• The Daily Caller: “Massive College Scams Taxpayers Out Of Student Loans With Fake Enrollment Paperwork, Whistleblowers Say”

• The Higher Education Inquirer: “What the Pentagon Doesn’t Want You to See: For-Profit Colleges in the Military-Industrial-Education Complex”

• Private correspondence with a longtime borrower, July 2025

Can Student Loan Debtors Work as Digital Nomads?

In recent years, the concept of working remotely while traveling—becoming a digital nomad—has become an aspirational lifestyle for many young professionals. The freedom to work from Bali, Buenos Aires, or Budapest with nothing more than a laptop and a Wi-Fi connection appeals to a generation burdened with economic precarity, stagnating wages, and dwindling faith in the American Dream.

But for over 40 million Americans burdened with student loan debt, the digital nomad lifestyle is not so simple. Can student loan debtors escape the geographic boundaries of the U.S. and work abroad without financial or legal risk? The answer depends on the type of loans, their repayment status, and how U.S. policy—particularly under presidential administrations—impacts enforcement and forgiveness.

The Debt No Passport Can Escape

Unlike credit card debt or even some tax liabilities, federal student loan debt follows Americans abroad. The U.S. Department of Education, through contracted servicers such as Aidvantage (a Maximus company), can still pursue debtors overseas. Wage garnishment, while difficult to enforce on foreign earnings, can be imposed if the debtor returns to the U.S. or has U.S.-based assets. More critically, failure to make payments can lead to loan acceleration, collection fees, and destruction of credit—regardless of one’s physical location.

Private student loans, meanwhile, can be even more punishing. While they don't have access to federal collection tools like tax refund garnishment, private lenders have fewer forgiveness options and are often aggressive in court.

Income-Driven Repayment and Remote Work

In theory, debtors enrolled in an income-driven repayment (IDR) plan could continue making small or even zero-dollar payments based on low or foreign-earned income. The Biden administration’s SAVE Plan is one such program, but its future is uncertain under political pressure and litigation.

However, reporting foreign income can be complex. Many digital nomads use foreign bank accounts, local clients, or under-the-table gigs, making it hard to verify income and remain compliant. The IRS, via the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), already monitors foreign financial activity of U.S. citizens. Student loan servicers may increasingly cross-reference this information under future administrations eager to enforce repayment—especially if a second Trump administration pursues cuts to loan forgiveness or implements harsh penalties.

The Visa Question

Living abroad full-time usually requires a visa that allows remote work—a gray area in many countries. Some nations, like Portugal, Estonia, and Costa Rica, offer special digital nomad visas. However, these often require proof of steady income. A heavily indebted American with little in the bank and fluctuating freelance income might not qualify. And overstaying a tourist visa while evading loan collectors could lead to a new form of 21st-century statelessness: not legally grounded in any system, and hunted by both creditors and immigration authorities.

Loopholes and Limitations

Some student loan debtors have used their overseas lifestyle to delay or dodge repayments, either by avoiding wage garnishment or reporting low-to-no income. But this is a short-term tactic that can have long-term consequences. Defaulting on federal loans leads to disqualification from forgiveness programs and adds ballooning interest and penalties.

On the other hand, those determined to pursue Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) or new cancellation pathways must remain in qualifying U.S.-based work. International remote work doesn’t count, even if the employer is American or the job is virtual.

The Future of Debtors Abroad

With growing disillusionment in the U.S. labor market, housing unaffordability, and distrust in higher education, the idea of “exiting the system” is gaining appeal. Online forums like Reddit’s r/studentloandebt and r/digitalnomad are filled with testimonies of people seeking a way out—physically and financially.

But the federal student loan system was never designed with mobility in mind. Instead, it anchors borrowers to domestic obligations. Until policymakers make meaningful reforms—through widespread cancellation, interest elimination, or true debt jubilee—student loan debt will continue to act as a modern tether. For many, even paradise has strings attached.

Final Thoughts

Digital nomadism may offer a temporary reprieve from America’s financial rat race, but it is not a cure for systemic debt. For the student loan debtor, a life abroad might feel freer—but the burden of higher education’s broken promise still weighs heavily, no matter the zip code or time zone.

As the Higher Education Inquirer continues to investigate the exploitative nature of the U.S. credential economy, we invite student loan borrowers abroad or aspiring nomads to share their stories. In this new phase of global capitalism, the educated underclass is learning to move—but cannot yet escape.

Will Maximus and Its Subsidiary AidVantage See Cuts?

Maximus Inc., the parent company of federal student loan servicer Aidvantage, is facing growing financial and existential threats as the Trump administration completes a radical budget proposal that would slash Medicaid by hundreds of billions of dollars and cut the U.S. Department of Education in half. These proposed changes could gut the very federal contracts that have fueled Maximus's revenue and investor confidence over the last two decades. Once seen as a steady player in the outsourcing of public services, Maximus now stands at the edge of a political and technological cliff.

The proposed Trump budget includes a plan to eliminate the Office of Federal Student Aid and transfer the $1.6 trillion federal student loan portfolio to the Small Business Administration. This proposed restructuring would remove Aidvantage and other servicers from their current roles, replacing them with yet-unnamed alternatives. While Maximus has profited enormously from servicing loans through Aidvantage—one of the major federal loan servicers—it is unclear whether the company has any role in this new Trump-led student loan regime. The SBA, which lacks experience managing consumer lending and repayment infrastructure, could subcontract to politically favored firms or simply allow artificial intelligence to replace human collectors altogether.

This possibility is not far-fetched. A 2023 study by Yale Insights explored how AI systems are already outperforming human debt collectors in efficiency, compliance, and scalability. The report examined the growing use of bots to handle borrower communication, account resolution, and payment tracking. These developments could render Maximus’s human-heavy servicing model obsolete. If the federal government shifts toward automated collection, it could bypass Maximus entirely, either through privatized tech-driven firms or through internal platforms that require fewer labor-intensive contracts.

On the health and human services side of the business, Maximus is also exposed. The company has long served as a contractor for Medicaid programs across several states, managing call centers and eligibility support. But with Medicaid facing potentially devastating cuts in the proposed Trump budget, Maximus’s largest and most stable contracts could disappear. The company’s TES-RCM division has already shown signs of unraveling, with anonymous reports suggesting a steep drop-off in clients and the departure of long-time employees. One insider claimed, “Customers are dropping like flies as are longtime employees. Not enough people to do the little work we have.”

Remote Maximus employees are also reporting layoffs and instability, particularly in Iowa, where 34 remote workers were terminated after two decades of contract work on state Medicaid programs. Anxiety is spreading across internal forums and layoff boards, as workers fear they may soon be out of a job in a shrinking and increasingly automated industry. Posts on TheLayoff.com and in investor forums indicate growing unease about the company’s long-term viability, particularly in light of the federal budget priorities now taking shape in Washington.

While Maximus stock (MMS) continues to trade with relative strength and still appears profitable on paper, it is increasingly reliant on government spending that may no longer exist under a Trump administration intent on dismantling large parts of the federal bureaucracy. If student loan servicing is eliminated, transferred, or automated, and Medicaid contracts dry up due to funding cuts, Maximus could lose two of its biggest revenue streams in a matter of months. The company’s contract with the Department of Education, once seen as a long-term asset, may become a political liability in a system being restructured to reward loyalty and reduce regulatory oversight.

The question now is not whether Maximus will be forced to downsize—it already is—but whether it will remain a relevant player in the new federal landscape at all. As artificial intelligence, austerity, and ideological realignment converge, Maximus may be remembered less for its dominance and more for how quickly it became unnecessary.

The Higher Education Inquirer will continue tracking developments affecting federal student loan servicers, government contractors, and the broader collapse of the administrative state.

Maximus AidVantage

[Image of AidVantage operations in Greenville, Texas. Note the barbed wire fence.]

The recent decision to have the Small Business Administration (SBA) take over the federal student loan portfolio has sent shockwaves through the world of education finance. As the SBA — an agency traditionally focused on supporting small businesses — begins to manage a multi-billion dollar portfolio of student loans, borrowers, consumer protection advocates, and financial experts alike are left to question what this transition means for the future of loan servicing, borrower protections, and higher education financing.

At the heart of this shift is the role of Maximus AidVantage, one of the major student loan servicers handling federal loans. Maximus has already come under scrutiny for its inefficiency, poor customer service, and mishandling of crucial borrower programs, such as Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) and Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans. The company’s track record has led to widespread frustration, with many borrowers reporting significant issues, including misinformation, lost paperwork, and mistakes that have placed them at risk of financial hardship.

Yet, despite these concerns, Maximus has maintained its position at the helm of federal student loan servicing. Its CEO, Bruce Caswell, has been compensated handsomely for overseeing the company’s role in this controversial space. According to recent financial reports, Caswell’s total compensation has included a base salary of over $1.3 million, with total compensation often exceeding $8 million when accounting for bonuses, stock options, and other forms of remuneration. This high pay, especially in light of the company’s poor performance in customer service and loan servicing, raises questions about the priorities of both the company and the federal government, which continues to entrust Maximus with managing the finances of millions of borrowers.

The Shift to the SBA: A Lack of Expertise

The most immediate concern surrounding the SBA’s takeover of student loan management is its lack of expertise in this field. The SBA’s core mission has been to assist small businesses, offering loan guarantees and financial support to promote economic growth. While it is well-equipped to manage business loans, the agency has no experience dealing with the unique and complex needs of student loan borrowers. Federal student loans involve intricate repayment plans, borrower protections, and specialized programs like PSLF, all of which require a deep understanding of the educational sector and the financial struggles of students and graduates.

Transferring such an important and complex responsibility to the SBA without a clear plan for adaptation could lead to mismanagement, inefficiencies, and disruptions for millions of borrowers. The SBA simply isn’t set up to handle issues like loan forgiveness, income-driven repayment plans, and the variety of special accommodations that are necessary for student borrowers. If the SBA isn’t adequately staffed or resourced to take on these new responsibilities, students could be left in the lurch, facing delays, confusion, and even errors in their loan servicing.

A Confusing Transition for Borrowers

For those already dealing with the intricacies of federal student loans, this transition to the SBA is likely to create a significant amount of confusion. Student loan borrowers rely on clear communication, accurate account management, and timely assistance when navigating repayment plans. The Department of Education has long been the agency responsible for ensuring that these programs are managed effectively, but with the SBA taking over, borrowers may face new systems, new contacts, and, potentially, a lack of clarity about their loan status.

One of the biggest risks in this transition is the potential disruption of critical loan repayment programs, such as PSLF, which allows public service workers to have their loans forgiven after ten years of payments. These programs require careful management to ensure that borrowers meet the necessary qualifications. The SBA is not accustomed to handling such programs and may struggle to maintain the same level of efficiency and accuracy, especially if the agency does not prioritize dedicated support for student loan borrowers.

Diminished Consumer Protections

Perhaps the most concerning outcome of the SBA taking over student loans is the potential erosion of consumer protections. The Department of Education has a specific mandate to protect borrowers, which includes holding loan servicers accountable for mishandling accounts and ensuring transparency in loan servicing practices. The SBA, however, has never been tasked with such consumer-focused regulations, and its shift to managing student loans raises concerns that borrower rights might not be adequately enforced.

For example, the SBA may not have the resources or inclination to monitor loan servicers like Maximus closely, allowing them to continue engaging in deceptive practices without fear of regulatory repercussions. The agency might also be less likely to step in when borrowers face issues such as misapplied payments, incorrect information about forgiveness programs, or poorly managed accounts. With the SBA’s focus on business rather than consumer welfare, student loan borrowers may find themselves facing more hurdles without the protections that the Department of Education once provided.

The Impact on Repayment and Forgiveness Programs

Another pressing issue is the potential disruption of repayment and forgiveness programs under SBA oversight. Programs like Income-Driven Repayment (IDR), designed to help borrowers pay off their loans based on their income, require careful management and regular updates. Similarly, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program is highly specific and requires rigorous tracking of borrowers’ payments and work history to ensure they qualify for forgiveness after ten years.

If the SBA is not adequately equipped to handle these specialized programs, borrowers might find themselves in a precarious position, especially if their loans are mismanaged or if they are denied forgiveness due to administrative errors. The confusion caused by the transition could delay or even derail borrowers’ efforts to achieve loan forgiveness, leaving them stuck with debt for longer than expected.

The Role of Maximus: Financial Incentives Amidst Failure

Amidst the uncertainty of this transition, Maximus continues to play a key role in servicing the federal student loan portfolio. Yet, despite its persistent failures in managing accounts and borrower relations, Maximus has remained highly profitable, with Bruce Caswell’s executive compensation reflecting this success in terms of revenue but not in terms of customer satisfaction.

Maximus’s reported $8 million in total compensation for Caswell, despite the company’s history of customer complaints, raises serious questions about priorities. While Maximus rakes in millions from servicing federal loans, borrowers are left to deal with the consequences of mistakes, misinformation, and poor service. In a system where the stakes are incredibly high for borrowers, this disparity between executive pay and customer service is concerning, especially in light of the SBA’s takeover, which promises more uncertainty.

Adding to the controversy, Maximus has also been involved in labor disputes with the Communications Workers of America (CWA), its workers' union. These disputes, which have centered on issues such as wages, benefits, and working conditions, further complicate the company’s already tarnished reputation. Workers have accused Maximus of engaging in unfair labor practices and failing to adequately support employees who are tasked with assisting borrowers. If these labor disputes continue to affect employee morale and productivity, it could lead to even worse service for borrowers who are already dealing with a complicated and frustrating loan servicing process. The combination of poor customer service, labor unrest, and executive compensation that seems out of sync with the company’s performance paints a troubling picture for the future of student loan management under Maximus.

The Threat of Reduced Loan Forgiveness and IDR Plans

Adding to the turmoil surrounding the future of student loans is the growing effort by the U.S. government to reduce or even eliminate key student loan forgiveness programs like Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) and Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans. These programs were designed to provide crucial relief for borrowers working in public service or those struggling with debt relative to their income. However, recent reports suggest that the government may look to reduce eligibility for these programs, impose stricter requirements, or completely eliminate them altogether as part of broader fiscal policy adjustments.

The removal of or reductions to these programs would leave borrowers with fewer avenues to manage their debt, potentially increasing default rates and extending the time it takes for borrowers to repay their loans. For individuals in public service jobs or those facing financial hardship, these changes would have a devastating impact on their ability to achieve financial stability and pay down their student loans. If the SBA, with its lack of focus on education finance, inherits this responsibility without reinforcing these programs, borrowers might find themselves in a far worse position than ever before.

Furthermore, this reduction in borrower protections and streamlining of repayment options may also be part of a broader strategy to push more borrowers into private loan options, which could further exacerbate financial hardship for those who are already struggling. With private loans often carrying higher interest rates, less favorable repayment terms, and fewer options for deferral or forgiveness, such a shift would mark a significant pivot towards privatization, benefiting financial institutions while leaving borrowers with even fewer protections and much higher costs.

A Plan to Push Consumers Toward Private Loans?

Many experts are beginning to question whether the government’s plans for overhauling student loan servicing are part of a larger agenda to move borrowers toward private loans. By reducing or eliminating federal loan protections, forgiveness programs, and income-driven repayment options, the government may be attempting to create a vacuum in which private lenders can step in and offer alternative (and likely more expensive) financing options.

This push toward privatization could significantly increase profits for private lenders while making it harder for borrowers to repay their loans. With private loans lacking many of the protections and flexible repayment options offered by federal loans, such a shift could result in higher default rates and greater financial instability for borrowers, particularly for those with already high debt levels.

Conclusion: A New Era of Uncertainty

The transition of student loan servicing to the Small Business Administration represents a significant shift in the federal student loan system, one that could lead to inefficiencies, confusion, and a reduction in protections for borrowers. With agencies like Maximus AidVantage continuing to profit from loan servicing despite failing borrowers, ongoing labor disputes, and a focus on executive compensation over customer service, and the SBA stepping into a complex arena with limited experience, the future of student loan servicing seems fraught with challenges.

The push to reduce or eliminate key student loan forgiveness programs like PSLF and IDR only adds to the uncertainty, leaving millions of borrowers facing a potentially more difficult future. Moreover, the possibility of moving consumers toward private loans with fewer protections and harsher terms would deepen the financial struggles of many borrowers. This move underscores the importance of effective oversight and the need for federal agencies to prioritize the well-being of borrowers over financial interests. The student loan system should be about more than just revenue generation — it should be about supporting borrowers and ensuring that they can achieve financial freedom, not be left trapped in a cycle of debt and frustration. Without proper management, this new era of student loan servicing risks deepening the crisis for millions of Americans who are already struggling to keep up with their education-related debts.

The Future of Federal Student Loans

The U.S. student loan system, now exceeding $1.7 trillion in debt and affecting over 40 million borrowers, is facing significant challenges. As political pressures rise, the management of student loans could be significantly altered. A combination of potential privatization, the elimination of the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and a new role for the Department of the Treasury raises critical questions about the future of the system.

U.S. Department of Education: Strained Resources and Outsourcing

The U.S. Department of Education (ED) is responsible for managing federal student loan servicing, loan forgiveness programs, and borrower defense to repayment (BDR) claims. However, ED has faced ongoing issues with understaffing and inefficiency, particularly as many functions have been outsourced to contractors. Companies like Maximus (including subsidiaries like AidVantage) manage much of the administrative burden for loan servicing. This has raised concerns about accountability and the impact on borrowers, especially those seeking loan relief.

In recent years, ED has also experienced staff reductions and funding cuts, making it difficult to process claims or maintain high-quality service. The potential for further cuts or even the elimination of the department could exacerbate these problems. If ED’s role is diminished, other entities, such as the Department of the Treasury, could assume responsibility for managing the student loan portfolio, though this would present its own set of challenges.

Potential for Privatization of the Student Loan Portfolio

One of the most discussed options for addressing the student loan crisis is the privatization of the federal student loan portfolio. Under previous administration discussions, including those during President Trump’s tenure, there were talks about selling off parts of the student loan portfolio to private companies. This would be done with the aim of reducing the federal deficit.

In 2019, McKinsey & Company was hired by the Trump administration to analyze the value of the student loan portfolio, considering factors such as default rates and economic conditions. While the report's findings were never made public, the idea of transferring the loans to private companies—such as banks or investment firms—remains a possibility.

The consequences of privatizing federal student loans could be significant. Private companies would likely focus on profitability, which could result in stricter repayment terms or less flexibility for borrowers seeking loan forgiveness or other relief options. This shift may reduce borrower protections, making it harder for students to challenge repayment terms or pursue loan discharges.

The Department of the Treasury and its Potential Role

If the U.S. Department of Education is restructured or eliminated, there is a possibility that the Department of the Treasury could step in to manage some aspects of the student loan portfolio. The Treasury is responsible for the country’s financial systems and debt management, so it could, in theory, handle the federal student loan portfolio from a financial oversight perspective.

However, while the Treasury has experience in financial management, it lacks the specialized knowledge of student loans and borrower protections that the Department of Education currently provides. For example, the Treasury would need to find ways to process complex Borrower Defense to Repayment claims, a responsibility ED currently manages. In 2023, over 750,000 Borrower Defense claims were pending, with thousands of claims related to predatory practices at for-profit colleges such as University of Phoenix, ITT Tech, and Kaplan University (now known as Purdue Global). Additionally, some of these for-profit schools were able to reorganize and continue operating under different names, further complicating the situation.

The Treasury could also contract out loan servicing, but this could increase reliance on profit-driven companies, possibly compromising the interests of borrowers in favor of financial performance.

Borrower Defense Claims and the Impact of For-Profit Schools

A large portion of the Borrower Defense to Repayment claims comes from students who attended for-profit colleges with a history of deceptive practices. These institutions, often referred to as subprime colleges, misled students about job prospects, program outcomes, and accreditation, leaving many with significant student debt but poor employment outcomes.

Data from 2023 revealed that over 750,000 Borrower Defense claims were filed with the Department of Education, many of them against for-profit institutions. The Sweet v. Cardona case showed that more than 200,000 borrowers were expected to receive debt relief after years of waiting. However, the process was slow, with an estimated 16,000 new claims being filed each month, and only 35 ED workers handling these claims. These delays, combined with the uncertainty around the future of ED, leave borrowers vulnerable to prolonged financial hardship. 

Lack of Transparency and Accountability in the System

While the U.S. Department of Education tracks Borrower Defense claims, it does not publish institutional-level data, making it difficult to identify which schools are responsible for the most fraudulent activity. 

In response to this, FOIA requests have been filed by organizations like the National Student Legal Defense Network and the Higher Education Inquirer to obtain detailed information about which institutions are disproportionately affecting borrowers. 

In one such request, the Higher Education Inquirer asked for information regarding claims filed against the University of Phoenix, a school with a significant number of Borrower Defense claims.

The lack of transparency in the system makes it harder for borrowers to make informed decisions about which institutions to attend and limits accountability for schools that have harmed students. If the Treasury or private companies take over management of the loan portfolio, these transparency issues could worsen, as private entities are less likely to prioritize public accountability.

Conclusion

The future of the U.S. student loan system is uncertain, particularly as the Department of Education faces the potential of funding cuts, staff reductions, or even complete dissolution. If ED’s role diminishes or disappears, the Department of the Treasury could take over some functions, but this would raise questions about the fairness and transparency of the system.

The possibility of privatizing the student loan portfolio also looms large, which could shift the focus away from borrower protections and toward financial gain for private companies. For-profit schools, many of which have a history of predatory practices, are responsible for a disproportionate number of Borrower Defense claims, and any move to privatize the loan portfolio could exacerbate the challenges faced by borrowers seeking relief from these institutions.

Ultimately, there is a need for greater transparency and accountability in how the student loan system operates. Whether managed by the Department of Education, the Treasury, or private companies, protecting borrowers and ensuring fairness should remain central to any future reforms. If these issues are not addressed, millions of borrowers will continue to face significant financial hardship.

Maximus AidVantage Contracts with the US Department of Education Publicly Available

The Higher Education Inquirer has received all the current contracts between the US Department of Education and Maximus/AidVantage through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Maximus serves millions of student loan debtors and has faced increased scrutiny (and loss of revenues) for not fulfilling their duties on time. 

The FOIA response (23-01436-F) consists of a zip file of 998 pages in 5 separate files. HEI is sharing this information with any news outlet or organization for free, however we would appreciate an acknowledgement of the source. 

We have already reached out to a number of organizations, including the Student Borrower Protection Center, the Debt Collective, the Project on Predatory Lending, the NY Times, ProPublica, and Democracy Now!  We have also posted this article at the r/BorrowerDefense subreddit.